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COBE ON-ORBIT ENGINEERING PERFORMANCE
GSFC, BUILDING 3 AUDITORIUM
MARCH 7 & 8, 1990
TOPIC PRESENTER
INTRODUCTION R. MATTSON
D. MCCARTHY
COBE OVERVIEW D. MCCARTHY
A. FRAGOMENI
QUALITY ASSURANCE A. HARPER
STRUCTURE
SYSTEM J. WOODS
ANALYSES O. SHEINMAN
DEPLOYABLES
SOLAR ARRAY S. NGO
TRF A. STEWART
M. PHAN
THERMAL R. CHALMERS
TF-I
POWER
SYSTEM AND SOLAR ARRAYS
PSE
BATTERIES
C&DH, TAPE RECORDERS, SCU, HARNESS
ATTITUDE CONTROL
SYSTEM
ACE
WHEELS, GYROS, MMA
EARTH SCANNERS, SUN SENSORS
ANALYSES
COMMUNICATIONS
SYSTEM
USO
TRANSPONDERS
ANTENNAE
DEWAR
CONTAMINATION
INSTRUMENTS OVERVIEW
INSTRUMENT MECHANISMS
J. JERMAKIAN
D. MANZER
S. TILLER
M. FLANEGAN
-T. TLATELY
W. SQUILLARI
M. FEMIANO
P. NEWMAN
S. PLACANICA
J. ROGERS
D. ZILLIG
G. KRONMILLER
B. JACKSON
S. VOLZ
R. BARNEY
E. YOUNG
M. RYSCHKEWITSCH
FIRAS M. ROBERTO
DIRBE L. LINSTROM
DMR R. MILLS
OPERATIONS AND GROUND SYSTEMS J. WOLFGANG
ORBIT AND ATTITUDE DETERMINATION R. DeFAZIO
COBE/DELTA CONFIGURATION
DEWAR
NEW DEPLOYABLE
RF/THERMAL SHIELD
NEW DEPLOYABLE SOLAR PANELS
(9 PANELS, DOUBLE SIDED)
DMR ANTENNAS
(REPACKAGED)
NEW TDRSS OMNI-ANTENNA
NEW STRUCTURE AND HARNESS
EARTH SENSORS
DEPLOYABLE MAST
WFF OMNt-ANTENNA
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
COBE WAS SUCCESSFULLY LAUNCHED ON NOVEMBER 18,1989 AT 0634 A.M. PST.
DELTA LAUNCH VEHICLE PERFORMED FLAWLESSLY:
- 900.5 KM X 899.3 KM
- 99.03 INCLINATION
OBSERVATORY DEPLOYMENTS OCCURRED AS PLANNED.
DEWAR COVER SUCCESSFULLY DEPLOYED ON DAY 4, AS PLANNED, AND CRYOGEN TEMPERATURE
CURRENTLY AT 1.41° K.
ALL THREE INSTRUMENTS OPERATING AND ACQUIRING SCIENCE DATA.
POCC/NETWORK SUPPORT HAS BEEN EXCELLENT.
11/30/89
FIRST TEN DAYS IN THE LIFE OF COBE
DAY
1 11/18/89
2 11/19/89
3 11/20/89
4 11/21/89
HIGHLIGHTS
o LAUNCH
o ALL MAJOR ASCENT, ACQUISITION, SEPARATION,
AND INITIALIZATION ACTIVITIES PERFORMED.
o ROLL TO 2 DEGREES PERFORMED TO ANALYZE HOT
COVER/COOL MAINSHELL CONDITION. RETURNED
TO 0 DEGREES TO MINIMIZE CLAMP BAND
COOLING.
o DMR FULL POWER UP AND SCIENCE DATA MODE
WITH FREQUENT CALIBRATIONS
o DEWAR INTERNAL COOLDOWN/PUMPDOWN BEGINS.
o FIRAS POWER UP AND CHECKOUT
o DIRBE CHECKOUT
o DEWAR COVER EJECTION
o FIRST SKY OBSERVATIONS BY DIRBE AND FIRAS
o ACS B GYRO FAILURE-B GYRO COMMANDED
OFF-CUT GYRO OUT OF LOOP
FIRST TEN DAYS IN THE LIFE OF COBE (CONTINUED)
DAY HIGHLIGHTS
11/22/89
11/23/89
11/24/89
o FIRAS MTM UNLATCHED AND SUCCESSFULLY
PLACED IN SCANNING MODE,
o FIRAS EXPERIENCES END OF TRAVEL HITS,
o INSTRUMENTS COLLECTING SCIENCE DATA.
o RECONFIGURED ACS TO A GYRO FAILURE
TOLERANT MODE,
o INSTRUMENTS COLLECTING SCIENCE DATA.
o FIRAS NULLING OF LOW FREQUENCY CHANNELS
USING ICAL.
o GYRO ANALYSIS SHOWS S/C SPIN-UP IS SAFE.
SPIN-UP SCHEDULED FOR DAYS 8, 9, AND 10.
o INSTRUMENTS COLLECTING SCIENCE DATA.
FIRST TEN DAYS IN THE LIFE OF COBE (CONTINUED)
DAY HIGHLIGHTS
8 11/25/89
10
11/26/89
11/27/89
o SIC SPIN-UP, TO 0.4 RPM SUCCESSFULLY
PERFORMED.
o DEWAR COOLS BELOW 1.6 K SPEC,
o INSTRUMENTS COLLECTING SCIENCE DATA.
o SIC SPIN-UP TO 0.6 RPM SUCCESSFULLY
PERFORMED,
o INSTRUMENTS COLLECTING SCIENCE DATA.
o SIC SPIN-UP TO 0.8 RPM (FINAL MISSION
RATE) SUCCESSFULLY PERFORMED,
o INSTRUMENTS COLLECTING SCIENCE DATA.
ON ORBIT ANOMALIE SUMMARY
PROBLEMS/ISSUES PROGRAMMATIC IMPACT ACTION
ESTABLISHED/
COMPLETED DATE
B GYRO FAILED TO OPERATE
ON DAY 4 OF THE MISSION.
RRAS MIRROR TRANSPORT
MECHANISM EXPERIENCING
"END OF TRAVEL HITS".
PRIMARILY IN RADIATION BELT
ENVIRONMENT (SAA AND VAB).
ADDITIONAL FAILURES OF THE
REMAINING GYROS (A & C)
COULD RESULT IN ATTITUDE
INSTABILITY AND DEWAR
POINTING INTO SUN.
-LONG TERM: THERMAL INPUTS
RESULT IN SOME LOSS OF
DEWAR LIFETIME.
-SHORT TERM: EXTENDS DIRBE
DETECTOR ANNEALING
SCHEDULE RESULTING IN SOME
LOSS OF DATA.
GRYG A&G CROSS-STRAPPING-
•REMOVE&PROVIBING-SAFE- -
OPERATIONSHOULB SECGNB -
ABOUT-X-AXI6; BUT-WITHIN -
SPEC.- - -
-CODE 71 2 IS ANALYZING
CURRENT CONFIGURATION.
INCLUDING POTENTIAL
FAILURES.
- GYRO COMMITTEE. CHAIRED
BY HENRY PRICE, REVIEWING
FAILURE TO REPORT BACK TO
PROJECT WITH FINDINGS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
COMMITTEE CHAIRED BY JOHN
PYLE (CODE 710) TASKED TO
REVIEW PROBLEM AND REPORT
BACK TO PROJECT WfTH
RECOMMENDATIONS.
COMPLETED
DECEMBER. 1989
DECEMBER, 1989
DECEMBER 8, 1989
TP-?
BACKGROUND AND SYSTEM OVERVIEW
TF-/0
BACKGROUND
MARCH 1976
JULY 1977
JULY 1982
COBE STUDY TEAM FORMED AT GODDARD
START OF DEFINITION PHASE
HEADQUARTERS APPROVAL FOR COBE DEVELOPMENT PHASE
(LAUNCH JANUARY 1989)
NOVEMBER 1982 COBE/STS SCHEDULE ACCELERATION-LAUNCH FALL 1988
NOVEMBER 1984
JANUARY 1986
COMPLETED CRITICAL DESIGN REVIEW OF OBSERVATORY
(SHUTTLE LAUNCH)
SHUTTLE 51L ACCIDENT
FEBRUARY 1986 INITIATED ALTERNATE LAUNCH MODE STUDY
NOVEMBER 1986
MAY 1987
NOVEMBER 1987
DECEMBER 1987
FEBRUARY 1988
HEADQUARTERS APPROVES LAUNCH OF COBE ON A DELTA
5920; LAUNCH SCHEDULED FOR FEBRUARY 1989.
COMPLETED CRITICAL DESIGN REVIEW OF OBSERVATORY
(DELTA LAUNCH)
INSTRUMENT TECHNICAL PROBLEMS (CHOPPER AND
MIRROR TRANSPORT MECHANISM) IMPACT INSTRUMENT
DELIVERY SCHEDULE AND LAUNCH DATE
COMPLETED INTEGRATION AND TESTING ON
COBE/SHUTTLE MOCK-UP.
DECISION TO DELETE FUTURE INSTRUMENT TESTING IN
TEST DEWAR AND PROCEED DIRECTLY TO FLIGHT DEWAR;
LAUNCH RESCHEDULED TO MAY 1989.
MARCH 1989 OBSERVATORY ACCEPTANCE TESTS STARTED. TP-tl
COBE MISSION
PERFORM A DEFINITIVE EXPLORATION OF THE DIFFUSE COSMIC
BACKGROUND RADIATION AND PROVIDE A FULL SKY MAP OF THE
BACKGROUND RADIATION
LAUNCH BY STS FROM VANDENBERG LAUNCH SITE. CALENDAR
YEAR 1989
ONE YEAR MISSION LIFE
EXECUTED IN-HOUSE AT THE GSFC WITH MAJOR SUBSYSTEM
PROCUREMENTS
INSTRUMENT PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
EIRAi
o MEASURE THE SPECTRUM OF THE COSMIC BACKGROUND RADIATION OVER THE
WAVELENGTH RANGE IM TO 10 MM
o PROVIDE AN ABSOLUTE DETERMINATION OF THE SPECTRUM TO AN ACCURACY AND KMS
NOISE LEVEL OF 10"15 W/CM2SR, FOR EACH 7 DEGREE PIXEL IN THE SKY IN THE
BAND FKOM 0-5 TO 5 MM
o SPECTRUM RESOLUTION HILL BE SI OR 0-2 CM*1, WHICHEVER IS LARGER
o MEASURE THE LARGE-ANGULAR-SCALE INTENSITY DISTRIBUTION OF THE COSMIC
BACKGROUND AT 32, 53 AND 90 GHz.
o SEARCH FOR ANISOTROPY IN THE BACKGROUND RADIATION WITH AN KMS NOISE
LEVEL OF 1 PART IN 10M (0-3 MK) OR SMALLER, IN EACH 7 DEGREE PIXEL
DIRBE
o MEASURE THE SPECTRUM AND ANGULAR DISTRIBUTION OF THE BACKGROUND IN 10
DISCRETE PHOTOMETRIC SPECTRAL BANDS BETWEEN 1 AND 300 MICRONS
o BANDS BETWEEN 1 AND 4 MICRONS WILL MEASURE THE LINEAR POLARIZATION OF
THE BACKGROUND AS WELL AS THE INTENSITY
o IN EACH 1 DEGREE PIXEL. PROVIDE AN ABSOLUTE DETERMINATION OF THE
INTENSITY IN EACH BAND TO AN RMS NOISE LEVEL OF 10"13 W/CM2 SR OR IX OF
THE ASTROPHYSICAL BACKGROUND (WHICHEVER IS LARGER)
TF-13
MISSION LIFETIME REQUIREMENTS
LIFETIME REQUIREMENT DERIVED FROM;
o VIEM NO LESS THAN 80 PERCENT OF THE CELESTIAL SPHERE FOR FIRAS AND DIRBE
o VIEW NO LESS THAN 95 PERCENT OF THE CELESTIAL SPHERE FOR DMR
o ACHIEVE SPECIFIED SENSITIVITIES
o OBSERVE 50 PERCENT OF THE SKY AT A RANGE OF SOLAR ELONGATIONS FROM M TO
124 DEGREES HITH DMR AND DIRBE
THEREFORE!
o M I N I M U M M I S S I O N OPERATIONAL LIFETIME FOR FIRAS AND DIRBE IS 6 MONTHS
(PLANNED LIFETIME OF 12 MONTHS)
o M I N I M U M M I S S I O N LIFETIME FOR DMR IS.12 MONTHS
TF~/f
ur turn: niSSiUN CHARACTERISTICS
LAUNCH DATE • • FY 1988
MISSION LIFE 1 YEAR PLANNED (CURRENT DEWAR LIFETIME;
> 12 MONTHS)
ORBIT 900 KM CIRCULAR, SUN SYNCHRONOUS, 6 AM/6 PM
NODE CROSSING
PARK ORBIT TO MISSION ORBIT TRANSFER-LESS THAN
1 WEEK
LAUNCH VEHICLE SHUTTLE, WESTERN SPACE AND MISSILE CENTER
OBSERVATORY STM/PROTOFLIGHT
HEIGHT (BOD 10,000 LBS (11,500 LBS CONTROL WEIGHT SUBMITTED
TO JSC)
LENGTH/DIAMETER 18/15 FT.
INSTRUMENTS DIFFERENTIAL MICROWAVE RADIOMETER (DMR),
FAR INFRARED ABSOLUTE SPECTROPHOTOMETER (FIRAS),
DIFFUSE INFRARED BACKGROUND EXPERIMENT (DIRBE),
DEWAR IRAS DESIGN MODIFIED FOR COBE
PROPULSION MONOPROPELLANT HYDRAZINE
ATTITUDE CONTROL ZERO MOMENTUM/3-AXIS STABILIZED
POWER SOLAR ARRAY/BATTERIES DIRECT ENERGY TRANSFER
THERMAL PASSIVE CONTROL
DATA RATE W96 BPS (REAL-TIME AND RECORD), 655 KBPS
PLAYBACK
GROUND SYSTEM
OPERATION AND CONTROL • • MULT I-SATELLITE OPERATIONS CONTROL CENTER
FORWARD DATA LINK .... COMMAND/TDRSS-MA (UP TO 2 HOURS PER DAY)
RETURN DATA LINK TELEMETRY/TDRSS-MA (UP TO 2 HOURS PER DAY)
SCIENCE DATA LINK .... DIRECT-TO-GROUND RECEIVING STATION AT THE GSFC
SCIENCE DATA PROCESSING- . COBE SCIENCE DATA ROOM
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HPS EXPLODED VIEW OF OBSERVATORY
BACKGROUND
o AFTER THE 51L ACCIDENT, THE COBE PROJECT REVIEWED USE OF ELV's AND
ALTERNATE LAUNCH SCENARIOS TO ACCOMPLISH COBE MISSION
o DECISION MADE TO DESIGN COBE FOR A DELTA 3920A WITH AN 8' DIA. FAIRING;
MAINTAINS COMPATIBILITY WITH OTHER ELV's. REFERENCE THE AUGUST 7, 1986
PRESENTATION TO NASA HEADQUARTERS (S. KELLER, ET AD
o BASELINED A SUN SYNCHRONOUS POLAR ORBIT FROM VAFB
o SPACECRAFT LAUNCH READINESS IS 29 MONTHS AFTER HEADQUARTERS DIRECTION;
PROJECT INTERPRETS POP 86-2M LETTER AS DIRECTION
o ACCELERATED SCHEDULE NECESSITATES A SKUNKWORKS MODE OF OPERATION
- DMR REPACKAGING
- SPACECRAFT REDESIGN
TF-/7
PROGRAMMATIC CONSIDERATIONS
o HILL DESIGN A SPACECRAFT COMPATIBLE WITH A DELTA 3920A
o SCHEDULE - TIGHT AT 29 MONTHS
o DESIGNING FOR DELTA ALLOWS COBE TO BE LAUNCHED ON ANY VEHICLE GREATER THAN
DELTA
o HILL REQUIRE TDRS SINGLE ACCESS (S/A) USE 5 TIMES/DAY FOR 20 MINUTES EACH
o DELTA HILL PROVIDE A QUALIFIED PAYLOAD ATTACH FITTING PLUS THE NECESSARY
PYROTECHNICS AND FIRING CIRCUITS
o MAKES AVAILABLE THE CURRENT COBE PRIMARY STRUCTURE ($5M), HYDRAZINE
PROPULSION SYSTEM ($5M), ELECTRONICALLY SWITCHED ANTENNA ($3M)
REQUIRED CENTER COMMITMENT
o A 'SKUNKWORKS' OPERATION (I.E., A DEDICATED, COLLOCATED ENGINEERING
AND SUPPORT TEAM UNDER ONE ROOF).
o ADDITIONAL 4,000 SQUARE FEET OF SPACE AVAILABLE FOR THE ENTIRE COLLOCATED
TEAM IN BUILDING 7/10/15 COMPLEX.
o PROCUREMENTS WILL BE PROCESSED IMMEDIATELY-
o NO LIMIT ON OVERTIME AND/OR COMPENSATORY TIME, AS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN
SCHEDULE.
o PROJECT EXPEDITORS TO TRACK PROCUREMENTS, HARDWARE, AND DOCUMENTATION-
o INSTITUTIONAL PRIORITY.
o DOCUMENTATION AND REPORTING WILL BE STREAMLINED.
o DOLLARS AND PROCUREMENT MANAGEMENT CONTROLLED AT THE PROJECT OFFICE LEVEL.
MR 'CIRCULAR POUR ORBIT (CPOV
LAUNCH VEHICLE
SHUTTLE
PAYLQAD
CftfflBILlII MAHOER COfflENTS
11,500 LBS* TO CPO XFER 180* BASELINE
HYDRAZINE PROFUSION
SUBSYSTEM (HPS)
CIRCULARIZE
••DISCRIMINA1
AVAILABILITY
ATHTR
DELTA 3920
ATUS CENTAUR
TITAN 34D
TITAN 3W
4,800 LBS. TO CPO
9,000 LBS* TO CPO
12,000 LBS* TO CPO XFER
ORBIT, CIRCULARIZE WITH
EXISTING HPS
15,000 LBS* TO CPO XFER
ORBIT, CIRCULARIZE WITH
EXISTING HPS
111'
180"
ARIANE (M2/W LP) 9,000 TO 12,000 LBS* TO CPO
900KN, 99° INCLINATION
ALL ELY'S REQUIRE NEW LOAD RATH AND RE-QUAL OF STRUCTURE
NEW LIGHT HEIGHT
STRUCTURE, NEW HARNESS,
niNimL REDUNDANCY,
DER.OYABLES
IWDIFY EXISTING STRUCTURE
NEW HARNESS
NEW COBE STRUCTURE, NEW
HARNESS, DER.OYABLES
HOST SIGNIFICANT
TO PROJECT, IW.TA
AVAIWBILITY AT WTR
AT PRESENT THERE IS NO
A/C CAWBILITY AT HTR
LAUNCH FACILITY
AVAILABILITY
MODIFY EXISTING STRUCTURE, VEHICLE COST
(MOST CLOSELY EMULATES
SHUTTLE)
MODIFY EXISTING STRUCTURE, VEHICLE COST
NEW HARNESS
COBE DELTA COBE ST-S
SUMMARY OF SUBSYSTEM CHANGES REQUIRED FOR A DELTA LAUNCH
SUBSYSTEM
PROPULSION SYSTEM
DIRBE
FIRAS
DEHAR
STRUCTURE
ACS
CHANGE
PROPULSION SYSTEM IS NOT
REQUIRED
NO CHANGE
NO CHANGE
MOUNT DMR RECEIVERS
TO DEWAR GIRTH RING
COMMAND/DATA HANDLING NO CHANGE
NEW LIGHTWEIGHT PRIMARY
STRUCTURE
NEW DEPLOYABLE RF/THERMAL
SHIELD
ELIMINATE TRANSFER ORBIT
ELECTRONICS
BLANKING FOR SENSORS
HERITAGE
N/A
N/A
N/A
IRAS
N/A
DELTA CLASS SPACECRAFT
SUCH AS SMM, IUE, ISEE,
ETC.
- SMM HINGE MECHANISM
- ATS-6 ANTENNA (LMSC)
- BLOCK 5D SUN SHIELD
(RCA)
N/A
LANDSAT D/D'
SUMMARY OF SUBSYSTEM CHANGES REQUIRED FOR A DELTA LAUNCH-CONTINUED
SUBSYSTEM
COMMUNICATIONS
POWER
THERMAL
DIFFERENTIAL MICRO-
WAVE RADIOMETERS
ELECTRICAL
CHANGE
ELIMINATE ELECTRONICALLY
SWITCHING SPHERICAL ARRAY
ANTENNA (ESSA)
NEW OMNI TO COMMUNICATE
WITH TDRS WITH
DEPLOYABLE MAST
NEW DEPLOYABLE SOLAR ARRAYS
EXCHANGE 50AMP-HR BATTERIES
FOR 20 AMP-HR BATTERIES
POWER SUPPLY ELECTRONICS
WEIGHT REDUCTIONS & POWER
INCREASE
RECONFIGURATION REQUIRES
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES
REWORK 31GHZ RECEIVER AND
REPACKAGE 53 AND 90 GHZ
RECEIVERS TO FIT WITHIN
8' DIAMETER FAIRING
NEW ELECTRICAL HARNESS
SCU - PYRO CIRCUITS
HERITAGE
N/A
ISEE SPACECRAFT
DE SPACECRAFT
ATS-6
SMM HINGE
"OFF THE SHELF" HARDWARE
N/A
DELTA CLASS SPACECRAFT
ISEE, IDE, SMM, ETC.
MAKES USE OF EXISTING
RECEIVER COMPONENTS
COBE HARNESS FOR STS;
EXISTING BOXES WITH
DEFINED INTERFACES
HEIGHT STATUS
SUBSYSTEM
STS LAUNCH DELTA MUNCH
HEIGHT (LBS.) WEIGHT (LBS.) REASON FOR CHANGE
PROPULSION
COTIAND/DATA HANDLING
ATTITUDE CONTROL
TRANSPONDERS/ANTENNAS
ELECTRICAL (HARNESS)
POWER
THER1AL 8 BALANCE HEIGHTS
STRUCTURE
DEHAR
FIRAS/DIRBE/CRYO OPT. ASSBLY.
m
2,061
175
175
206
489
603
211
3,803
1,126
790
352
0
175
362
12
285
382
80
1,000
1,360
790
352
NOT REQUIRED FOR A DELTA LAUNCH
ONE MCMENTW WHEEL/NO GYRO SHELF
REMOVE ELECTRONICALLY DESPUN
ANTENNA/ELECTRONICS & REPLACE WITH 01NI
SHORTER HARASS RUNS
2 20-WP/HR BATTERIES FOR 2 50-AMP/HR
AND MODS TO PSE & SHUNT DISSIPATORS
SMALLER SPACECRAFT & NO BALANCE
HEIGHTS
NEH STRUCTURE JESIGN
AUX. VAC. SYSTEM * CUNP BAND THER1AL
SHIELD NOT REQUIRED FOR A DELTA LAUNCH
BASED ON STS ACTUALS
f
TOTAL 10,59i| 1,828
COBE/DELTA WEIGHT ANALYSIS
ACTUAL HEIGHT (EXISTING HARDWARE) 2,642 IBS. (bbl)
DERIVED HEIGHT (SOX IS STRUCTURE) 1,315 LBS. (27Z)
ESTIMATED HEIGHTS 871 LBS. (18X)
TOTAL SPACECRAFT HEIGHT 4,828 LBS. (100X)
DELTA 3920A PERFORMANCE 5,125 LBS.
(95X PCS, 900 KM SUN SYNC.)
MARGIN 297 LBS.
PERCENT MARGIN ON ESTIMATED AND DERIVED HEIGHT
OQ.TA SU.44TT-,
LAUNCH CONFIGURATION - SJOE VIEW
COBE/DELTA LAUNCH PROFILE
1. DELTA ORIENTS COBE WITH PROPER ATTITUDE AND RATES (ZERO SPIN RATE) AFTER
SOLAR ARRAY AND THERMAL SHIELD DEPLOYMENT
2. COBE RELEASE FROM DELTA INITIATES TORQUERS, MOMENTUM WHEELS, ANTENNA
DEPLOYMENT
3. RUN UP MOMENTUM WHEEL TO SPACECRAFT ROTATION OF 0-3 RPM
4. CAPTURE IN LOCAL VERTICAL WITH CONTROL TORQUERS
5. COMMAND-TO-MISSION MODE
6. SPIN UP SPACECRAFT TO 0-8 RPM
7. ASSESS PERFORMANCE
8. CHECK PITCH-BACK MANEUVER AND ROLL MANEUVER
9. SLOW SPACECRAFT SPIN RATE TO 0.5 RPM
10. PITCH BACK FOR DEWAR COVER EJECTION
11. EJECT DEWAR COVER
12. RETURN TO MISSION MODE
13- SPIN UP SPACECRAFT TO 0-8 RPM
W. START SCIENCE OBSERVATIONS
,6 RPM
TORS
SCIENCE DATA
TO WALLOPS
LIFTOFF /(WSMC)
CMD/TLM
AND
RANGING
SEPARATION/
DEPLOYMENTS
SECO II
(MISSION ORBIT INJECTION)
COBE - Delta Launch Profile
Solid Drop (3)
(124 sec)
Alt = 26.9 nml
Vel, = 6,207 fps
COBE MISSION
TYPICAL BOOST PROFILE
VD04225
MECO (227 sec)
Alt = 62.9
Vel, = 16,784 fps
Fairing Drop (245 sec)
Alt = 70.2 nml
Vel, = 16,822 fps
Second Stage
Ignition (240 sec)
Alt = 68.2 nml
Vel, = 16,773 fps
Second Stage
Engine Cutoff
(650 sec)
Alt = 105 nmi
Vel, = 26,005 fps
Solid Drop (6)
(78/79 sec)
Alt = 12.3 nml
Vel, = 2,744 fps
\ Solid Impact (Second Set)
Impact(First Set)
• Drag Corrected Surface Range 231 nml
DLO - 21
ORBIT
VELOCITY
TO * 5 DAYS
GROUNDCOMMAND
DEPLOYS DEWAR
COVER
TQ » 02 TO 07 SEC
SCU INITIATES
MOMENTUM WHEEL
SPIN-UP. SOLAR
ARRAY DEPLOYMENT
AND ANTENNA
DEPLOYMENT
T0* 60 TO 77 SEC
DELTA SEPARATES
INTERFACE CONNECTOR.
AND FIRES SEPARATION
BOLTS
DELTA RELEASES
SEPARATION LATCHES
AND BACKS AWAY
FROMS/C
EARTH
TO * 2 SEC
SCU INITIATES
THERMAL/RF
SHIELD
DEPLOYMENT
TO
DELTA RE-ORIENTS
TO SEPARATION
ATTITUDE AND
ENABLES S/C SIGNAL
CONDITIONING UNIT (SCU)
ORBfT INJECTION
DELTA SECOII
(.1 HOUR FROM
LIFTOFF)
COBE On-Orbit Deployment
DEPLOYED CONFIGURATION
SIDE VIEW
OMNI _/
* •
1
COBE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
1. DEFINED BY: COBE-SP-401-1004-01, REV. B, AUGUST 1988,
"COBE SYSTEM PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATION FOR A DELTA LAUNCH"
2. COMPLIANCE WITH: COBE-PV-401-1004-01, NOVEMBER 1989,
"COBE PERFORMANCE VERIFICATION MATRIX"
COBE/DELTA CONFIGURATION
-x
DEWAR
DEPLOYABLE
RF/THERMAL SHIELD 90-GHz
DMR ANTENNA
DEPLOYABLE SOLAR PANELS
(9 PANELS. DOUBLE SIDED)
OMNI-ANTENNAE
(DEPLOY ABLE MAST)
Figure 3-1. COBE Body Fixed Reference Frame
»* -Y
+2 AXIS INTO
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Figure 1-1. COBE System Diagram
PROVIDE A 3 AXIS CONTROLLED ROTATING PLATFORM IN THE MISSION
MODE TO ENABLE THE FIRAS AND DIRBE TO VIEW NO LESS THAN 80
PERCENT OF THE COSMIC BACKGROUND RADIATION DATA OVER 80
PERCENT OF THE CELESTIAL SPHERE WITHIN A SIX-MONTH PERIOD AND
95 PERCENT OF THE CELESTIAL SPHERE WITHIN A 12-MONTH PERIOD
FOR DMR.
UTILIZE THE TDRSS SSA LINKS FOR COMMUNICATIONS TO AND FROM THE
POCC AND GSFC.
STORE DATA DURING THE MISSION ORBIT AND DUMP THIS DATA ONCE A
DAY DIRECTLY TO THE WALLOPS FLIGHT FACILITY GROUND STATION.
OPERATE AT A NOMINAL MISSION CIRCULAR ALTITUDE OF 900 +9KM,
-26KM, SUNSYNCHRONOUS, 0600 OR 1800 HOURS LOCAL MEAN ASCENDING
NODAL CROSSING TIME, 99.03° ± 0.03° INCLINATION, AND MAINTAIN
THE NODE CROSSING TIME WITHIN -1/2 HOUR TO +3/4 HOURS FOR A
YEAR.
PROVIDE A HELIUM BATH TEMPERATURE OF 1.6K OR LESS FOR THE
OPTICAL PORTIONS OF THE DIRBE AND FIRAS INSTRUMENTS, ALSO
REFERRED TO AS THE CRYOGENIC OPTICAL ASSEMBLY (COA) WHEN
COMBINED WITH THE INSTRUMENT INTERFACE STRUCTURE (IIS).
PASSIVELY COOL THE 2 HIGHER FREQUENCY DMR'S TO 140K OR LESS
AND MAINTAIN THE LOWER FREQUENCY DMR AT 300 ±5K.
SPIN AT A RATE OF 0.815 ±0.015 RPM ABOUT AN AXIS OFFSET FROM
AND NEARLY PARALLEL TO THE OBSERVATORY GEOMETRIC X AXIS.
o SPACECRAFT SPIN RATES ABOUT THE -X AXIS SHALL MAINTAIN SAFE
THERMAL AND ENERGY BALANCE OPERATION.
o MAINTAIN THE SPIN VECTOR/SUN LINE ANGLE AT 94.0° WITH A ± 1
DEGREE MAXIMUM ERROR.
0 KEEP THE SPIN AXIS POINTED GENERALLY AWAY FROM THE EARTH AND
WITHIN 6° with a ±1 DEGREE MAXIMUM ERROR.
o KEEP THE SPIN AXIS POINTED GENERALLY AWAY FROM THE EARTH AND
WITH 6° MAXIMUM ERROR OF THE SUN-EARTH NADIR PLANE.
o CAPABILITY TO VARY THE ANGLE BETWEEN THE SPIN AXIS AND SUN
VECTOR FROM 90° in 1/2° INCREMENTS.
o CAPABILITY TO VARY THE PITCH ANGLE (BACK ONLY) IN THE ORBIT
PLANE FROM 0° TO 30° IN 1° INCREMENTS, AND REMAIN AT ANY STEP
FOR UP TO 3 DAYS.
o PROVIDE FOR TIME TAGGED ATTITUDE RECONSTRUCTION (ON THE
GROUND) TO AN ACCURACY OF +1.0 DEGREES FOR DIRBE AND ±1.0°
(30) RANDOM VARIATION AND Q.2*~ PEAK PERIODIC VARIATION FOR
FIRAS AND DMR, IN EACH INSTRUMENT LINE OF SIGHT REFERENCED TO
INERTIAL COORDINATES.
o PROVIDE FOR ATTITUDE RECONSTRUCTION USING COMBINED DIRBE AND
SPACECRAFT DATA TO AN ACCURACY OF 3.5 ARC MIN (10).
PROVIDE TIME TAGGED TELEMETRY DATA WITH A RESOLUTION OF ± 1
MILLISECOND AND AN ACCURACY OF ±10 MILLISECONDS.
THE OBSERVATORY SHALL BE REDUNDANT WHERE FEASIBLE SO THAT NO
SINGLE POINT FAILURE SHALL CAUSE MISSION FAILURE.
THE UNAMBIGUOUS STATUS OF THE OBSERVATORY SHALL BE
TELE-METERED WITHIN 128 MINOR FRAMES HAVING A 32.0 SEC.
REPETITION PERIOD FOR THE SCIENCE FORMAT AT 4096 BPS
(EXCEPTIONS FOR MULTIPLEXED TELEMETRY FOR INSTRUMENTS AND SCU
SHALL BE PERMITTED); FOR EACH COMMAND THAT CHANGES STATUS OR
PARAMETERS, THERE SHALL BE AN UNAMBIGUOUS TELEMETERED STATUS
CHANGE.
ALL COMMANDS WHICH CAN LEAD TO FAILURES SHALL BE AT LEAST A
TWO-BIT CHANGE FROM ALL OTHER COMMANDS. CRITICAL COMMANDS ARE
DEFINED TO BE ANY COMMAND WHICH COULD CAUSE MISSION
DEGRADATION OR COULD RESULT IN HAZARDS; ALL CRITICAL FUNCTIONS
MUST BE CONTROLLED BY AT LEAST TWO COMMANDS.
INSTRUMENT SCIENCE OPERATION SHALL NOT BE PERFORMED UNTIL
AFTER ARRIVAL AT THE MISSION ORBIT AND CHECKOUT OF THE
OBSERVATORY HAS BEEN COMPLETED.
THE MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE DOPPLER SHIFT CAUSED BY THE ERROR IN
PREDICTING THE OBSERVATORY VELOCITY SHALL BE LESS THAN ±700 HZ
OUT OF A 2287.5 MHZ TRANSMITTER FREQUENCY.
o THE MAXIMUM TIMING ERROR FOR PREDICTING THE OBSERVATORY'S
POSITION AT THE TIME OF INTENDED TDRSS ACQUISITION SHALL BE
LESS THAN ±9 SECONDS.
o THE DELTA TARGETED ORBIT IS AS FOLLOWS
(1) ORBIT ALT1TUDE-900KM ( + 9KM, -26 KM), CIRCULAR
(2) INCLINATION-99.030 ± 0.03°
(3) SUNSYNCHRONOUS-0600, -15 MINUTES + 30 MINUTES OR 1800
HOURS, -15 MINUTES +30 MINUTES LOCAL MEAN ASCENDING NODE
CROSSING TIME
(4) LAUNCH-ANY DAY OF YEAR
o ALL SOLAR ANGLES FORWARD OF THE COBE Y-Z PLANE SHALL BE
MINIMIZED WHILE ON THE DELTA AND DURING THE MISSION LIFETIME
TO PREVENT UNNECESSARY HEATING OF THE DEWAR COVER AND
MAINSHELL NO ILLUMINATION OF THE MAINSHELL SHALL OCCUR
AFTER DEWAR COVER EJECTION.
o RELIABILITY AND SINGLE POINT FAILURES (SPF)-MINIM»ZE SINGLE
POINT FAILURES-NO SPF SHALL CAUSE A MISSION FAILURE.
MAXIMIZE OPERATIONAL WORKAROUNDS.
(SEE VERIFICATION MATRIX FOR LIST OF
SPF'S AND RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE)
TF-3?
o CONTAMINATION-DMR RECEIVER THROAT 300A
DIRBE PRIMARY MIRROR 100A
DIRBE OTHER SURFACES 500A
FIRAS SKYHORN CALILB. 200A
FIRAS OTHER SURFACES 300A
o AUTONOMOUS FOR UP TO 20 HOURS
- ONE MOMENTUM WHEEL (LATER ADDED SECOND WHEEL)
- DEWAR OVER-TEMP SENSING
- ACE POWER SUPPLY SWITCH-OVER (AUTO)
- NON-ESSENTIAL LOAD REMOVAL
- DIRBE SHUTTER CLOSING
- LOSE ONE ACS LOOP AND MAINTAIN CONTROL
o MAXIMIZE THE USE OF FAIL-SAFE DESIGNS AND PROVIDE THE
NECESSARY INHIBITS.
o PREVENT THE GENERATION OF UNWANTED OUTPUT SIGNALS AND PREVENT
DEGRADATION OF PERFORMANCE OF ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT DUE TO
POWER FAILURE, INTERNAL CIRCUIT FAILURE, COMPONENT FAILURE,
NOISE, RADIO INTERFERENCE, ELECTRICAL TRANSIENTS, OR
ENVIRONMENTS.
o COMPONENT SHELF LIFE-COMPONENTS SHALL BE DESIGNED FOR A
MINIMUM SHELF LIFE OF 4 YEARS.
TF-W
o RADIATION ENVIRONMENT
- ELECTRONIC PARTS SHALL WITHSTAND A MINIMUM TOTAL DOSAGE OF
ELECTRON AND PROTON BOMBARDMENT OF 4 X 103 RADS WITH 3/32"
WALL THICKNESS. (TOP DECK 5 X 103 RADS.)
o ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY-OBSERVATORY SHALL BE DESIGNED
FOR ELECTROMAGNETIC SELF COMPATIBILITY AND FOR ELECTROMAGNETIC
COMPATIBILITY WITH THE INSTRUMENTS AND THE DELTA FOR ALL
PHASES OF THE MISSION. MIL-STD-461 SHALL BE USED.
o MAGNETIC REQUIREMENT
- D-C MAGNETIC FIELD PRODUCED BY ANY COMPONENT
<_ 0.2 AM2 DIPOLE MOMENT
<_ 0.1 AM2 DIPOLE MOMENT AFTER 50 X 10~4 TESTS DEPERM
- INDIVIDUAL SHIELDING OF BOXES
o FRACTURE CONTROL-EACH DESIGN WILL PRECLUDE FAILURE OF ANY
ATTACHMENT BOLTS AND CONTAINMENT OF ANY HARDWARE
POUNDS.
o MICROPHONICS
- FIRAS MTM < 3.3 X 10~'2 F3 G2/HZ
- DMR < .01 GRMS/HZ (10 HZ TO 1000 HZ)
o CORONA DISCHARGE-CAN BE NEITHER THE SOURCE OF OR
SUSCEPTIBLE TO.
o CHARGING/DISCHARGING-SURFACE MATERIAL AND FINISHES SHALL BE
SELECTED TO MINIMIZE THE EFFECTS OF CHARGING AND DISCHARGING.
(SHOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER DEFINED.)
VERIFICATION
o DESIGN QUALIFICATION BY ANALYSIS AND/OR TEST
o COMPONENT/SUBSYSTEM ACCEPTANCE TESTS
- FUNCTIONAL
- EMC
- VIB
- T/V
o OBSERVATORY ACCEPTANCE TESTS
- FUNCTIONAL
- EMC
- ACOUSTIC/RANDOM
- TV AND TB
o 200 TROUBLE-FREE TEST HOURS
- 100 HOURS FOLLOWING OBSERVATORY EMC
- 100 HOURS AFTER OBSERVATORY ACCEPTANCE TESTS
o TREND DATA COLLECTION FOR SELECTED PARAMETERS
VERIFICATION (CONTINUED)
o VERIFICATION MATRIX 1 TO 1 WITH SYSTEM SPEC.
o ETC MET WEEKLY TO REVIEW/APPROVE ALL OBSERVATORY LEVEL
MALFUNCTIONS/PROBLEMS, WAIVERS/DEVIATIONS, AND TEST PLANS
AND PROCEDURES.
ANALYSES REQUIRED
o STANDARD STRUCTURAL ANALYSES
o STANDARD THERMAL ANALYSES
o FMECA'S
- TOTAL FLIGHT SYSTEM
- ANY GSE DIRECTLY INTERFACING WITH FLIGHT OBSERVATORY
o SYSTEM SAFETY ANALYSES
o OPERATIONAL HAZARDS ANALYSES (OHA) FOR ALL MAJOR TESTS
o CIRCUIT ANALYSES:
- PARTS STRESS ANALYSES
- WORST CASE ANALYSES
- "SPICE"
OOBE PROGRAM - PERFORMANCE VERIFICATION MATRIX
AS OF 11/18/89 OOBE-PV-401-1004-01
REQUIRBCNT ASSESSMENT PERFOmWCE SHORTFALL WIVER RATIONALE
II. SIMttRY OF EXCEPTIONS TO HEQUHBgNTS
3.3
A qualitative assessment of each tubrequirement has been made.
•acceptable* follows:
Ml it Ion Performance and
Operational Requirements
A s ta tus / reso lu t ion surrmary of items rated as "unacceptable" and
3.3.1 Minion Orbit
Maintain the spin vector/
sun l ine angle at 94.0°
within ± 1 degree.
Valid only during
sunlit periods.
This angle w i l l experience transients
up to 4° during maximum shadow time in
eelipse season.
Acceptable. Total time in
shadow is small compared to
overal I mission time.
Resulting angles can be
accomodated in processing of
science data.
o The observatory shall be
redundant where feasible
so that no s ing le point
fai lure shall cause
mission failure.
and
Reliability and Slnile Point
Failure (From Section 8.2)
o Each mission critical
failure mode shall be
Investigated using design
analysis, historical fail-
ure data, failure mode
effects and c r l t i c a l l t y
analysis (FMECA), and past
exper ience.
Meets Requirement by
FMECA Analyses and
Structural Tests,
except for agreed-to
single point fail-
ures Iisted as per-
formance shortfalls.
Aireed-to Single Point Failures;
1. RF Transfer Switches
2. Dewar Plumbing and Valves (V4
failure, Porous Plug)
3. Unfused Portions of Essential
Bus
4. X-Axis Gyro in Eclipse
(Recoverable - 2 ea on)
5. ACS Power Supply in Eclipse
(Recoverable)
6. fiCE In Eclipse (Recoverable)
7. PSE Current Measuring Shunt
Failure
8. MTM Mechanical Failure
9. DIRBE Shutter Mechanical Failure
10. DIRBE Chopper Mechanical Failure
11. FIRAS Excal Mechanical Failure
12. Loss of Battery
Continued...
The listed single
ures have been
point fail-
agreed to
during PDR's,
tation,
without
and
CCR's.
CDR's,
other
documen-
reviews
Reference: Memo from
j. Turt 1 1 to distribution
dated October 22, 1989;
Subject: Certification of
COBE Single Point Failures.
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Reliability and Single feint
F*llMr> (Continued)
3.3.1 Million Orbit (Continued)
o For each comrand that
changes status or
parameters, there shall be
an unambiguous telemetered
status change.
Agreed-to Single Point Failures (Con't)
13. Failure of Oeployables
(Pyros are Redundant)
RF/Thermal Shield
Solar Array Panels
Dewar Cover
Antenna Boom
14. Structure
15. Dewar
16. Resistor Failure in PSE
Charge/Shunt Drive could result
In out-of Spec Performance.
Requirement met except for approxi-
mately 196 of comrunds. Example: pyro
FIRE cormund.
Acceptable. The changes
resulting from these cormunds
can be inferred from other
telemetered data.
The maximum timing error
for predicting the
Observatory's position at
the time of Intended TDRSS
acquisition shall be less
than + 9 seconds.
Effects of heliun venting may require
more frequent updates.
Acceptable as indicated.
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3.4
3.4.1
Instrument Performance
R«qulr«mnts
Scienti f ic
Requlrwntnt
Observation
3.4.1.1 DIR8E
Measure the spectrun and angular
d is t r ibut ion of the dif fuse In-
frared background radiation
(Lambda I
 LOTM,-) 13
to a sens i t iv i ty of 10 J watts
per square centimeter steradian,
or 196 of the zodiacal scattering,
or errmlssion, whichever Is
greater, at wavelengths from 1 to
300 micrometers for each 0.7
square degree f ie ld of view.
P r o j e c t CCR #725: Band 9 (120-200
mic rons ) f a c t o r o f 3 l e s s s e n s i t i v e
than requirement.
DIRBE Band 8 heater Inabil i ty to c lose ly regulate tempera-
fa i led, ture of detector and anneal detector
following radiation impact.
Accepted by Project CCB.
Replacement of detector is
severe programrutic impact.
Although sens i t i v i t y is not
met, data can provide meaning-
ful science.
Reference: Letter from
HQ/Code E to NASA GSFC/Code
100 dated November 14, 1989;
Subject Waiver of Level 1
Science Requirements for COBE
DIRBE Band 9.
Accepted for flight by
Project. Plan to overbias
detector in orbit to reduce
effects of nuclear radiation.
Reference: Information pre-
sen ted by j* Mather at the
CCBE Spacecraft Flight Readi-
ness Rev iew on November 11,
1989: "DIRBE Band 8 Heater
Anomaly.*
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3.5.1.2 employables
3.5.1.2.1 Themal/RF Shield
o Shield Temperatures:
Survival: -70 to 200»C
Operational: -30 to 50«C
Internal: < 240K
T/RF shield cannot
be exposed to +200°C
without degradation
of honeycomb bond.
None is expected. The 200° C require-
ment Is a carryover from STS; a maximum
temperature of less than 65° C is pre-
dicted.
Acceptable as indicated.
3.5.3 Attitude Control
The Observatory's orienta-
tion shall preclude the
Sun from illuminating the
dewar cover or main shell
for extended periods. No
Illumination of the main
shell shall occur in
mission mode.
Requirement not
satisfied in
vertical mode.
Not a mission impact since v e r t i c a l Acceptable,
mode is planned only during the first operations
few orbits. dewar cover
Vertical mode
occur prior to
ejection.
3.5.5.1 Instrument Operating
Teaperatures
o FIRAS detectors shall be
maintained below 1.6K.
Cannot be maintained
below 1.6K if Dewar
cryogen tank Is at
1.6K.
None is expected. The Dewar cryogen
tank is predicted to run at 1.45 k in
mission orbit. FIRAS requirement w i l l
be met with this condition.
Acceptable as indicated.
(Ref. Section 3.5.2
In Section I I I )
1 1 -
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3.5.8 Electrical
o The signal and power
returns shall be Isolated
from each other In each
electronic assembly.
Frequency Standards
do not meet require-
ment.
None observed. Existing flight hardware
design used. Acceptable
performance noted in test of
Observatory.
o The power returns shall be
isolated from the chassis
of each electronic assem-
bly.
Frequency Standards
do not meet require-
ment.
None observed. Existing f I ight hardware
design used. Acceptable
performance noted in test of
Observatory.
o Except for the instrument
electronics, the signal
returns shall be isolated
from the chassis of each
electronic assembly.
Requirements are
generally met inside
the assembly, but
signal grounds are
tied to chassis out-
side the assembly.
Performance actually improved. The original
incorrect.
requirement was
o The frame shall not be
used to return primary
current to the power
supply.
Frequency Standards
and Momentum Wheel
Electronics Assem-
bl ies do not meet
requlrement.
Possible increase in system noise
s ignature.
Existing flight hardware
design used. MACA potential
defect minimized by shortening
current path to PSE.
Acceptable performance noted
during Observatory testing.
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3.5.8 Electrical (Continued)
o Fusing shall be accom-
plished by means of redun-
dant fuses (In parallel),
with each fuse capable of
carrying at least 150% of
maximum steady state
current.
Redundant fusing Is
not used for alI
Power Supply
Electronics (PSE)
Internal circuits.
Ref: Memo from 0.
Manzer to OOBE
Observatory Manager,
•PSE Fuses for
Flight and SPF
justification,1
dated November 7,
1989.
Battery charger c i r c u i t failure.
Shunt dissipator circuit failure.
Boost converter circuit failure.
Acceptable. Can lose 4 of the
12 battery charger circuits
without mission impact.
Acceptable. Normal
dissipation can be accomodated
with 15 of the 24 shunt
circuits.
Acceptable. Normal spacecraft
operations can be supported by
2 of the 3 boost converters.
GGBE AUGMENT REQUIRaENTS
SEE SECTION 111
(From TABLE 3-6)
DIG SIM SENSOR:
EARTH SCANNER:
Stability 0.05°
Stability 0.05°
Waivers granted to DSS's and ESA's for
alignment s t a b i l i t y in excess of
requirement (as result of static load
tests). Project OCR #729.
Approved by Project CCB.
Out-of specification condition
is minor and is not expected
to affect mission performance.
OvR Heads: Placement 0.5° DMR 31 GHz Head does not meet placement
requirement ( t i l t and horn pair plane).
Acceptable as is. Errors are
not considered large enough to
merit repositioning. Agree-
ment by Project and Principal
Investigator.
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4.5 Dewar GSE
o Maintain a vacuum on the
dewar while the dewar Is
on the Delta prior to
launch.
Pump must be
disconnected at
hours prior to
launch.
12
Reduction In Dewar helium lifetime as a
result of launch delays.
Acceptable based on launch
abort/turnaround plan to
minimize impact. After 3
launch attempts (3 days),
Dewar topoff and pumpdown w i l l
be required.
S.9 Observatory Pr«~Fllght
Acceptance Tests
o Prior to launch, the
Observatory and Its
elements must successfully
pass 200 trouble-free
hours of operation.
Ref. "Verification
Matrix for the OGEE
Spacecraft1, dated
September 28, 1989.
(Appendix A to
COBE-SP-750-1702-02,
Verification Plan
and Specification
for OCBE.)
Items not expected to meet 200-hour
trouble-free requirement prior to
launch:
Tape Recorder 1
Tape Recorder 2
Instrument Telemetry Unit 1
Acceptable to Project.
Changes made to Tape Recorders
and Instrument Telemetry Unit
were minor and operation of
the Spacecraft for the sole
purpose of accumulating
trouble-free time was
concluded to be inappropriate.
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8.2 Reliability ind Single
Point Failures
o Redundant circuits shall
be routed through separate
connectors and wire
bundles
Generally not true
for spacecraft elec-
trical assemblles.
Implemented where deemed
necessary (e.g. pyro
circuits).
8.7 Corona Suppression
Electrical and electronic equip-
ment shall be designed so that It
Is neither the source of, nor Is
susceptible to, corona discharge.
Dlplexer #2 is known to be susceptible
to corona discharge.
Acceptable. Transmitter w i l l
be "off for launch; transmit-
ter #2 to be turned on no
earlier than 1 hour after
launch
8.13 Electrical Connectors
o Separate connectors shall
be provided for the
functions of power, data/
comnands, and telemetry.
Generally true for
power vs. data/
comnands and
telemetry; but,
generally not true
for data/corrmands vs
t eI erne try.
None observed. Requirement was implemented
where deemed necessary (e.g.
Instrument detectors).
Generally not Implemented
because of practical limita-
tion.
All connectors shall be
keyed; connectors on the
s*ne black box having the
same shell size shall be
keyed differently.
Connector keying was
not implemented in
component (block
box) and harness
des ign.
Mistakes during integration and test
leading to degradation of flight hard-
ware-
Used fl i g h t hardware already
designed. Design of f I i g h t
harnesses minimizes mismate
possibilities. Emphasis
placed on procedures and
training of personnel to
insure proper mating of
external harnesses and plugs.
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8.14 Matnetlc Conpat Ibl 11 tY
o The DC magnetic field
produced by any component
(except for torquer bars),
including any of its
operating modes, shall not
exceed 0.2 am2 dipole
moment following Its
manufacture, 0.3 am
exposure to a 5 x 10
tesla magnetic field and a
0.1 mr moment after a 50
x 10 tesla deperm.
With minor exception
component testing
was deferred to
Observatory level of
test.
None. System requirements are accept-
able.
Acceptable as indicated.
The assembled Observatory
sh a l l not exceed 3.0 am
dipole moment following
its manufacture, S.O am
after exposure to a
5 x 10 tesla magnetic
field and a 2.0 anv moment
after a 50 x 10"4 tesla
deperm.
Magnetic requirement
relaxed based on
analys is by Code
712. ("Residual
Dipole Effect Upon
the GGBE Attitude
Control Subsystem,1
memo by S. Placanica
dated October 13,
1988) Waiver for
test tolerance based
on relaxed
requirement.
Negligible affect on control system. Acceptable based on Observa-
tory testing.
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o The Observatory and each
of Its components shall
not produce magnetic
fields due to internal
current flows in excess of
O.S and 0.05 am ,
respectively.
Magnetic requirement
relaxed based on
analys is by Code
712.
Negligible affect on control system. Acceptable based on Observa-
tory testing.
8.19 Microphonlcs
Mechanical noise generated by any
component within the observatory
shall not cause degraded
performance of any subsystem or
instrument.
Instrument interference is noted when
either Momentum Wheel is above 2000
RPM.
Both wheels can be used in
complementary manner to
control Observatory spin
without either being above
2000 RPM. In addition, in
orbit ajustments for
optimizing mlcrophonic effects
are possible.
TF'£5
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LESSONS LEARNED
CODE 400 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE PROGRAMS
1. INSUFFICIENT PARALLEL ANALYSES OF CRITICAL SUBSYSTEMS
2. LACK OF ONE-ON-ONE PEER REVIEW BY GOVERNMENT
TECHNICAL PERSONNEL
3. LACK OF ONE-ON-ONE PEER REVIEW BY CONTRACTOR
TECHNICAL PERSONNEL
4. FAILURE TO RIGOROUSLY CONTROL PLANNED TEST PROGRAM
5. INSUFFICIENT ANALYSES OF LIFE-SENSITIVE COMPONENTS
AND ASSOCIATED LIFE TESTING RATIONALE
6. INSUFFICIENT MAINTENANCE OF FUNCTIONAL TEST LOGS
7. INSUFFICIENT TROUBLE-FREE FUNCTIONAL OPERATING TIME
OF CRITICAL SUBSYSTEMS PRIOR TO LAUNCH
8. INAPPROPRIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF REDUNDANCY
9. INSUFFICIENT TREND ANALYSIS DURING TEST PROGRAM.
10. INSUFFICIENT WORST-CASE ANALYSES
COBE LESSONS LEARNED-ENGINEERING
o CONTAMINATION CONTROL; A COST AND SCHEDULE DRIVER; DEFINE REAL
REQUIREMENTS
-ESTABLISH BUDGET EARLY BY SYSTEMS ENGINEERS AND PI'S
-PLAN ON BLACK BOX BAKEOUTS AS PART OF BOX-LEVEL ACCEPTANCE
TESTS.
o HI-FIDELITY HARDWARE; BUILD TWO OF ALL PRIMARY STRUCTURES
o MECHANISMS; THE KEY TECHNOLOGY PROBLEM
o TEST DEWARS; NEED LOTS, SOME VIBRATABLE; DESIGN LIFETIMES INTO
THE VIBRATABLE ONES
o COLD STRUCTURAL QUALIFICATION
o INSTRUMENT COST AND SCHEDULE DOUBLED FROM INITIAL ESTIMATES;
WHY? SIGNIFICANTLY UNDERESTIMATED THE JOB; CRYOGENICS; RETEST
RATES; CONTAMINATION CONTROL; TEST HARNESSES AND BLACK BOXES
o NOT BEING ABLE TO FORESEE THAT TEST CONDITIONS WOULD EXCEED
THE IN-ORBIT ENVIRONMENT, E.G. HONEYCOMB IN TV/TB AND EARTH
SCANNERS IN TV AND TB-COULD SEE CHAMBER WALLS-TOO WARM.
o INSTRUMENT TEST DEWAR HAD TO BE REDESIGNED DUE TO FATIGUE
(STRESS CORROSION) AND HIGH "G" LOADS DURING VIBRATION TEST.
o NEED MORE EMPHASIS EARLY-ON REGARDING STRUCTURAL TOOLING AND
MANUFACTURING SIMULATORS AND GSE.
o FACTOR "G" NEGATION INTO THE DESIGN EARLY.
o NEED MORE SYSTEM ANALYSES, E.G. FMECA'S. WORST-CASE ANALYSIS,
PARTS STRESS ANALYSES, AND "SPICE" BEFORE WE START CUTTING
HARDWARE; I.E. START EARLY.
o ANALYSIS OF TEST DATA-COBE INSTRUMENTS REQUIRED UP TO TWO
WEEKS TO ANALYZE DATA. THIS PRECLUDES LEGITIMATE REAL-TIME
PASS/FAIL CRITERIA.
o PACKAGING DESIGN
- STS DESIGNED-TOO COMPLEX, TOO LARGE-PCB'S, DIFFICULT TO
HANDLE, COULD CAUSE THERMAL PROBLEMS.
- ELECTRONIC BOXES THAT WEIGH OVER 100 POUNDS.
- DESIGN TO MAKE SURE GROUNDING, EMI, THERMAL, SHIELDING,
STRUCTURE WERE CONSIDERED AND CAN IT BE EASILY REPAIRED
AND TESTED.
o MORE SYSTEMS DESIGN
- BLACK BOXES TOO COMPLEX AND HEAVY
- BETTER POWER DISTRIBUTION AND CONTROL
- GSE, HANDLING AND TRANSPORTATION MUST BE CONSIDERED
DURING INITIAL DESIGN.
- S/C COOLING DURING GROUND OPERATIONS
- EASIER MECHANICAL INTERFACE WITH LAUNCH VEHICLE
o MISSION OPERATIONS
- START DETAILS VERY EARLY
- OPERATING HANDBOOKS FOR EACH BLACK BOX/SUBSYSTEM
- ISOLATION OF CRITICAL COMMANDS
- LAUNCH AND EARLY ORBIT OPS VERY CRITICAL
o TUTORIALS AND PROJECT CONDUCTED DESIGN REVIEWS
- START TUTORIALS EARLY ON DESIGN CRITERIA AND OPERATIONS.
- CONDUCT MORE PROJECT-CHAIRED REVIEWS STARTING WITH
CONCEPTS, PRELIMINARY DESIGN, ETC.
- MANUFACTURING, FABRICATION AND ASSEMBLY REVIEWS
- TEST REVIEWS
CRYOGENICS-REQUIRES MUCH MORE ENGINEERING DESIGN TO BUILD
HARDWARE AT ROOM TEMPERATURE AND THEN FUNCTION AT CRYOGENIC
TEMPERATURE. TAKES MORE TIME TO TEST. RETEST RATES
APPROACHED 100 PERCENT-SCHEDULE DRIVER.
ADHESIVES-THERE IS NOT A UNIFORM UNDERSTANDING OR TABULATION
OF PROPER ADHESIVE§~AT THEIR REQUIRED SERVICE TEMPERATURES.
PARTS-MUST BE CONCERNED WHEN CHOOSING PARTS TO SELECT THOSE
WITH THE HIGHEST RADIATION TOLERANCE. DR. TRAINOR'S LECTURE
ON SINGLE EVENT UPSETS MUST BE HEARD EARLY-ON BY ALL.
FASTENERS-FAILURE TO ANALYZE FOR STRENGTH AND ACCOUNT FOR
STRESS CORROSION/CRACKING.
EARLIER VERIFICATION OF INTERFACES AND PERFORMANCE ON ACTUAL
HARDWARE, E.G., EVEN BREADBOARDS AND ENGINEERING MODELS.
NOT ENOUGH ATTENTION PAID EARLY ENOUGH TO THE DETAILS OF
TESTING AND THE SUBTLETIES THERE-OF. EXAMPLES:
- THE TV-TB THERMAL SHIELD (TEST) TEMPERATURES WOULD
EXCEED THE ON-ORBIT AND DESIGN LIMITS.
- THE EARTH SCANNER WOULD EXCEED THE ON-ORBIT AND
DESIGN LIMITS AND EMI TYPE PROBLEMS INDUCED BY THE
FACILITY IN THE SCREEN ROOM AND SES.
o TOOK FOREVER AND A DAY TO POWER UP AND VERIFY THE STATUS OF
THE OBSERVATORY. NEED A MORE FLEXIBLE C&DH SYSTEM. GROUND
TEST REQUIREMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN FACTORED INTO DESIGN OF THE
C&DH SYSTEM TO ENABLE US TO SPEED UP THE SAMPLING RATES AND
CONCENTRATE GREATER PORTIONS OF THE FORMAT IN SPECIFIC AREAS
AND FOR SPECIFIC TIMES.
o ONE-ON-ONE PEER REVIEW BY TECHNICAL PERSONNEL-LOOK AT THE
DRAWINGS, NOT VU-GRAPHS.
o PARALLEL ANALYSES OF CRITICAL SUBSYSTEM (APL REVIEW OF ACS)
o RIGOROUSLY CONTROL PLANNED TEST PROGRAM
o ANALYSES OF LIFE-SENSITIVE COMPONENTS AND ASSOCIATED LIFE
TESTING RATIONALE
o MAINTENANCE OF FUNCTIONAL TEST LOGS
o TROUBLE-FREE FUNCTIONAL OPERATING TIME OF CRITICAL SUBSYSTEMS
PRIOR TO LAUNCH
o IMPLEMENTATION OF REDUNDANCY AND OPERATIONAL WORKAROUNDS
o TREND ANALYSIS DURING TEST PROG RAM-START AT BLACK BOX
o EMI/EMC
WITH SENSITIVE INSTRUMENTS, WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO MEASURE
THAT WHICH WE DO NOT WANT ON THE SACECRAFT; I.E. "NOISE.
DID NOT WORRY ENOUGH ABOUT THIS EARLY-ON.
DEFINITIVE INTERNAL BOX LEVEL AND SYSTEM LEVEL DESIGN
CRITERIA. EQUIPMENT LAYOUT, STHELDING, HARNESSING,
GROUNDING, ETC.
BOX-LEVEL TESTS PER MIL-STD-461 NOT GOOD ENOUGH. TOO
BROAD A SPECTRUM AND FREQUENCIES WERE NOT MODULATED.
REVIEW ECAC DATA EARLY-ON AND DETERMINE ON-ORBIT
FREQUENCY SPECTRA, MODULATION AND FIELD STRENGTHS.
CONDUCT INTENSIVE/REALISTIC BOX-LEVEL EMI TESTS.
SPECIFICALLY DESIGN OBSERVATORY-LEVEL EMI TEST TO VERIFY:
- SELF COMPATIBILITY
- TRANSPORTATION ENVIRONMENT
- COMPATIBILITY WITH LAUNCH VEHICLE
- CAPABILITY TO SURVIVE IN PRESENCE OF GROUND SOURCES
-- DO TH5 Miss'QV AT Z -<Z
o RANGE AND LAUNCH OPERATIONS-START EARLY
o TEST PLANS/PROCEDURES MUST BE APPROVED BY THE PROJECT OFFICE.
o DON'T EVER GET COMPLACENT, ESPECIALLY WITH EXISTING
DESIGNS/HARDWARE.
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COBE LESSONS LEARNED-ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
o OPTIMUM SITUATION-COLLOCATE ENTIRE PROJECT TEAM IN ONE BUILDING,
o EXPAND SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
- BROADER BASE: ELECTRICAL, MECHANICAL, CONTROLS AND ANALYSTS
TO DO FMECA'S, ETC.
- ALL SYSTEMS ENGINEERS MUST REPORT TO THE SYSTEM MANAGER.
o ALL MONEY MUST BE CONTROLLED AND DISTRIBUTED BY PROJECT OFFICE
IN ACCORDANCE WITH WBS.
o CENTRALIZE ALL PROCUREMENT IN THE PROJECT OFFICE.
o ONE CCB RUN BY THE PROJECT OFFICE-RIGOROUSLY CONTROL ALL CHANGES.
o ALL DRAWINGS, SPECS, DOCUMENTS, CHANGE ORDERS, ETC. MUST BE
RELEASED BY SINGLE PERSON IN PROJECT OFFICE. ALL DOCUMENTS
APPROVED BY PROJECT OFFICE.
o GSFC SORELY NEEDS PRODUCTION CONTROL.
o BRANCHES/DIVISIONS MUST ADVISE THE PROJECT OFFICE AND CONSENT TO
CONTROL OF THE PROJECT OFFICE.
COBE LESSONS LEARNED-ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT (CONTINUED)
o BRANCHES MUST BE RESPONSIBLE FOR DELIVERABLES TIED TO THE WBS. ONE
INDIVIDUAL MUST BE RESPONSIBLE FOR A DELIVERABLE. WBS TO LEVEL 5.
o PROJECT OFFICE AND BRANCH SHOULD CO-SIGN SUB-SYSTEM MANAGER KSO'S
AND PERFORMANCE~APPRAISALS.
o MORE DETAILED SOWS FOR BOTH CONTRACTORS AND BRANCHES.
o CLOSED LOOP SYSTEM TO FOLLOW UP ON ALL ACTION ITEMS.
o CM, CERT LOGS, R&QA SHOULD BE IN PLACE AND NOT DEVELOPED ALONG THE
WAY.
o COBE INSTRUMENT TEAM-MATRIX ORGANIZATION BUILDS UP ULCERS, TEARS
DOWN SCHEDULES, AND INCREASES COST. DETAILED INSTRUMENT
DEVELOPMENT PLAN (IDP) NEEDED VERY EARLY AND TIED TO WBS.
o I&T MANAGER PART OF THE PROJECT OFFICE.
o FORMAL/WEEKLY STATUS REVIEWS WITH EACH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
o SHORT
COBE ORGANIZATION
COBE IS PERFORMED IN THE IN-HOUSE MODE TO STRENGTHEN AND
PRESERVE THIS CAPABILITY AT THE GSFC
• COVERS A MAJORITY OF THE ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE
TECHNOLOGIES
- INSTRUMENT DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT AND DATA
HANDLING
- SPACECRAFT DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT
- OBSERVATORY INTEGRATION AND TEST
• PROVIDES HIGH TECHNOLOGY WORK
- INFRARED DETECTORS
- CRYOGENICS
• PROVIDES HANDS ON EXPERIENCE
- NEW HIRES
- TRAINING TOOL
CUSTOMER PERSPECTIVE-COBE PROJECT OFFICE
SYSTEM DEFINITION-CONFIRM THE OBJECTIVE
- LEVEL I PROJECT REQUIREMENTS (PROJECT PLAN)
- OBSERVATORY LEVEL SPECIFICATION (CODE 401/701)
- SUBSYSTEM SPECIFICATIONS-CO-SIGNED (CODE 401/704/700)
- STATEMENT OF WORK-CO-SIGNED (CODE 401/704/700)
- INTERFACE CONTROL DOCUMENTS-CO-SIGNED (CODE 401/704/700)
PLANS/STUDIES-ESTABLISH BOUNDARIES AND THEIR COMPLIANCE
(CODE 400/704)
ENGINEERING EXECUTION-PARTITION THE SYSTEM (CODE 401/704)
TRADE-OFFS-OPTIMIZATION (CODE 401/704)
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IN-HOUSE SUBSYSTEM PROCUREMENT MODE
GSFC PERFORMS THE ROLE OF THE "SYSTEMS CONTRACTOR"
• INSTRUMENTS: BUY PARTS/COMPONENTS
DESIGN/FABRICATE/INTEGRATE/TEST IN-HOUSE
• SPACECRAFT: SYSTEM DESIGN IN-HOUSE. BUY COMPONENTS
(EARTH SCANNERS, BATTERIES. REACTION WHEELS, ETC..)
AND MAJOR SUBSYSTEMS (PROPULSION. DEWAR, ETC.)
• GROUND SYSTEM: SYSTEM DESIGN IN-HOUSE. BUY
HARDWARE/SOFTWARE
• INTEGRATION AND TEST: IN-HOUSE/CONTRACTOR SUPPORT
• LAUNCH/MISSION OPS: IN-HOUSE/CONTRACTOR SUPPORT
SOURCE BOARD
o SPECS/SOW PREPARED BY FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION AND APPROVED BY
PROJECT PRIOR TO SUBMITTAL TO SEB.
o SYSTEMS MANAGER MEMBER OF ALL SEB'S, OTHER PROJECT PERSONNEL
CONSULTANTS.
o SEB CHAIRPERSON-NO SET POLICY
o OBSERVATORY MANAGER PART OF NEGOTIATION TEAM
o ALL SPEC/SOW CHANGES APPROVED BY CCB.
DOCUMENTATION CONTROL AND
METHOD OF CHANGE
PROJECT APPROVES AND MAINTAINS TOP LEVEL DOCUMENTS
EXAMPLES:
- COBE SYSTEMS PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATION:
COBE-SR-401-1004-01
- COBE CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PLAN: PL-401-1001 01
- COBE VERIFICATION AND TEST PLAN: COBE-PL-730-1702-01
PROJECT APPROVES ALL INSTRUMENT AND SPACECRAFT
SUBSYSTEM SPECIFICATIONS/ICD'S. DOCUMENTS NORMALLY
MAINTAINED AT BRANCH LEVEL.
COBE CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PLAN ESTABLISHES THE
BASIC FRAMEWORK FOR CONTROL OF CHANGES
- CLASS I CHANGES (PROJECT APPROVAL REQUIRED)
- CLASS II CHANGES (PROJECT REPRESENTATIVE INVOLVED)
PROJECT APPROVES (OR DISAPPROVES) AND MAINTAINS ALL
CLASS I CHANGES
- CONFIGURATION BOARD MEETS WEEKLY TO DISPOSITION
CHANGES
- DISPOSITION EMERGENCY CHANGE REQUESTS IN "REALTIME1
PRQJEGT_REPRESENTAT!VES PARTICIPATE IN AND REVIEW ALL
CLASS II CHANGE ACT IONS
DOCUMENTATION
ALL PROCURED ITEMS ARE DELIVERED WITH ACCEPTANCE DATA PACKAGE.
ALL IN-HOUSE HARDWARE IS DELIVERED WITH CERT LOGS.
OBSERVATORY IS INTEGRATED VIA APPROVED (I&T MANAGER & Q/A) WORK
ORDERS.
OBSERVATORY IS TESTED WITH APPROVED WORK ORDERS AND APPROVED TEST
PLAN (DPM) AND TEST PROCEDURES (OBSERVATORY MANAGER AND/OR
INSTRUMENT MANAGER)
ALL PROBLEMS ARE DOCUMENTED BY Q/A (REFERENCE AGAINST WORK ORDER)
AND REVIEWED BY OBSERVATORY AND/OR INSTRUMENT MANAGERS.
PROBLEM RECORDS THAT BECOME MALFUNCTION REPORTS ARE REVIEWED BY
ENVIRONMENTAL TEST COMMITTEE-SIGNED OFF BY Q/A AND OBSERVATORY
OR INSTRUMENT MANAGER AND SYSTEMS MANAGER.
TEST CONDUCTOR LOG SHOWS WHAT PROCEDURES WERE RUN FOR EACH
OBSERVATORY TEST.
DOCUMENTATION (CONTINUED)
ACTUAL SUBSYSTEM VALUES ARE ARCHIVED IN THE COMPUTER FILE (FILED
BY DATE).
Q/A MAINTAINS LIST OF ALL PROBLEMS/MALFUNCTIONS AGAINST EACH TEST.
Q/A MAINTAINS SHEETS SUBMITTED WITHIN 24-HOURS OF A TEST.
COBE INSTRUMENTS HAVE REQUIRED APPROXIMATELY 2 WEEKS TO ANALYZE
DATA. PRECLUDES A LEGITIMATE REAL-TIME PASS/FAIL CRITERIA.
COBE MONTHLY REPORTING SCHEDULE
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COBE PROJECT DOLLAR/MANPOWER/SCHEDULE
REPORTING SYSTEM (CONT.)
CAUSE AND IMPACT OF VARIANCES WORKED MONTHLY WITH
SUBSYSTEM MANAGERS. ESTIMATE AT COMPLETION (EAC)
DETERMINED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION PLANNED
PROJECT SUMMARIZES DATA AT THE SPACECRAFT. DEWAR, AND
INDIVIDUAL INSTRUMENT LEVEL AND PRESENTS MONTHLY TO
"DIRECTORS OF"
COBE PROJECT DOLLAR/MANPOWER/SCHEDULE
REPORTING SYSTEM
o DETAILED SCHEDULES, DOLLAR AND MANPOWER PLANS ESTABLISHED AT
THE SUBSYSTEM LEVEL:
- COST IDENTIFIED AT THE BOX AND TASK LEVEL FOR THE
SPACECRAFT SUBSYSTEM"5TTHE COMPONENT AND TASK LEVEL
FOR THE INSTRUMENTS.
- MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
IDENTIFIED TO SAME LEVEL AS COST.
- PERT SCHEDULES DEVELOPED FOR EACH SPACECRAFT SUBSYSTEM AND
INSTRUMENT:
- SPACECRAFT 17 NETS (2000 NODES)
- INSTRUMENTS 3 NETS (250 NODES EACH)
o DATA ACCUMULATED FROM SUPPORTING ORGANIZATIONS AND SUMMARIZED
IN PROJECT OFFICE AT THE SUBSYSTEM LEVEL.
o TECHNICAL PROGRESS/PROBLEMS REVIEWED WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
DAILY/WEEKLY/MONTHLY.
PROJECT WORK BREAKDOWN
STRUCTURE FOR COBE
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COBE ASSURANCE MANAGEMENT
LESSONS LEARNED
March 7, 1990
flH-1
GENERAL
o TEAM SPIRIT, COMMUNICATION
o SKILLED PEOPLE WHO TAKE PRIDE IN THEIR WORK, THINK ABOUT
WHAT THEY'RE DOING
o SKELETON CREWS
o OFFICE OF FLIGHT ASSURANCE TECHNICAL EXPERTS
o TEAM SPIRIT
PARTS
O PARTS LISTS ON ELECTRONIC DATA BASE, UP TO DATE
o AS BUILT PARTS LISTS
O ECO REVIEW FOR EEE PARTS CHANGES
O RADIATION TESTING - SINGLE EVENT UPSET REVIEW
o REVIEW FOR APPLICATION
o PART PROGRAM COSTS
o BOX RELIABILITY
/-I
MATERIALS
o FASTENER TESTING AND CONTROL IMPLEMENTED
o MATERIALS REVIEWED FOR APPLICATION
o CONTAMINATION VS BSD CONTROL
o PYROTECHNICS
o CONTAMINATION
CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
o CLOSED LOOP SYSTEM WORKED WELL
o CERT LOGS WORKED WELL
o BETTER CONTROL OF AS-BUILT, ORIGINAL DRAWINGS - SPECIFICALLY HARNESS
MILLIOHM DRAWINGS
o QA NOT INCLUDED IN ALL ASPECTS OF MECHANICAL DRAWING AND ECO REVIEW
EARLY PLANNING AND DESIGN
o PEER REVIEWS OF DESIGNS IMPLEMENTED
o REALISTIC DRAWING REQUIREMENTS
o DESIGNING WITH GROUND TEST AND ENVIRONMENTS IN MIND
o QA REVIEW OF TASK ORDERS IMPLEMENTED
o QA REVIEW OF DESIGN CHANGES
MANUFACTURING AND PROCESSING
O LIMITED LIFE ITEMS TRACKED
O CERT LOGS IMPLEMENTED
O ENVIRONMENTAL TEST COMMITEE FORMED
O CONTAMINATION CONTROL
O SURVEILLANCE OF CONTRACTOR
M-7
INTEGRATION AND TEST
o PROCEDURES SHOULD STAND ALONE, WHEN POSSIBLE, HAVE MORE THAN ONE
PERSON QUALIFIED TO RUN PROCEDURE
o BSD CONTROL - YES, GLOVES AND WRISTATS ARE A BAD IDEA, NEEDS MORE
ATTENTION FOR FUTURE PROGRAMS
o MATE/DEMATE - DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE NUMBER OF MATES/DEMATES WITH
COBE LOG, LOG SHOULD BE LISTED PER CONNECTOR, NOT PER DAY.
o DAILY I&T MEETINGS VERY USEFUL
o WALKTHROUGHS VERY USEFUL
o CONTROL OF UNSCHEDULED TESTS
o WORK ORDER AUTHORIZATIONS IMPLEMENTED
o TEST SOFTWARE AND HARDWARE CONTROL
O CONSISTENT FUNCTIONAL/PERFORMANCE TESTS - WHEN WE HAD THEM, THEY
WERE GREAT, WHEN WE DIDN'T TIME AND EFFORT WAS WASTED
o TESTS WERE RUN AS CLOSE TO FLIGHT CONFIGURATION AS POSSIBLE.
TEST BOX CONFIGURATION CONTROL - SOME SURPRISES WHEN TEST BOX OR HARNESS
NOT AS EXPECTED
o CLOSED LOOP NONCONFORMANCE CONTROL SYSTEM IMPLEMENTED
o FACILITY QA INITIATED
o STAFFING, INADEUATE AT TIMES FOR 24 HOUR OPERATIONS
LAUNCH SITE
o AVOID NEW, UNREHEARSED TESTS CLOSE TO LAUNCH DAY
o ADEQUATE STAFFING FOR 24 HOUR TESTING
o COMMUNICATIONS NET CHECKOUT AND REHEARSAL VERY USEFUL
o MORE INTERFACE BETWEEN LAUNCH VEHICLE AND SPACECRAFT PERSONNEL FOR
I&T PLANNING
o MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO
POST LAUNCH
o SPACECRAFT ORBITAL ANOMALY REPORT (SOAR) SYSTEM UTILIZED
o MISSION DATA CENTER
o BONDED STORES OF FLIGHT SPARES USEFUL FOR POST LAUNCH TROUBLESHOOTING
A/I -to

GENERAL
1. TEAM SPIRIT
The team spirit over came many adversities.
2. RESPONSIBLE PERSONNEL
One thinking person is better than 100 procedures.
Procedures are very necessary, but occasionally, there'll be a
mistake in one or it won't explain something fully. COBE
personnel never hesitated to report a problem.
3. MANAGEMENT SUPPORT
An assurance management program doesn't work as well when
management doesn't support it. COBE management was very
responsive to perforance assurance requirements.
4. SKELETON CREW
The in-house COBE assurance mangement team was much smaller
than that for a comparable out-of-house spacecraft. Some bending
of the rules was required for the sanity and sleep of those
involved. However, the spirit of GSFC performance assurance
requirements was never compromised, and the entire COBE team
became involved in the program. Total Quality Management is the
buzzword today from NASA headquarters. The implementation of
that idea was seen on COBE and other GSFC programs.
5. OFFICE OF FLIGHT ASSURANCE TECHNICAL EXPERTS
One thing COBE personnel made good use of was the technical
expertise of Code 300 personnel. Many people see us only as
watchdogs but the Code 300 groups contain experts in materials
and EEE parts, experienced designers, and personnel experienced
in test and evaluation.
PARTS CONTROL
1. UP TO DATE PARTS LIST, ON ELECTRONIC DATABASE
The parts lists must be kept up to date and on a computer
data base. COBE was unable to keep the electronic data base up
to date. As a result, most part searches were done by hand,
using recipe cards, parts lists, and ECO's. This, of course, was
very labor intensive.
Some of our lists were in good shape, but for others, to be
really be sure of the as-built configuration, we had to go back
to the manufacturer. In one case, we almost replaced a part
because our lists showed it to be a bad date code. That
particular part had already been replaced at the manufacturer,
but they had failed to up date the as-built parts list with the
correct date codes.
2. AS-BUILT PARTS LISTS
As-built parts lists must reflect manufacturer, d/c and,
ideally, board serial number. Not all of our lists had this, but
those that did saved eons of time researching parts data. The
new NHB handbooks require this information specifically, and it's
worth the effort to make sure you get it. If the contractor is
being funded to maintain the as-built list, be sure to include
the requirement to perform special parts searches, not just those
related to GIDEP. NASA TWX Alerts are one example of non-GIDEP
parts alerts.
3. ECO REVIEW FOR EEE PARTS CRANAGES
COBE implemented parts engineer review of ECO's for EEE
parts changes. A logical follow on to parts list review.
4. RADIATION TESTING
Radiation testing was included in the COBE parts program.
Single Event Upsets and Latchups should be reviewed.
5. REVIEW FOR APPLICATION
EEE parts should be reviewed for application as well as
Perferred Parts status. The peer reviews of each design would be
an excellent way to double check applications. A parts engineer
should be a member of the review team. Stress analyses and worst
case analyses also are places where parts ratings can be taken
into account. Some poor applications on COBE were discovered by
stress analysis and parts were changed early in design. Another
application, where a part did not meet full derating criteria,
was not discovered until peer reviews performed very late in the
program. Although this part was acceptable as is, it illustrated
the need for early peer reviews.
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6. PARTS PROGRAM COSTS
We've learned that a Grade 2 parts program is expensive.
It is worth a little effort on the design engineer's part to
check for the availability of standard parts. Besides their
proven reliability, they save expensive NSPAR reviews and qual
programs.
Even after the boxes are built, parts costs continue.
There are Alert searches and random part failures that require
research and testing. Although costs level out after hardware
builds are complete, they are still incurred up to launch day.
In fact, COBE had a small amount of parts testing performed after
launch.
Tracking of parts program costs is essential. COBE
closely tracked parts test status and charge backs. A number of
large charge back errors were noted - charges from other programs
were put on the COBE books. Schedule tracking also kept parts
moving through the screening process.
7. BOX RELIABILITY
It at all possible, avoid using the same date code in
redundant boxes. If a part lot is found to be defective, the
effect will be lessoned .if we use many different lots in our
boxes.
MATERIALS CONTROL
1. FASTENER CONTROL
We now realize that counterfeit and substandard fasteners
exist in US stocks. COBE went back and tested stock fasteners
and implemented a fastener program on new buys. We did discover
cracked, porous, and soft fasteners during our receiving
inspection of transporter fasteners. This demonstrated that
ground support equipment must be considered in the fastener
program.
2. MATERIALS REVIEW
Materials must be reviewed for application. Some COBE
applications were severe, with cryogenic temperatures and
contamination cosnstraints, The fact that we had so few
materials problems is owed to the close work with Code 313 in
determining materials usage.
3. BSD VS CONTAMINATION
Consider contamination aspects when evaluating BSD control
materials.
4. PYROTECHNICS
Nray of pyrotechnic devices was utilized to verify charge
fill of flight devices.
5. CONTAMINATION
Strict adherance to contamination requirements in materials
usage eliminated many potential problems for the spacecraft.
One problem we did suffer from was Caprolactam contamination
from the antistatic blankets that were used. By the time an
alert was issued for the material, RCAS 2400, COBE had been
covered with it for months. Most of the contamination was
eliminated during thermal vacuum, but some remained and turned up
as a white residue on the spacecraft after shipment. RCAS was
replaced with Llumalloy.
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CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
1. CLOSED LOOP SYSTEM
The use of a closed loop system worked well for COBE. No
CCR was closed until the work was completed and inspected.
2. CERT LOGS
Again, cert logs are invaluable for recording and verifying
as-built configuration.
3. CONTROL OF DRAWINGS
We did not control harness drawings with milliohm
measurements very well. As a result, the drawings became torn,
some were lost and the rest were just hard to dig through.
4. QA REVIEW OF DRAWINGS
All major contractors include QA in the review of drawings.
We did not review mechanical drawings on a regular basis. No
specific problems were encountered, but a QA review enables us to
do such things as check for materials applications, verify
fracture control implementation and make sure all the other
proper people have reviewed the drawings.
EARLY PLANNING AND DESIGN
1. PEER REVIEWS OF DESIGNS IMPLEMENTED
Peer reviews of deployables and some electronics systems
provided detailed insight into the designs. The deployables
reviews, in particular did an excellent job of action item
followup.
2. REALISTIC DRAWING REQUIREMENTS
Avoid too tight tolerances. We had an excessive reject
rate on COBE mechanical parts, and most of the problems written
up were bought use-as-is. Also, we were forced by schedule to
accept some items that we could have reworked. In the future
more pressure should be put to bear on the machine shops to build
parts to print. The Institutional Assurance group is setting up
a trend program to identify areas of concern.
3. DESIGNING WITH GROUND TEST AND ENVIRONMENTS IN MIND
In some cases, the Ig environment "helped" our system,
masking design problems. Special 0 g tests for the XCAL
mechanism exposed design faults not apparent at 1 g.
In other cases, the Ig environment hurt our system. The
loading on the honeycomb DMR ring during t/v was going to be
much more severe than in flight loading. Some scrambling and
testing was performed close to t/v to ensure that no damage would
be incurred.
4. QA REVIEW OF TASK ORDERS
QA review of Task Orders and Purchase Requests was performed
to ensure that proper quality requriements were imposed. Most
COBE contractors imposed proper requirements on themselves, but
we occasionally ran into problems where QA review was missed and
contractors did not plan for the cost of quality assurance. On
other programs, we've also had contractors refuse to perform
certain quality tasks because that clause has been left off the
Task Order. Bottom line, great when we did it , shakey when we
forgot.
5. CONTROL OF DESIGN CHANGES AND QA REVIEW
Tight control of design changes throughout the design
and manufacturing process is necessary. This is the only way to
accurately track the as-built configuration. Also, QA should be
part of drawing review. This would enable us to review for
materials and parts applications, fracture control
implementation, etc.
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MANUFACTURING AND PROCESSING
1. LIMITED LIFE
Limited life items were tracked. Because of unscheduled
tests and activities, systems are often run more than originally
planned. Tracking the limited life articles on COBE made it easy
for us to feel comfortable about how much margin we had in system
lifetimes.
2. CERT LOGS
Cert logs provided an excellent source of test and
configuration information. Many many times, we were able to go
back to cert logs and find out what cleaning procedure had been
used on a box, or to verify the date of a test. Many people find
them a bother to fill out, but they are the only piece of
documentation that travels with the hardware throughout it's
life. Engineer's notebooks may contain the same information, but
different people that work on a box will have different
notebooks, and these will not travel with the hardware.
Some cert logs were lost during the course of the program.
Cert logs should be as carefully tracked as flight hardware. .
3. ENVIRONMENTAL TEST COMMITEE
This was a special committee formed on COBE to ensure that
the verification plan was executed on all subsystems. In addition
to tracking testing, the committee acted as a peer review group
for test plans and procedures.
4. CONTAMINATION
From the beginning of the hardware build to launch,
contamination control should be considered. There are some
schools that believe that hardware can be built in an
uncontrolled environment and then cleaned to required cleanliness
levels. Some hardware, such as harnesses, can never be brought
back to acceptable levels once contaminated. The COBE program
at GSFC maintained c.c. early on. Care taken in keep hardware
clean helpd us during thermal vacuum preparation and of course,
elimintaed flight problems.
At least two failures on COBE were traced to contamination
introduced during manufacturing. Two boxes in the C&DH system
had small metallic slivers introduced during the conformal
coating process. These failures were not discovered until quite
late in the program. Had the contractor maintained closer
surveillance of the boards and environment, these problems may
have been eliminated.
5. SURVEILLANCE OF CONTRACTORS
We can't be a at a contractor's plant all the time, and we
don't really want to be. However, whenever possible, visits to
contractors and potential contractors should be made to get a
feel for their performance assurance program. Review of
paperwork alone is not effective. You have to get out on the
floor and see the equipment being used, see if the technicians
are certified, verify if they are using the wonderful procedures
they submitted in their proposal, etc.
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INTEGRATION AND TEST
1. PROCEDURES
Procedures: a necessary evil. Procedures are there to
remind a skilled technician or engineer what to do. They're not
there to teach us what to do. They tell us what equipment we
need, they provide QA with a checklist so that we can aid in the
verification of the procedure. They provide a forum for the
retention of data. They also provide a mechanism for review; one
person is not planning arid performing a test, a team of people
are involved. The tests that worked best in our mind were the
ones with the most clear procedures. The set up went quickly,
the pass fail criteria were there, etc. Generally we ran into
fewer surprises when working with a proc that was well thought
out.
Whenever possible, more than one person should be qualified
to run a procedure. That way, when one person is absent, I&T
doesn't grind to a halt. A couple of our subsystems were
undermanned during the test period.
A word on pass/fail criteria. More than once, we were
burned when we didn't believe the pass/fail criteria in our
procedures. An open circuit in the pyro harnesses went
undetected for months, even though the data showed a clear
failure. As QA people, we should not accept a quick, on the spot
evaluation such as "it must be in the test box". Very often it
is just a set up anomaly, but all test failures must be written
up and evaluated as nonconformances.
Before beginning a test verify that all the necessary test
equipment, break out boxes, etc. are available. If the
procedures lists these right up front, it will be easy to just
go through the list and check things out. The engineers and
technicians sometimes had to spend some of their scheduled test
time hunting up equipment.
2. BSD CONTROL
Yes, gloves and wrist stats are not always compatible with
BSD control. The MTM watchdog box was damaged by BSD, possibly
during a period when no wrist stat was being used at all.
Everyone knows that this is important. COBE did not suffer any
serious BSD failures, but after the BBXRT incident, we now
realize that our procedures allowed for many of the same hazards.
The Code 700 BSD working group should deal with this problem.
3. CONNECTORS
Mate/Demate logs should list mates per connector, not per
day. We kept a daily log and it was almost impossible to tell
how many times a particular connector had been mated or demated.
GSFC does have log sheets in the new format. Although we'll end
up with many sheets in the end, if we start at the beginning of a
program and make up new sheets as we connect new connectors, the
implementation won't be too difficult. /?"// O/N
4. I&T MEETINGS
Daily I&T meetings were a good forum for planning test
activities.
5. WALKTHROUGHS
At designated points through the program, COBE instituted
walkthroughs. A representative from each subsystem was invited
to come and review the hardware. .In general, COBE was found to
be in good shape, but we did discover discrepancies that would
have caused problems later.
6. UNSCHEDULED TESTS
Times were always hectic on COBE, but we feel, in
performance assurance, that we should have been more cautious of
our approval of unscheduled tests. Although no damage ever
occurred to any instrument or subsystem, the potential was there.
We did have tests that wasted time because they were designed in
haste. Time was spent investigating "problems" that were only
misinterpretations of data. Sometimes too many parameters were
changed at once, making interpretation of data difficult. Also,
because these invariably occurred in the off hours, the people
running the tests were not always as familiar with the system as
the test designer. If problems occurred within the procedure,
and mistakes were easy to make in a proc written in an hour, a
lot of time was spent trying to get the thing to run.
7. WORK ORDER AUTHORIZATIONS (WOA'S)
Work Order Authorizations worked well.
GOOD - They made verification of work done and by whom very easy
- They allowed for control and review of work to be
performed.
- QA was include in review, allowed for proper QA
requirements, notified QA for scheduling of manpower,
allowed us to close the loop on CCR actions.
BAD - Too many jobs were included on some WOAs. Work should be
completed within one work period, otherwise, we found that
a WOA could linger in the cleanroom for months.
Occasionally, they got lost.
Occasionally too many groups in the cleanroom at once.
QA requirements for witnessing were sometimes missed.
Sometimes QA had to act as a traffic cop in the test area.
This could be avoided if the I&T group has the luxury of
it's own traffic cop to manage the changing flow of work.
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8. TEST SOFTWARE AND HARDWARE CONTROL
Control of test software and hardware does not have to be
quite as rigorous as flight. However, we did run into problems
because of our loose controls.
Failures in test harnesses cost us some time during I&T.
Good commercial quality, if not flight level, should be something
to strive for.
Design and configuration control of test equipment should
not be taken lightly. Although we never damaged flight
equipment, we did blow out a small piece of test equipment
because miscommunication in a test box design. An evening's work
would have been saved if the drawings had been reviewed with more
care. Another time, we thought there was a short in the pryo
harnessing. After several hours, it was discovered that a test
turnaround plug was not wired as expected.
Once test equipment is working, it changing the
configuration should not be considered trivial.
These examples are also reasons why safe to mate tests are
so important.
A similar argument goes for test software. After a few
bloopers on "improved" test software, we began to perform closer
reviews of the procedures with the engineers. Going through the
proc with the engineer step by step didn't take too much time,
and we did ferret out some problems that way. For tests of
critical functions, or procedures that could cause damage to the
spacecraft, configuration control should be imposed.
9. CONSISTENCY
Consistency between performance tests that are run again and
again through the life of the system are very important. When we
had them, they provided a concise view of the system's health.
When we didn't, we wasted time and effort trying to trend a
system whose test parameters kept changing.
10. MISSION CONFIGURATION
Tests that were run as close to mission configuration as
possible gave us the best insight into in-flight system
performance. A concrete example of this was the use of flight
arming plugs, not flight like. We learned a few times that what
you think is exactly like flight is not always, by design or
workmanship. It was worth our peace of mind to test with the
real thing.
One add on to this is the requirement for control of small
flight pieces like fuse plugs and arming connectors. These units
go on and off the spacecraft and can be mishandled if not
immediately put in a flight storage area.
11. NONCONFORMANCE REPORTING
A closed loop problem and malfunction reporting system was
implemented for COBE. No nonconformance was closed until the
work was completed. Some other systems close NR's when the
corrective action is determined. Out of sight, out of mind, the
corrective action can be forgotten.
12. FACILTY QA
Qaulity assurance for facilty operations such as thermal
vacuum and vibration was attempted for COBE. Review of test
procedures, verification of test equipment and set up were some
of the things that we tried. For future programs, we recommend
that facility groups be included in the full mission assurance
program.
13. STAFFING
Can be summed up as long hours, tired people, mistakes are
possible.
Special consideration could be taken for off shifts. Because
of manpower problems, we sometimes had personnel on night shifts
who were not quite as familiar with the systems as the day shift.
Operational mistakes were made. And back to the unscheduled test
theme, QA should be very wary of unscheduled tests during off
hours when full staff is not present for review of procedures.
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LAUNCH SITE
1. AVOID NEW, UNREHEARSED TESTS CLOSE TO DATE OF LAUNCH.
We had a test planned that would check critical dewar valves
one last time before launch. Although this test was reviewed
carefully a number of times before its execution, a glitch
occurred. The test harness, which had been used on the
spacecraft for at least a-year, had turnarounds that we were
unaware of. The test failed on the first attempt. It was the
day before launch, and every hour counted. The problem was
discovered and corrected, and the test completed in time. This
may not always be the case. It also may not always be the case
that the engineers retain cool heads. To start unscheduled
troubleshooting or test activities with the clock ticking away
can cause people to make serious judgement errors.
2. ADEQUATE STAFFING
Because of lack of travel funding, or attrition, inadequate
staffing was often a problem. Personnel were forced to work long
hours. In cases where there was only one representative from a
subsystem or instrument, that individual would work late into the
night. Concentrated effort is impossible over such a long day.
3. COMMUNICATION CHECKOUT
Check out the communications net and rehearse protocols before
launch day. We discovered that there were many faults in the
communication system during rehearsals. Channel by channel
checkouts ensured that the net was up and running by launch day.
4. INTERFACE BETWEEN LAUNCH VEHICLE AND SPACECRAFT PERSONNEL
In one famous incident, COBE I&T made a request to the
Delta shift manager to stop fairing work. Although that request
was accepted, the crew in the tower continued work. The ensuing
miscommunication caused the COBE to be exposed in the tower for
some four hours. In another, the COBE FAM was told at a Delta
staff that COBE personnel could safe the spacecraft before pad
closure. At the same time, a call came in from the pad that the
crew was being ejected.
At the beginning of operations, we could have used a little
more understanding between Delta and COBE personnel on who to go
to in event of a schedule change.
More interface for I&T meetings to understand launch vehicle
schedules as they mesh with COBE would have been useful. Those
kind of integrated schedules were instituted later in the game
and they were helpful.
Also, special spacecraft safety restrictions should be
made clear to vehicle personnel. Contamination was a big item
that was discussed many months before our arrival to the launch
site. Restrictions against flash photography, Xray, and cleaning
solutions, could also have been included.
5. MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO
As work level plateaued, daily I&T meetings became erratic.
The I&T meetings allowed different groups to schedule tests
efficiently. They also provided a forum for reviewing complex
test procedures and making sure all participating groups were
prepared and understood their roles in the test. Without good
meetings, personnel were unsure at times when a test was to be
run.
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POST LAUNCH
1. SPACECRAFT ORBITAL ANOMALY REPORTS (SOAR'S)
COBE has implemented the GSFC SOAR system. This adds COBE
data to the ever growing database for GSFC spacecraft.
2. MISSION DATA CENTER
COBE's idea to have a mission data center was a good one.
Although the execution became difficlt with limited manpower, it
was useful to hae a single location for storage of tapes, data
packages test reports and drawings.
3. FLIGHT STOCKS
Keep critical flight stocks available in case of in-prbit
failure. Spare boards and parts were used for troubleshooting of
the Rate Measurement Assembly failure and the Firas MTM
anomalies.
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SC-C & DH
COBE ACS
COMPONENT INTERFACE
PERFORMANCE
•LAUNCHED NOVEMBER 18, 1989
• CONTROL SYSTEM PERFECT (EARLY ORBITS)
•NO UNSCRIPTED COMMANDS REQUIRED
•GYRO FAILED AFTER ONLY 4 DAYS
•UNEXPECTED ECLIPSES JANUARY 26, 1990
LESSONS LEARNED/EARLY ORBIT
PERFORMANCE
• ESA EMI PROBLEMS • — P. NEWMAN
•GYRO FAILURE/FOLLOW-ON ANALYSIS S. PLACANICA
•ECLIPSE M. FEMIANO
•SUN SENSOR PERFORMANCE T. FLATLEY
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EMI
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COBE
EARTH SENSOR
EMI PROBLEM
(RADIATED SUSCEPTIBILITY)
AND ITS SOLUTION
P h i l l i p A . Newman J r .
NASA Goddard Space F l i g h t Center
CODE 712.2
G r e e n b e l t , MD 20771
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I n t r o d u c t i o n
The COBE E a r t h Sensor is a m i c r o p r o c e s s o r c o n t r o l l e d i n s t r u m e n t
t h a t o p e r a t e s i n t h e 14-16 m i c r o n s p e c t r a l r e g i o n . T h e
m i c r o p r o c e s s o r a n a l y z e s a sa m p l e d e a r t h s i g n a l , d e t e r m i n e s t h e
e a r t h c e n t e r a n d o u t p u t s a n e r r o r s i g n a l , p r o p o r t i o n a l t o t h e
a n g u l a r d i s t a n c e from t h e n a d i r , t h a t i s used t o c o n t r o l t h e
s p a c e c r a f t . T h e m i c r o p r o c e s s o r a l s o commutales t h e b r u s h l e s s d c
motor and c o n t r o l s its speed. F i g u r e 1 shows a block d i a g r a m of
the COBE E a r t h Sensor. The sensor met alI of the NASA p e r f o r m a n c e
r e q u i r e m e n t s d u r i n g a c c e ptance t e s t a n d t h e four f l i g h t u n i t s
have p e r f o r m e d f l a w l e s s l y i n f l i g h t .
However the COBE E a r t h Sensor was found to be e x t r e m e l y s e n s i t i v e
to m o d u l a t e d RF, e s p e c i a l l y in the f r e q u e n c y range of UHF/L band
radar (400 to 450 MHz], at f i e l d s t r e n g t h s s t r o n g e r than 1V/m.
It was d e t e r m i n e d that t h e r e were a number of o p e r a t i o n a l radar
systems t h a t c o u l d produce f i e l d s of 3V/m or g r e a t e r at the COBE
o r b i t . A s o l u t i o n was found in a Faraday cage that c o m p l e t e l y
s h i e l d e d the Earth Sensor up to lOV/m and did not i n t e r f e r e w i t h
t h e o p t i c a l p erformance.
F i g u r e 1 COBE E a r t h Sensor B l o c k D i a g r a m
C h r o n o l o g y
T h e E a r t h Sensor Q u a l i f i c a t i o n M o d e l u n d e r w e n t a c o m p l e t e L M I
t e s t as r e q u i r e d by the s p e c i f i c a t i o n and MILSTD 4 6 1 A . The t e s t
i n q u e s t i o n , RS-03 r a d i a t e d s u s c e p t i b i l i t y , w a s passed t o t h e
spec l i m i t of 2V/m. MILSTD 4 6 1 A docs not r e q u i r e m o d u l a t i o n of
t h e R F a l t h o u g h l a t e r v e r s i o n s d o .
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F i g u r e 2 E a r t h Sensor
S u s c e p t i b i l i t y Test
E r r o r S i g n a l d u r i n g S/C RF
D u r i n g a s p a c e c r a f t l e v e l EMI s u s c e p t i b i l i t y t e s t in May of 1989,
where the RF was m o d u l a t e d at 30 H? and 100.1 Hz in o r d e r to
accommodate o n e o f t h e e x p e r i m e n t s , i t w a s found t h a t t h e E a r t h
Sensor head c l o s e s t t o t h e a n t e n n a gave s p u r i o u s e r r o r s i g n a l s
t h a t e v e n t u a l l y s a t u r a t e d a n d even l o c k e d u p , t h e sensor. T h e t e s t
was conducted w i t h o u t an e a r t h t a r g e t .
A t f i r s t t h e concern w a s w i t h h i g h power r a d a r s a t t h e l a u n c h
s i t e c a u s i n g a l o c k - u p i n a sensor t h a t w o u l d r e s u l t i n a hard
f a i l u r e . An i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n d i c a t e d t h a t component damage wa s
u n l i k e l y a t f i e l d s t r e n g t h s l e s s t h a n a m i c r o w a v e oven. B y m i d -
J u l y i t became c l e a r t h a t t h e r e were a number o f r a d a r s a t
u n d i s c l o s e d l o c a t i o n s t h a t h a d h i g h enough f i e l d s t r e n g t h s t o
cause s e r i o u s o p e r a t i o n a l p r o b l e m s . L a t e r , a d d i t i o n a l systems
were d i s c l o s e d t h a t c o u l d p r o d u c e -even h i g h e r f i e l d s t r e n g t h s .
A component t e s t was c o n d u c t e d on the q u a l i f i c a t i o n model E a r t h
Sensor i n e a r l y S e p t e m b e r o f 1989. I t w a s d i s c o v e r e d t h a t t h e
m o d u l a t e d r f w a s b e i n g d e t e c t e d b y t h e sensor h e a d . T h e
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d s i g n a l c o u l d b e seen r i d i n g o n t o p o f t h e a n a l o g
e a r t h sensor v i d e o s i g n a l C f i g u r c 3 ) .
A second s p a c e c r a f t l e v e l E M I t e s t w a s c o n d u c t e d i n t h e l a s t week
of September of 1989 where each of the t h r e e f l i g h t sensor heads
were p o s i t i o n e d , i n t u r n , i n close p r o x i m i t y t o t h e a n t e n n a . A l l
heads had the same p r o b l e m to v a r y i n g d e g r e e s . S e v e r a l a p p r o a c h e s
to s h i e l d i n g the sensor head we re t r i e d w i t h s omc success. A
c r u d e p a r t i a l Faraday cage seemed t h e most p r o m i s i n g .
A t i g e r team was formed to s o l v e the p r o b l e m . The f i r s t m e e t i n g
at Barnes E n g i n e e r i n g in S h c l t o n , CI pr o d u c e d a cage d e s i g n and
o u t l i n e d a c r i t i c a l t e s t p l a n t o assure t h a t i t would s o l v e t h e
p r o b l e m w i t h o u t i m p a c t i n g t h e E S A performance.
T h e f i r s t u n i t w a s f a b r i c a t e d over a weekend u s i n g 5 m il Be-Cu
w i r e . The EMI t e s t showed no e v i d e n c e of the m o d u l a t e d RF in the
v i d e o at l e v e l s of 10V/m and g r e a t e r . Subsequent o p t i c a l t e s t s
were a l l s u c c e s s f u l . T h i s f i r s t q u a l model broke a w i r e d u r i n g
a c o u s t i c t e s t . It was d e t e r m i n e d t h a t the w i r e had a s u b s t a n t i a l
number o f d e f e c t s (voids) t h a t made i t u n s u i t a b l e f o r t h i s
a p p l i c a t i o n . The u n i t was reworked w i t h a new source of A mil Be-
C u w i r e a n d passed a l l o f t h e m e c h a n i c a l t e s t i n g w i t h o u t f a i l u r e .
Four f l i g h t u n i t s were c o m p l e t e d and tested by October 26, 1989
and were s h i p p e d to V a n d e n b e r g AFB for i n s t a l l a t i o n on the
s p a c e c r a f t p r i o r to the c l o s i n g of the D e l t a shroud.
No e v i d e n c e of any e a r t h sensor anomaly has been observed s i n c e
l a u n c h .
D e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e P r o b l e m
The a n a l o g c i r c u i t s of the e a r t h sensor are d e s i g n e d to o p t i m i z e
the s i g n a l to n o i s e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the e a r t h s i g n a l . A sun
s i g n a l is c l i p p e d at about -M V. The ac c o u p l e d e a r t h s i g n a l
n o r m a l l y r i d e s between a dc l e v e l of -4 to -1 v o l t for a 250°K
e a r t h .
The m o d u l a t i o n of the RF is d e t e c t e d as a d i f f e r e n t i a t e d s i g n a l
r i d i n g on top of the e a r t h s i g n a l ( f i g u r e 2 ) . S i n c e it is not
o r d i n a r i l y a t a n e x a c t m u l t i p l e o f t h e scanner s i g n a l i t moves
w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e e a r t h p u l s e a t each r e p e t i t i o n . A t l o w l e v e l s
t h e o n l y n o t i c e a b l e e f f e c t i s when t h e m o d u l a t i o n s i g n a l moves
over an edge. T h i s has the e f f e c t of c h a n g i n g the a p p a r e n t
p o s i t i o n o f t h e edge s l i g h t l y a n d thus t h e e r r o r s i g n a l a p p e a r s
n o i s y . The r e a l p r o b l e m occurs as the RF l e v e l i n c r e a s e s . When
t h e m o d u l a t i o n s i g n a l reaches t h e c l i p l e v e l a n d t h e lower power
s u p p l y r a i l , the e r r o r s i g n a l s t a r t s to go between i 50 d e g r e e s , a
s a t u r a t e d e r r o r s i g n a l . A s t h e l e v e l g e t s h i g h e r t h e
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d R F m o d u l a t i o n s i g n a l b e g i n s t o b r o a d e n a n d f l a t t e n
a t i t s peak a n d r a i s e t h e d c l e v e l o f t h e s i g n a l . A t t h i s p o i n t
the' e r r o r s i g n a l u s u a l l y goes t o e i t h e r i s a t u r a t i o n a n d s t a y s
t h e r e .
<v\
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On at l e a s t t h r e e o c c a s i o n s an
e a r t h sensor has been seen to
'lock up'; t h a t i s t h e e r r o r
s i g n a l r e m a i n e d anomalous even
a f t e r the RF was removed.
D e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e S o l u t i o n
A Faraday cage was b u i l t
c o n s i s t e d o f f i n e w i r e s
mil Be-Cu ) s t r u n g and
t e n s i o n e d between
I owe r Be-Cu p l a t e s
and 5 D . The upper
j o i n e d to the lower
membe r l o c a t e d at
n a d i r p o s i t i o n i n t h e
t h a t
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r e g i o n of the sensor. The
lower p l a t e is fastened to a brass c o l l a r w h i c h
and t h e r m a l l y t i e d to the sensor by a section of RF
loca t e d around i t s i n n e r c i r c u m f e r e n c e . T h e
m e c h a n i c a l l y fastened to the m o u n t i n g f e e t of the
t h r o u g h stand off studs.
i s e l e c t r i c a l l y
f i n g e r s t r i p
c o l l a r i s
sensor head
The 4 mil wires are located 0.8 a p a r t on a c i r c l e t h a t is
somewhat l a r g e r in d i a m e t e r than the sensor. A major concern was
the e f f e c t of these w i r e s on the o p t i c a I performance of the
sensor due to o b s c u r a t i o n , h e a t i n g or the r e f l e c t i o n of s o l a r
energy.
A c r i t i c a l
e n g i n e e r i n g
c o n f i g u r e d ,
condi t ions
test was conducted
model Faraday cage
so that they c o u l d
and observed by the
at Barnes E n g i n e e r i n g where an
w a s f a b r i c a t e d w i t h t h e w i r e s
be heated up under c o n t r o l l e d
e a r t h sensor a g a i n s t a l i q u i d
H a l f of the w i r e s (consecutive} were heated
at a t i m e w h i l e the v i d e o s i g n a l was observed for any mod uI a t i on.
In t h i s t e s t the w i r e s were heated to red heat (s:12000CD w i t h o u t
any o b s e r v a b l e e f f e c t .
n i t r o g e n background.
Another test i n v o l v e d the p o s s i b l e sensing
r e f l e c t e d off the wires. A 1 s o l a r c o n s t a n t
source was used at Barnes to s t i m u l a t e the
a n g l e ; a g a i n w i t h o u t o b s e r v a b l e e f f e c t .
of solar r a d i a t i o n
c o l l i m a t c d i n f r a r e d
sensor f rom eve r y
A t h i r d o p t i c a l t e s t concerned i t s e l f w i t h t h e m a r g i n between t h e
edge of the f i e l d of v i e w and the Be-Cu p l a t e s . I h i s was
c o n d u c t e d i n t h e near f i e l d w i t h a h o t s o l d e r i n g i r o n a n d showed
t h a t a s u b s t a n t i a l m a r g i n e x i s t e d .
The EMI t e s t on the Faraday Cage swept the RF s i g n a l , m o d u l a t e d
at 30 Hz w i t h a 1 m i l l i s e c o n d p u l s e w i d t h , from 10 KHz to 2.6 GHz
w i t h v e r t i c a l a n d h o r i z o n t a l p o l a r i z a t i o n s a t a f i e l d s t r e n g t h o f
10 V/ m. For t h i s t e s t o n l y the a n a l o g v i d e o was o b s e r v e d . E x c e p t
for one narrow frequency band at 900 MHz no e v i d e n c e of the
m o d u l a t i o n s i g n a l c o u l d b e d e t e c t e d .
A t t h i s p o i n t a l l o f p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e Faraday cage were known
a n d found t o b e s a t i s f a c t o r y w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f i t s a b i l i t y t o
s u r v i v e l a u n c h loads. S i n c e the f i n e w i r e s of the I a r a d a y cage
are v e r y d e l i c a t e a n d c a n e a s i l y b e damaged in h a n d l i n g , a
m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h e qua! model g r o u n d i n g c i r c u i t r y w a s
a c c o m p l i s h e d as a p o s s i b l e backup p o s i t i o n . The q u a l model e a r t h
sensor head was m o d i f i e d to tie the c h a s s i s ground and s i g n a l
grounds t o g e t h e r as c l o s e to the d e t e c t o r as p o s s i b l e and to cut
the s e l f test LED leads and a l s o ground them at the same p l a c e .
A n E M I t e s t showed t h a t t h i s d i d n o t i m p r o v e t h e s u s c e p t i b i l i t y
a t a l l .
T h e f i n a l q u a l model a n d f l i g h t model Faraday cages underwent
a c o u s t i c a n d random v i b r a t i o n t e s t s t o a n t i c i p a t e d l a u n c h load
l e v e l s w i t h o u t f a i l u r e .
C o n c l u s i o n
The Faraday cage, as d e s i g n e d and f a b r i c a t e d by a j o i n t team of
e n g i n e e r s and t e c h n i c i a n s from the GSFC and Barnes E n g i n e e r i n g as
w e l l as some of t h e i r c o n t r a c t o r s , meets all of the r e q u i r e m e n t s
f o r s u p p r e s s i n g t h e p o t e n t i a l s u s c e p t i b i l i t y o f t h e e a r t h sensor
to h i g h power radar s i g n a l s w h i l e not i m p a c t i n g , to any d e g r e e ,
its per formance.
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GYRO FAILURE/FOLLOW-ON ANALYSIS
S. PLACANICA
A-c r-
GYRO FAILURE
• November 22,1989 05:30 Z (Day 326 - 4 days after launch) B-axis
transverse gyro failed
• Operated in this failure mode until 07:23 Z when the B = - (A + C)
cross-strapping command was given
• Performance during failure mode
Sun elevation angle range: -1.1° to -6.3°
Pitch angle range: 1.5° to 7.2°
• Following the cross-strapping command, the ACS resumed nominal
pointing performance
• Current mode as of Day 327 11:37 Z
Gyro B off
No cross-strapping
No orbit rate stripping
B-AXIS GYRO FAILURE CHARACTERISTICS
Motor current dropped from 75 to 22 milliamps
Zero pulse counts
Analog rate registered negative full scale (zero volts)
Gyro baseplate temperature increased from 24°C to 39°C
1.3 amp drop in the essential bus current following the
removal of 28 volt power to gyro
/f
GYRO FAILURE
Northrop, the gyro manufacturer, experienced a similar
failure during a gyro test two weeks before the COBE
in-flight failure
Appears to have been an overloading of the 22 volt
regulator
57 different electronic parts could have caused the
failure
The COBE Gyro Review Committee concluded that the
failure was a random electronic part failure that
overloaded the regulator
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FOLLOW-ON ANALYSIS « MISSION MODE
• HIFIJR simulations investigated risk of an additional
component failure during mission mode operation
• Failure modes: Gyro, earth scanner,
torque rod, reaction wheel
• Matrix of 45 runs
• Worst case simulations result in a roll angle of 8.6°
into the sun
MISSION MODE
WORST CASE GYRO A FAILURES
Gyro A Failure Gyro A Failure
High Positive High Negative
Roll angle range -2.81 ° to 10.40° -0.94° to 9.37°
Roll angle transient -3.15° -1.20
Avg roll angle 3.82° 4.14
Pitch angle range -3.21 ° to 11.50° -2.15° to 9.80°
Avg pitch angle 4.19° 3.82
F i l e : C O B E H I . B I N ; 3 7 5 C08E M I S S I O N UOOE
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MISSION MODE
WORST CASE GYRO C FAILURES
Gyro C Failure Gyro C Failure
High Positive High Negative
Roll angle range -0.39° to 7.83° -0.24° to 7.84°
Roll angle transient -0.70° -0.70'
Avg roll angle 3.67° 3.77<
Pitch angle range -1.46° to 13.21 ° -1.64° to 12.68<
Avg pitch angle 5.68° 5.23(
MISSION MODE
WORST CASE SCANNER FAILURES
Scanner A Failure Scanner C Failure
High Positive High Positive
Roll angle range -0.66° to 8.39° -8.62° to 3.39°
Roll angle transient -1.52° -5.24C
Avg roll angle 4.09° -1.91°
Pitch angle range 1.23° to 13.63° -7.12° to 11.12*
Avg pitch angle 7.26° 2.70C
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FOLLOW-ON ANALYSIS - ECLIPSE SEASON
Predicted performance during deepest eclipse for current
configuration of B-axis gyro off and no orbit rate stripping
Sun elevation angle
Range: 2.98° to 10.71°
Average: 4.69°
Pitch angle
Range : 3.06° to 13.99°
Average: 6.44 °
Summer solstice
HIFIJR simulation number 408
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PITCH BACK MANEUVERS
HIFIJR Simulation run 440 -- 30° pitch back maneuver under
the current configuration
Predicted performance at 30° pitch back
Sun elevation angle
Range: 4.27° to 5.39°
Average: 4.67°
Pitch Angle
Range: 25.34° to 34.70°
Average: 30.00°
No pitch back maneuvers are allowed during the two month
eclipse season
Pitch back maneuver is performed through the use of the
three orbit rate stripping commands
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80000 f
PITCH BACK RISKS
HIFIJR simulations studied risk of second failure
during 30° pitch back
Matrix of 21 runs
Worst case simulations show large pitch excursions
and up to 2.5° roll into the sun
30° PITCH BACK
WORST CASE GYRO FAILURES
Gyro A Failure Gyro A Failure
High Positive High Negative
Roll angle range -1.45° to 13.20° 6.47° to 11.23°
Roll angle transient -1.90° -0.07C
Avg roll angle 5.89° 5.92C
Pitch angle range 17.11 ° to 37.48° 18.32 to 36.26C
Avg pitch angle 27.23° 27.17C
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December 19, 1989
TO: 7OO/Chief Engineer
FROM: 303/Flight Assurance Manager, COBE
SUBJECT: COBE Gyro Review Commitee Action Items
In regard to Action Item #4., Code 311 reviewed the gyro
assembly parts list for any radiation sensitive device.
Their conclusion is that there could have been no
degradation due to total dose radiation. There simply was
not enough time in orb'it. And while COBE did not
specifically test for Single Event Phenomenon, i.e. latchup,
no parts that were particularly sensitive to this failure
mode were found.
In addition to the formal action items, Code 3O3 also took
action to test residual RMA transistors found in the COBE
stock. These transistors were of the manufacturer and type
of the one that failed at Northrup. Parts were subjected to
xray, PIND, and wire bond pull tests. While 3 of 10 parts
failed PIND testing, only organic fibers were found inside.
Xrays were nominal and the wire bonds passed with flying
color's.
Northrup has identified some 4O EEE parts that could have
caused our RMA failure. Right now, they're working on
getting the screening data for those parts. I'm still
interested in these data. Although our 3368 transistors
came out with a- clean.bill of health, I was surprised by the
PIND failures. Did the failures manage to slip through the
Northrup system, or was this a decision based on concrete
test results?
Abigail Harper
cc: R. Baumann/300
W. Kneval/303
M. Femiano/712. 3
In Reply Refer To:
FG:7-6634(6042)JFF:sb
NORTHROP Precision Products Division
E!oc:.-c.-.:cc SVS'.ST.S G:c:jp
ICO Morse Street
Norwood. Massachusetts 02062December 22, 1989
 Trteohona617.SMaco
NASA
Goddard Space Flight Center
Greenbelt, MD 20777
Attention: M. Femiano, COBE Project Office
Gentlemen:
Reference: COBE RMA Failure Analysis Support
Subject: Report of Findings to Date
Enclosed is one copy each of the following data:
1. List of components whose failure could overload the +22 VDC
regulator.
2. Test reports for the screening of
A. JANTXV2N3868S transistor
B. JANTXV2N2222A transistor
C. JANTXV1N4148-1 diode
D. JANTXV1N5806 diode
3. Part Analysis Report for a JTX2N3868 transistor which failed during
assembly testing of another product. This item was from a
different lot date code. Note that this was JANTX vs JANTXV used
in COBE.
The specific cause of the RMA failure could not be determined given the
timeframe or data available.
Very trul
/7>/James F. FitzGerald
// Senior Systems Contracts Administrator
Enclosure: (1), (2), (3) as noted - 1 each
TYPE
RCLAC.D
Jan. 2,1990
TO: 700/Chief Engineer Henry Price -^
FROM: 7127 Michael Femiano V?
SUBJECT: COBE Gyro Review Committee Action Items
Henry -
I have today received from Northrop the 3 items
which I requested, in order to close out their investigation of the COBE
gyro failure. These are :
(1) A list of the 57 electronic parts whose failure could
have overloaded the 22 volt regulator. These include various transistors,
capacitors.diodes and microcircuits, distributed across all 6 boards in
the Rate Measuring Assembly.
(2) Test reports for the screening of 4 of these parts:
(a) 2N3868 transistor
(b) 2N2222A transistor
(c) 1N4148-1 diode
(d) 1N5806 diode
It was a 2N3868 transistor which failed in the classified
Northrop program. The screening data for the COBE build shows that 40
2N3868 devices were screened by Assurance Technology Corporation
for Northrop and passed successfully. This included the Particle Impact
Noise Detection (PIND test) per MIL-STD-750 Method 2052. There were
no failures in that test.
(3) The failure analysis report on the 2N3868 transistor
failure in the classified program. The report contains no surprises,
indicating the failure to be a collector-emmiter short circuit due to
a contaminating gold flake. Polaroid photographs had already be made
available to GSFC (you have them).
As far as their assessment of the cause for COBE's gyro
failure, Northrop concludes "the specific cause of the RMA failure could
not be determined given the timeframe or data available".
This concludes Northrop's failure investigation. I have attached
copies of the above information.
Michael Femiano
cc: Henry Hoffman/712
Al Sherman 7710
Abigail Harper 7303
Bob Baumann 7300
January 4, 1990
I
TO: 401/COBE Project Manager v
FROM: 700/Chief Engineer ^
SUBJECT: COBE Gyro Review Committee .Findings
The review committee has considered many aspects of 'the COBE B
Gyro failure and come to the conclusion that the failure was a
random part failure that shorted a regulator and caused the gyro
to malfunction.
Northrop, the gyro manuracturer, has identified 57 parts that
could have caused the failure. One part considered highly
suspect was a switching transistor in the motor drive circuit
because of a similar failure in unit test at Northrop that was
identical to the in-orbit failure. All transistors of the same
type in the COBE residual stock were tested and came out with a
clean bill of health.
Radiation effects were discounted because of the short time in
orbit. Review of the worst case analysis revealed that all parts
were properly derated and conservatively utilized. No additional
clues were uncovered by a total S/C data review at the time of
the malfunction. EMI/EMC test data was also revealed and no
anomalies were uncovered.
All the above is the basis for the conclusion that a random part
failure shorted the power system.
Henry W. Price
cc: A. Harper/300
R. Freeman/400
T. Huber/700
H. Price/700
J. Turtil/704
A. Sherman/710
H. Hoffman/712
M. Femiano/712
J. Wilson/4 01/EER
B. Martin/ Swales
D. Gilman/HQ/EZD
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SUN SENSOR PERFORMANCE
* ANNULAR SOLAR ECLIPSE OCCURRED ON JANUARY 26, 1990 IN ANTARCTIC REGION
* COBE FLEU THROUGH THE MOON'S SHADOW TWICE
* SUN 87 PERCENT COVERED AT DARKEST POINT OF FIRST PASS (1827-1845 GMT)
* SUN 93 PERCENT COVERED AT DARKEST POINT OF SECOND PASS (2026-2044 GMT)
* CONCERNS WERE RAISED ABOUT TWO-AXIS DIGITAL SUN SENSOR PERFORMANCE
WITH GREATLY DIMINISHED SUN AND EXCEPTIONALLY BRIGHT EARTH BELOW
* PRECAUTIONS WERE TAKEN TO AVOID POSSIBLY SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES OF
ERRONEOUS SUN SENSOR OUTPUT
* TELEMETRY DATA INDICATES THAT PRECAUTIONS WERE UNNECESSARY
* SYSTEM PROVIDED NOMINAL INDICATION OF SUN VECTOR POSITION THROUGHOUT
BOTH ECLIPSE PASSAGES
* DELAYED HEAD TRANSITIONS OCCURRED (DUE TO BY-DESIGN HYSTERESIS IN
ELECTRONICS) BUT DATA QUALITY WAS UNEFFECTED
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COBE ATTITUDE CONTROL ELECTRONICS
by Walter Squillari
The Attitude Control Electronics (ACE) is the heart of the
COBE Attitude Control System. This unit contains all of the
electronics to properly maintain the spacecraft's attitude
and in addition processes and formats certain attitude sensor
data for telemetry.
The ACE is an analog/digital system that does not employ
microprocessors. As originally designed for a COBE shuttle
launch, the ACE consisted of 26 printed circuit boards.
After it was decided to launch the COBE spacecraft on a Delta
vehicle, several circuits within the ACE required redesign.
Along with the redesign, seven Orbit Transfer printed circuit
boards were eliminated. As launched, the ACE consisted of 19
printed circuit boards and approximately 1500 interconnecting
wires used to carry signals between the boards and interface
to the spacecraft sensors, actuators and Command & Data
Handling (C&DH) system. The ACE was approximately 24in x
13in x llin and weighed 53 pounds. Fully powered, the unit
consumed a low 8 watts of power.
The ACE is a fully redundant unit. The control system was
designed as a triaxial system such that no single point
failure existed and certain multiple failures could be
sustained without jeopardizing the COBE mission.
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Figure 1 shows a block diagram of the electronics within the
ACE. Power distribution within the unit is accomplished via
relays located on two of the printed circuit boards. These
boards interface with two dc-dc converters and the C&DH
system. Upon command from the spacecraft's C&DH, they apply
or remove power to the remaining ACE boards.
The Common Electronics (CE) cards are fully redundant and
process much of the sensor data prior to interfacing with the
A,B,C mission electronics cards. These cards also format the
Digital Sun Sensor and Gyro data for telemetry. These data
are used by the Flight Dynamics Facility in determining
the spacecraft's attitude.
The following is a brief explanation of the functions
performed by the CE in conjunction with the on-board sensor
inputs.
a. Digital Sun Sensors: The CE receives gray coded
elevation, azimuth, head ID and sun presence information from
these sensors at 10 millisecond intervals. This information
is used to calculate the elevation error, spacecraft azimuth
angle and when to energize the eclipse mode.
b. Spin Gyros (Xa,Xb,Xc): Upon command, one of the
three gyros is selected for use by the CE. The incremental
angle pulses from the gyro are accumulated by a counter and
telemetered. The selected X gyro incremental angle pulses
Page 2
Yare used by the electronics to develop the spacecraft's
azimuth angle information required by the mission
electronics in resolving the error signals during eclipse
operations. This gyro information, along with a spin rate
command, is also used by the Spin Rate Control card to
develop the spin error signal required by the Magnetic
Management Assy. The addition of the Spin Rate Control card
was one of the modifications made to the ACE following the
Challenger disaster.
c. Transverse Gyros (A,B,C): Incremental angle pulses
from these gyros are used by the CE rate processing
electronics to derive the spacecraft's A,B,C body rates. The
electronics strips out orbit rate, removes gyro drift and the
resulting body rate signal is applied to the mission
electronics cards to control the reaction wheels.
d. Coarse Sun Sensors; This sensor information is
processed for telemetry and used to determine the
spacecraft's attitude if the sun is out of the field-of-view
of the Digital Sun Sensors. The -X coarse sun sensors are
further processed and a signal is sent to the DIRBE
instrument to close its shutter when the sun angle to the
spacecraft's -X axis exceeds a predetermined value.
e. Command £ Data Handling (C&DH): The CE receives and
stores numerous commands for the mode selections and bias
adjustments. The unit also interfaces with the data system
and telemeters the large amounts of formatted sensor data as
well as analog housekeeping data.
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Within the ACE are redundant 48 channel analog multiplexers.
These cards were added in order to decrease the number of
analog telemetry channels required by the ACE. The
multiplexers telemeter the analog housekeeping data and
control error signals.
The A,B,C electronics (Mission) cards further process the
Common Electronics data. Figure 2 shows a more detailed
block diagram of the electronics that resides within these
three cards. The Mission cards perform the control laws
required to maintain proper spacecraft attitude through all
spacecraft operating modes. Their outputs are applied to the
Reaction Wheel and Momentum Management Assemblies. These
Mission cards receive their signals from either of the two
Common Electronics. The Common Electronics selection occurs
by either ground command or automatically from an autonomy
circuit housed within Common Electronics #2.
The Mission cards incorporate many sensor and actuator cross-
strapping modes that may be initiated through ground
commands. This allows the spacecraft's control system to
withstand numerous sensor and actuator failures without
seriously affecting the mission objectives. In case of an
Earth Sensor failure, the failed sensor may be switched out
of the control loop and the negative sum of the other two
earth sensors can be used for pitch control. If a Reaction
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Wheel or mission electronics fails, the control law may be \
modified to compensate for this failure. In case of a gyro
failure (as it happened four days after launch), the signal
from the remaining "good" axes can be cross-strapped to drive
the wheel in the "failed" axis without any loss of
performance.
Within Common Electronics #2 resides an autonomy circuit that
switches ACE control to Common Electronics #2 (if CE#1 is
in use). This circuit monitors certain Common Electronics #1
parameters and if their predetermined values are exceeded and
the autonomy is enabled, the Mission card inputs are switched
to Common Electronics #2. These parameters are as follows:
a. Elevation error exceeds +/-3.V5 degrees.
b. Digital Sun Sensor is turned OFF or the sensor
ceases to transmit data for at least 70
milliseconds.
c. The CE#1 internal oscillator ceases to function.
Only routine fabrication problems were encountered during the
development and assembly of the ACE. No design problems were
discovered during board testing, closed loop testing and
finally, environmental testing.
The Attitude Control Electronics was successfully integrated
without any problems to the spacecraft's power, command &
data handling system and to the control system sensors and
Page 5
actuators. The unit completed all required spacecraft tests
and performed well within the system specifications.
Since launch, the unit has performed flawlessly. The total
system (prime and redundant) has been checked out.
One of the cross-strapping and gyro bias commands was used
four days after launch when the Attitude Control System
experienced a gyro failure.
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COBE MOMENTUM WHEEL ELECTRONICS ASSEMBLY V
by Walter Squillari
The Momentum Wheel Electronics Assemblies (MWEA) are fully
redundant drivers that power the two COBE Momentum wheels.
These wheels are used for the control of the spacecraft's
spin rate.
Figure 1 shows a block diagram of the MWEA. The MWEA
consists of two sub-assemblies, the Power Control Electronics
(PCE) and Speed Control Electronics (SCE). The PCE is the
power stage that converts the low level logic of the wheel
speed error and phase signals into the drive signals for the
wheels. The PCE, an existing wheel driver design from a
military contract, was purchased from TRW. Within the PCE
are also a dc-dc converter and the electronics to develop the
motor current signal used in controlling the motor voltage
during run-up.
The second sub-assembly, the SCE, was designed and fabricated
by Code 712. Figure 2 shows a block diagram of the SCE.
The SCE interfaces with the magnetic wheel tach and provides
the PCE with a pulse width modulated signal that represents
wheel speed error. The SCE contains a linear motor frequency
drive of 125hz to 250hz. This variable frequency was provided
in order to maintain a 20% motor slip and reduce the wheel
power by approximately 5 watts. A current limiter is
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incorporated to limit surge currents to 7 amps and motor run-
up current to 3 amps. If motor current were not limited, the
motor could overheat. Through speed commands from the Command
& Data Handling System, the wheels may be controlled from 440
rpm to 4500 rpm with a controlling accuracy of +/-Q.Q2%.
The only problem encountered prior to delivery of the units
to the spacecraft was an integrated circuit part failure that
occurred during the second hot soak of the MWEA#2 thermal-
vacuum tests. This part was replaced and both MWEA's
successfully completed all environmental tests.
The two MWEA's have operated flawlessly since launch and the
wheel speeds have been trimmed to 1600.2 rpm, giving the
spacecraft a spin rate of approximately 0.815 rpm. As
measured from telemetry, speed control is better than
+/-o.02% and the wheels are consuming a low 2.5 watts each.
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COBE ON-ORBIT
ENGINEERING PERFORMANCE
STRUCTURES SUBSYSTEM
OREN R. SHEINMAN
MARCH 7-8, 1990
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STRUCTURAL SUBSYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
• DELTA 5920 INTERFACE
• MASS PROPERTIES
- STRUCTURE
• WEIGHT < 980 LBS.
- OBSERVATORY PREDICTED ACTUAL
• (Ixy2 + Ixz2)^2< 50 SLUG-FT 21 31
« Ixx KNOWN TO i 2% 766 (1.2%) 775
• I lyy - Izz I < 300 SLUG-FT 20 ~
. C.G. OPPOSITE POROUS PLUG
ORS-3
3/90
COBE/DELTA STRUCTURE WEIGHT SUMMARY
COMPONENT
THERMAL SHIELD
SOLAR ARRAY
DMR SUPPORT
STRUCTURE
COWLING
PRIMARY **
STRUCTURE
CONE
ACS MODULE
OMNI BOOM
BRACKETS
HARDWARE
MISCELLANEOUS
STRUCTURE TOTAL
CONCEPT
(IBS)
115
150
110
65
305
40
10
75
80
50
1000
CDR
(IBS)
108
210
43
110
278
25
53.5
10.5
62
80
50
980.0
FINAL
(LBS)
107.3
223.2 *
47.1
62.0
286.5
26.8
54.0
12.5
59.8
19.0
0.0
898.2
* PIN PULLER/PYRO INCLUDED
+•+ PRIMARY STRUCTURE CONSISTS OF THE MAIN ERAME, TOP DECK. BOTTOM DECKS.
A ERAMES. EQUIPMENT PANELS, PANEL TO PANEL DISCONNECT BRACKETS. AND
HARDWARE.
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STRUCTURAL SUBSYSTEM REQUIREMENTS (CONT.)
INTERFACES
- 6019 PAF
- DEWAR
- SOLAR ARRAYS
- THERMAL SHIELD
- OMNI ANTENNA
- ELECTRONIC BOXES
- ACS
- ELECTRICAL
- THERMAL
- HANDLING
MAINTAIN STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY WHEN SUBJECTED TO DELTA LAUNCH
AND C-5A/I-95 SHIPPING ENVIRONMENTS.
- DESIGN TO THE FOLLOWING DESIGN LIMIT LOAD FACTORS
- DELTA +10.7/-0.71g's (THRUST); +/- 2.1g (LATERAL)
• C-5A 3.0g FORWARD; 1.5g AFT.LATERAL; 2g UP; 3.5g DOWN
- SHOW WE MARGINS FOR 1.4 AND 1.25 FACTORS ON ULTIMATE
AND YIELD/TEST RESPECTIVELY TIMES THE DESIGN LIMIT LOAD.
- DESIGN LIMIT LOAD = CONFIDENCE FACTOR x FLIGHT LOAD.
- CONFIDENCE FACTOR = 1.08 (THRUST); 1.31 (LATERAL); DELTA
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ON-ORBIT PERFORMANCE VS. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
TELEMETRY BEING RECEIVED - SPACECRAFT IS ALIVE!
- NO DIRECT INDICATORS
- SPACECRAFT SEPARATION ACHIEVED
- DEPLOYABLES FUNCTIONED
- ALIGNMENT MAINTAINED
LAUNCH PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS
EVENT
MECO POGO
MINI POGO 1
MINI POGO 2
.LOCATION
SECOND STAGE
GUIDANCE SECTION
SECOND STAGE
GUIDANCE SECTION
SECOND STAGE
GUIDANCE SECTION
FREQUENCY (HZ)
PREDICTED
19.027
26 - 27
32 - 38
ACTUAL
17.7
27.3
32.0
ACCELERATION (G'S)
PREDICT LI.) •
1 . 7 G ( T )
0.64 (L)
0.12 (T)
0.40 (L)
0.12 (T)
0.22 (L)
ACTUAL »»
1.85
0.51
0.16
0.23
D.O"L
0.14
DOES NOT INCLUDE STEADY STATE ACCELERATIONS
VALUES KEft 'RENCED FROM R. COLADONATO
ORS-7
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TRADE-OFFS
MACHINED VS. HONEYCOMB STRUCTURE
- CANDIDATES
• TOP DECK
• EQUIPMENT PANELS
• BOTTOM DECKS
- MACHINED STRUCTURE WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY
HEAVIER THAN HONEYCOMB.
- HONEYCOMB PROVIDES GREATER MOUNTING
FLEXIBILITY.
- HONEYCOMB IS MORE EXPENSIVE.
* BASE CONFIGURATION
- SIX-SIDED STRUCTURE
- MMS STRUCTURE
- THREE-SIDED STRUCTURE
ORS-8
3/90
NEXT TIME AROUND
• ATTACH EQUIPMENT PANELS TO CORNERPOSTS USING THROUGH BOLTS
OR SHEAR PINS INSTEAD OF HELICOILS.
• INCREASE SHEAR/TRANSITION AREA OF EQUIPMENT PANEL TIE DOWNS.
- SHOW POSITIVE MARGINS ANALYTICALLY WITHOUT REQUIRING
ADDITIONAL TEST DATA.
• LIFT SPACECRAFT ABOVE THE C.G.
- PROVIDE LIFT CAPABILITY FOR THE S/C THROUGH THE DEWAR.
- WE HAD THE LOAD CARRYING CAPABILITY, BUT THE NUMBER
OF LIFTPOINTS WERE EITHER INSUFFICIENT OR COVERED
UP BY THE DMR'S.
• USE SINGLE INSTEAD OF DOUBLE CASTORS AND PROVIDE A STEERABLE
LINK ARM FOR THE FLIGHT DOLLY.
ORS-9
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LESSONS LEARNED
• HONEYCOMB PANELS PROVIDED EXTREME FLEXIBILITY IN DESIGN
WITH OPTIONS FOR CHANGE.
- FINAL BLACK BOX AND HARNESS TIE DOWNS NOT REQUIRED UP
FRONT DURING DESIGN PHASE OF THE PANELS.
- BRACKETS, TIE DOWNS, SMALL PACKAGES CAN BE MOUNTED FAR
DOWNSTREAM IN THE PROGRAM USING RIV-NUTS, DELRON INSERTS,
OR THROUGH BOLTS.
• ETU INVALUABLE FOR THIS TYPE OF PROGRAM.
- PROVIDES A TOOL THROUGH WHICH PROOF OF CONCEPT AND DRESS
REHEARSAL CAPABILITY FOR TESTS AND FIT CHECKS CAN BE
PERFORMED.
- DECOUPLES FLIGHT STRUCTURE FROM SUBSYSTEM TESTING FOR
EARLY DELIVERY TO INTEGRATION.
- PROVIDES REPRESENTATIVE STRUCTURE FOR FABRICATION OF
HARNESS AND THERMAL BLANKETS.
- PROVIDES PERSONNEL EXPERIENCE IN HANDLING BEFORE FLIGHT
STRUCTURE IS PROCESSED.
• CAMLOC FASTENERS TYPICALLY USED IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY
HAVE GOOD APPLICATIONS FOR NON-STRUCTURAL, REMOVABLE PANELS.
ORS-10
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LESSONS LEARNED (CONT.)
• GOOD PRACTICE TO RUN ASSEMBLY DRAWINGS THROUGH THE
TECHNICIANS PRIOR TO SUBMITTING PARTS TO FABRICATION.
• DOCUMENTATION IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT.
• DO MAJOR TESTS ON SATURDAYS AND SUNDAYS AT MIDNIGHT!
• DESIGN AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE UP FRONT FOR CLOSEOUTS
AND GSE.
• FOUND USE OF ASAP (AUTOMATED STRESS ANALYSIS PROGRAM)
USEFUL.
- ONCE EQUATIONS ARE CODED, INPUT FROM FINITE ELEMENT
ANALYSIS IS THE ONLY REQUIREMENT,
. DELTA LIFTOFF AND MECO POGO
• C-5A
• TRANSPORTATION (HIGHWAY)
• STATIC LOAD TEST CASES
• HANDLING
3/90
LESSONS LEARNED (CONT.)
THE SHIPPING CONTAINER CAN BE AS BIG A DESIGN JOB AS THE
STRUCTURE IN MANY RESPECTS — START IT EARLY!
PROCEDURES FOR ASSEMBLY, INSTALLATION, TESTS, ETC. SHOULD
BE INTO THE REVIEW CYCLE EARLY, PARTICULARLY WHEN DEALING
WITH AN OUT-OF-HOUSE PARTY.
WHEN MOUNTING HONEYCOMB IN A SIMILAR CONFIGURATION AS THE
EQUIPMENT PANELS TO THE FRAMES, ASSUME 75% OF THE LOAD WILL
GO DOWN THE REAR FACESHEET FOR STRESS CALCULATIONS.
ORS-12
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COBE ON-ORBIT
ENGINEERING PERFORMANCE
SOLAR ARRAY SUBSYSTEM
MARCH 1990
CODE 731
GODDARD SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
SOLAR ARRAY SUBSYSTEM
AGENDA
• INTRODUCTION
• DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
• TRADE-OFFS DURING DEVELOPMENT
• SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS DURING I & T
• ON-ORBIT PERFORMANCE VS. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
• FUTURE CONSIDERATION
• LESSONS LEARNED
SNN-01
3/90
3(\.t» s
t **:AI
tl.OO i
>tA. tit. Oil
irA«ina>
LAUNCH CONFIGURATION - SJDE VIEW
SNN-Q2
3/90
COBE DELTA ORBIT CONFIGURATION SNN-03
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REQUIREMENTS FOR THE COBE SOLAR ARRAY
REQUIREMENTS
PARAMETER
CELL AREA
ELV LAUNCH
• STOWED SPACE
• LOADS
DEPLOYED TORQUE
RATIO
DEPLOYED
STIFFNESS
TEST
TEMPERATURE
( ° 0
FULLY REDUNDANT
PYROTECHNIC IN
RELEASE MECHANISM
ELECTRICAL
GROUNDING
CONTAMINATION
CONTROL
VALUE
328 FT*
18G. 3G
2 TO 1
>1HZ
-20CC HOT
+ 60''C. COLD
—
-
-
BASIS
-
DESIGN
ANALYSIS
DESIGN
ANALYSIS
ANALYSIS
ANALYSIS
DESIGN
DESIGN
-
VERIFICATION
PLAN
-
STRUCTURAL TEST
COMPONENT TEST
DEPLOYED TEST
STRUCTURAL TEST
DEPLOYED TEST
DEPLOYED TEST
COMPONENT TEST
DEPLOYED TEST
COMPONENT TEST
ASSEMBLY TEST
CONT. MONITOR
CLEANING PROC.
SNN-05
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TRADE-OFFS DURING DEVELOPMENT
PIN PULLER VS. BOLT CUTTER
THERMAL VAC VS. THERMAL DEPLOYMENT TEST
WRAP & STOWAGE OF PANELS
DEPLOYMENT SEQUENCE (DRIVEN VS. INDEPENDANT)
SNN-06
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PROBLEMS DURING I&T
• SLOT HOLES ON SHEAR BLOCKS DURING ASSEMBLY
• G-NEGATION SYSTEM (AIR PADS AND MOBILE SYSTEM)
• DAMPER REPLACEMENT • LAUNCH SITE
• PIN PULLER REBOUND
SNN-07
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ON-ORBIT PERFORMANCE
OUTBOARD PRIMARY MICROSWITCH B DID NOT WORK
PANEL DEPLOYMENT SEQUENCE AS EXPECTED
SNN-10
3/90
DEPLOYMENT TIMES COMPARISON
we A
TEST
22 sec
IS see
S? sec
W-OR&r
22 sec
16 see
S3 sec
Rod hing« & 50 C
60* hinge & 25 C
180° hinge 6 25 C
WG 3
25 aec
11 sec
55 sec
21 see
17 SW
50 sec
Root binge © 60 C
60° hinge 9 2& C
180° hinge @ 25 C
«W7 r
02 sec
12 sec
59 sec
25 sec
25 sec
66 sec
Root binge @ 50 C
60° hinge £> 25 C
160° binge 9 Zb C
* yftW/KW2F/4A? WATERS TO MAINTAIN DANffiK'S 1SUFEKATVRE
JT45 3V 50 DE&X&: C.
Ott-OR3!T DEPWYMWT TJMES AXE i 16 SEC DOS TO DATA COtfVERS/W
SNN-U
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Q4A/PER 9 VA5 REPLACED 0 UVNCH S/TE
LPLOT NSB_MNQ_GC_001:RDT_TIME/UNITS-HOURS/WINDOW-(1.56,1.6) PSfiftOP/TflL
5.
4.5
4 .
5.5
5.
2.5
2.
1 .5
I . -
.50001 -
0.
50001
1.555 1.56 1.5651.57 1.575 1.58 1.585 1.59 1.595 1.6 1.605
flDT_TIME (HOURS)
Drawn: 6-FEB-1990 17:07
By:SHIV
18-NOV-1989 14:01:08.30
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FUTURE CONSIDERATION
DESIGN THE BOTTOM RELEASE MECHANISM SIMILAR TO
THE UPPER RELEASE MECHANISM
PROVIDE BETTER ADJUSTMENT & ACCESS FOR THE
ASSEMBLY OF THE WING
PROVIDE SUSPENSION SYSTEM ON THE AIR PAD SYSTEM
CHECK THE DAMPER AFTER EACH DEPLOYMENT TO
INSURE NO DAMAGE. AS PART OF THE DAMPER QUAL
TESTS, ADD AN OVER-TORQUE TEST TO ELIMINATE THE
DAMPERS WITH WEAK SEALS
DOCUMENT MORE EFFICIENTLY
SNN-13
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UPPER INBOARD RELEASE MECHANISM
L
raj
LOWER INBOARD RELEASE MECHANISM
SNN-1^
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SILICON RUBBER
PIN PULLER HOUSING
NUT
SPHERICAL SPACER
SPRING RETAINER
• PIN PULLER
'SHEAR PLATE
• MIDDLE SHEAR PLATE
• OUTBOARD SHEAR PLATE
SNN-15
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• UPPER MIDDLE/OUTBOARD RELEASE MECHANISM
p.f.
i r -«
SNN-16
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LESSONS LEARNED
• USE DAMPER IN THE SPRING DEPLOYABLE SYSTEM
• HARNESS TORQUE TEST AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
• STUDY THE INTERFACE AROUND THE DEPLOYABLE
• ALWAYS BE CONSCIOUS ON THE FAILURE MODES OF
THE DEPLOYABLE
SNN-18
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COBE/DELTA
THERMAL/RF SHIELD
ON-ORBIT ENGINEERING
PERFORMANCE
ALPHONSO C. STEWART
PANEL
1HERMAL/RF SHTRTD
DEWAR
-LINKAGE ARM
DMR COVER
MLI BLANKET
FIGURE 1: EXPLODED VIEW OF CQBE SPACECRAFT
OUTER THERMAL
BLANKETS
HONEYCOMB PANELS
(12)
INNER HONEYCOMB PANEL
BLANKETS
(12)
OUTER LOWER
THERMAL BLANKETS
TOP DECK BLANKET
(SEGMENTED)
TOP DECK/THERMAL
SHIELD INTERFACE CONE
EXPLODED VIEW OF THERMAL/RF SHIELD
2-
DMR COVERS
ALINKAGE ARM—-^
• INBOARD
MULTI LAYER INSULATION (MLI-BLANKET)
OUTBOARD
FIGURE 3: STOWED THERMAL/RE SHIELD WITH MLI AND DMR COVER T/RF ACS3/7/90
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FIGURE 4: DEPLOYED THERMAL/Rf SHIELD WITH MLI AND DMR COVER T/RF ACS
3/7/90
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TRADE-OFFS
PANELS
SHEET AND STIFFENER VS HONEYCOMB
O SHEET AND STIFFENER UNABLE TO MEET THE WEIGHT BUDGET AND GEOMETRIC ENVELOPE
REQUIREMENTS
O HONEYCOMB LIGHTER, MORE RIGID, AND FIT WITH SIZE REQUIREMENTS
LINKAGE ARM ASSEMBLY
ALUMINUM LINKAGE ARM VS STAINLESS STEEL
O ALUMINUM IS LIGHTER AND HAS A HIGH THERMAL
CONDUCTIVITY
O STAINLESS STEEL IS HEAVIER AND HAS A LOWER THERMAL
CONDUCTIVITY
FLEXIBLE SHIELD PARTS (BLANKET)
RF FABRICS VS MLI
O RF FABRICS ATTENUATE SIGNALS BUT FAIL TO MEET THERMAL REQUIREMENTS
O MLI (ALUMINIZE KAPTON) MET BOTH THERMAL AND RF REQUIREMENTS
T/RF ACS
3/7/90
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THERMAL/RF SHIELD DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
- THERMAL
TO PROVIDE THERMAL ISOLATION FOR THE DEWAR AND DMR
INSTRUMENTS ON THE INSIDE FROM THE EARTH AND SUN ON THE
OUTSIDE. (INNER SHIELD TEMP. LESS THAN 220 K)
- EMI
PREVENT RADIATION FROM EARTH, SUN, AND S/C COMMUNICATIONS
FROM REACHING THE INSTRUMENTS.
(ATTENUATE 60 dB AT 2.2 GHz)
PHYSICAL DIMENSION
STOWED CONFIGURATION MUST FIT WITHIN PAYLOAD ENVELOPE
T/RF ACS
3/7/9
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PROBLEMS DURING I & T
- LINK ARM
O PANEL(#8) UNABLE TO STOW PROPERLY DURING PLIGHT INTEGRATION
o LINKAGE ARM FLANGE MADE CONTACT WITH PANEL BRACKET
RADIUS DURING S/C INTEGRATION.
SOLN.: RESHAPED PANEL BRACKET RADIUS
- GLINT
o LIGHT (LASER) BEAM REFLECTED OF THE EDGE OF THE T/RF
BLANKET DOWN TOWARDS THE DEWAR DURING GLINT TEST.
SOLN.: INSTALL LIGHT BLOCKER ON T/RF PANEL CORNERS
(5 MIL ALUMINIZE KAPTON)
- CABLE RESTRAINT
O DEVELOP A SYSTEM THAT CAPTURES THE THERMAL/RF SHIELD RETAINER CABLE DURING
DEPLOYMENT TEST.
SOLN.: ATTACH AN ADDITION GSE CABLE TO THE ENDS OF THE RETAINER TO CAPTURE
IT DURING DEPLOYMENT TEST.
- G-NEGATION SYSTEM
O DEVELOP A SYSTEM THAT WILL MINIMIZE THE EFFECTS OF GRAVITY ON THE THERMAL
SHIELD DURING DEPLOYMENT TESTING
T/RF ACS
3/7/90
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I..HU AGL ARM FLANGE
!,!!': A W A Y FROM PANEL
BkAi.K.t T P.AUIUS
LINKAGE ARM FLANGE
MOVES TOWARD AND MAKES
CONTACT WITH PANEL BRACKET
RADIUS
LINKAGE ARM FLANGE
MOVES A W A Y FROM
PANEL BRACKET RADIUS
LINKAGE ARM FLANGE
SITS FURTHER AWAY
FROM PANEL BRACKET
RADIUS
S T O W E D CONFIGURATION 4 DEC. DEPLOYED 13 DEG. DEPLOYED DEPLOYED CONFIGURATION
FIGURE 4; THERMAL/RF SHIELD DEPLOYMENT SEQUENCE T/RF ACS
3/7/90
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PANEL BRACKET
LINKAGE ARM FLANGE
LINKAGE ARM FLANGE AGAINST PANEL BRACKET RADIUS
T/RF ACS
3/7/90
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MACHINED PANEL BRACKET
BEFORE AFTER
THERMAL/RF SHIELD' WITH MACHINED PANEL BRACKET T/RF ACS
3/7/90
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INNER BLANKET
PANEL
LIGHT R A Y S REFLECTING OFF THERMAL/RF SHIELD BLANKET
T/RF ACS
3/7/90
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INNER BLANKET
LIGHT RAYS UNABLE TD
REFLECT OFT INNER
BLANKET SURFACE
THERMAL SHIELD WITH LIGHT BLDCKER INSTALLED
T/RF ACS
3/7/90
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DRETAINER CABLE (FLT)
RESTRAINT CABLE (GSE)
THERMAL/RF SHIELD CABLE WITH
RESTRAINT SYSTEM (STDW CDNFIGURATIDN) TDP VIEW DF THERMAL/RF SHIELD CABLEBEING RELEASE IN A DEPLOYMENT TEST
THERMAL/RF SHIELD WITH RETAINER CABLE RESTRAINT SYSTEM
T/RF ACS
3/7/90
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ON-ORBIT PERFORMANCE
DEPLOYMENT OCCURRED AS EXPECTED (I.E. DEPLOYMENT INDICATED BY MICROSWITCH
READINGS)
ALL TEMPERATURE REQUIREMENTS FOR THERMAL/RP SHIELD HAVE BEEN MET.
(ALL LESS THAN 220 K)
AT PRESENT, NO EVIDENCE OP LIGHT GLINT OVER THE TOP EDGE OF THE T/RF SHIELD.
AT PRESENT, NO EFFECTS OF EMI ON INSTRUMENTS.
T/RF ACS
3/7/90
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WHAT WOULD I DO DIFFERENTLY
DESIGN AND DEVELOP A TESTING PROGRAM FOR THE THERMAL/RF SHIELD THAT INVOLVES AS FEW
PERSONNEL AS POSSIBLE AND USES THE LEAST AMOUNT OF TIME.
- DEVELOP GSE FOR TENSIONING THE T/RF SHIELD RETAINER CABLE.
- DEVELOP A STOWING SYSTEM WHICH IS EASIER TO EXECUTE.
T/RF ACS
3/7/90
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LESSONS LEARNED
FOR A DEPLOYABLE SYSTEM, BE AWARE OF THE PATH IN WHICH SYSTEM TRAVELS FROM ONE
POSITION TO ANOTHER. (I.E. STOWED TO DEPLOYED)
CONCENTRATE MORE ON GSE SYSTEMS EARLY IN THE DESIGN STAGE AND DO NOT ASSUME IT
IT CAN BE TAKEN CARE OF LATER.
BE CRITICAL OF THE INTERFACES IN WHICH YOUR SUBSYSTEM IS ATTACHED TO.
(I.E. ARE THE INTERFACE TOLERANCES SUITABLE FOR YOUR SUBSYSTEM?)
T/RF ACS
3/7/90
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COBE/DELTA OMNI DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM
ON-ORBIT ENGINEERING PERFORMANCE
NASA/GODDARD SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
MECHANICAL ENGINEERING BRANCH
STRUCTURAL LOADS & ANALYSIS SECTION
MINH C. PHAN
MARCH 7,8 1990
CONTENTS
o SUBSYSTEM OVERVIEW
o SPECIFICATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS
o TRADE-OFFS REQUIRED DURING DEVELOPMENT
o SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS DURING I&T
o WAIVERS/DEVIATIONS
o ON-ORBIT PERFORMANCE VS. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
o DO DIFFERENTLY
o LESSON LEARNED
MCP 2
SUBSYSTEM OVERVIEW
MCP 3
COBE SPACECRAFT ON-ORBIT CONFIGURATION
MCP 4 :
STOWED/DEPLOYED CONFIGURATION
XX
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MCP 6
REQUIREMENTS
STOWED CONFIGURATION
o PREFERRED ORIENTATION WITHIN ALLOWABLE ENVELOPE
o FAILURE OF OMNI DEPLOYMENT MUST NOT CAUSE COBE MISSION FAILURE
DEPLOYED CONFIGURATION
o ALIGN ON COBE GEOMETRIC CENTER WITH +- 0.5 DEGREE TILT FROM THE X-AXIS
o CLEARANCE OF 19 DEGREES FROM THE SOLAR ARRAY
DESIGN LOADS
LAUNCH LOAD [ 18-G THRUST, 3-G LATERAL ] FOR ALL COMPONENTS
MCP7
REQUIREMENTS (CONT.)
STRUCTURAL DYNAMICS
o IN STOWED CONFIGURATION, FIRST STRUCTURAL NATURAL FREQUENCY
MUST BE ABOVE 40 HZ
o IN THE DEPLOYED CONFIGURATION, FIRST STRUCTURAL NATURAL
FREQUENCY MUST BE ABOVE 1 HZ
THERMAL
o OPERATING TEMPERATURE RANGE -20 C <~> +60 C
0 SURVIVAL TEMPERATURE RANGE -40 C <—> +75 C
WEIGHT
o OMNI ANTENNA WEIGHS 5 LBS
o ALLOTTED WEIGHT FOR DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM IS 10 LBS
MCP 8
STCWT.D
SPACECRAFT
SUN SENSOR
ANTENNA STOWED
EARTH SENSOR
ATTACH FITTING
0 W.OO ENVELOPE
STOWED CONFIGURATION
MCP9
SOLAR PANEL DEPLOYED
ANTENNA DEPLOYED
SPACECRAFT
SUN SENSOR
EARTH SENSOR ff u.oo ENVTLOPF.
AVTF.NNA OF.I ' I .OVI
ft 16.00 ENVELOPE
DEPLOYED CONFIGURATION
MCP 10
TRADE-OFFS DURING DEVELOPMENT
o DESIGN WITHOUT DAMPER VS. DESIGN WITH DAMPER
o PIN PULLER VS. CABLE CUTTER
o ANTENNA SAFETY BUMPER VS. ANTENNA SIGNAL GAIN
o BASE HINGE DESIGNS FOR VARIOUS COAXIAL CABLES
o STRAIGHT DEPLOYMENT VS TILT ANGLE DEPLOYMENT
MCP 11
MCP 12
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SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS DURING I&T
o RIVETING THE BOOM TO THE BASE HINGE BRACKET
o CRACKING OF THE ALIGNMENT BLOCK
o INTEGRATING TWO VERY SENSITIVE CO-AXIAL CABLES
o DEINTEGRATION OF THE BOOM/ANTENNA TO FACILIATE HANDLING SPACECRAFT,
GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT INSTALLATION TO & REMOVAL FROM SPACECRAFT
o ROUTING OF THE THERMISTER WIRES ACROSS BASE HINGE
MCP 13
nfV.^-^f** <r*4»M«« tMCj^ CD
BOOM/BASE HINGE BRACKET ASSEMBLY
MCP 14
o <; z z m z > 3D m m S rn o 2C O)
WAIVERS & DEVIATIONS
o NO WAIVER
O NO DEVIATION
MCP16
ON-ORBIT PERFORMANCE VS. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
o MISSION OBJECTIVE
DEPLOYABLE SYSTEM SURVIVED THROUGH LAUNCH ENVIRONMENT
SUCCESSFULLY DEPLOYED THE OMNI ANTENNA
o STRUCTURAL DYNAMICS
STIFF BOOM (>1HZ) TO SATISFY THE ALTITUDE CONTROL SYSTEM
o THERMAL
SURVIVE AND OPERATE WITHIN THE TEMPERATURE RANGE
o DEPLOYMENT TIME AND TELEMETRY
ACTUAL DEPLOYMENT TIME WAS WITHIN PREDICTED TIME
ALL TELEMETRY INDICATED AS PREDICTED
MCP 17
DO DIFFERENTLY
o REDUCE WEIGHT OF THE OVERALL DEPLOYABLE SYSTEM
o CHANGE HOUSING & PISTON MATERIAL OF COBE PYROTECHNIC PIN PULLER
o DESIGN THE RELEASE MECHANISM DIFFERENTLY
MCP18
:tmi
o
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C O B E
P/N 1456479
HI-SHCAP .
13 - xxxxx**
S/N X X X X X
— LOT VJO.
SC«? I'M. MO.
PIN PULLEIR
ASSET MBL_V
MCP
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SILICON RUBBER
PIN PULLER MOU3IHO
TOP DECK
PIN P U L L E R
• B E L L V I L L E WV3HERS
NUT
. S P H E R I C A L SPACER
3PRINO R E T A I N E R
• SHEAR PLATE
• MIDDLE SMEAR P L A T E
O U T B O A R D SHEAR P L A T E
• UPPER MIDDLE/OUTBOARD RELEASE MECHANISM
MCP 22
LESSONS LEARNED
o ALWAYS DESIGN DEPLOYABLE SYSTEM WITH REDUNDANCY PHILOSOPHY
o BEWARE OF FAILURE MODES OF DEPLOYABLE SYSTEM
o ALWAYS DESIGN SYSTEM/COMPONENT WITH THE CAPABILITY OF FUTURE ADJUSTMENT
o CAREFULLY INSPECT ALL COMPONENTS OF DEPLOYABLE SYSTEM BEFORE AND AFTER A TEST
o X-RAY OF PYROTECHNIC PIN PULLER SHALL BE TAKEN FOR 2
ORTHOGONAL VIEWS SHALL BE CAREFULLY INSPECTED
o ALWAYS PERFORM A CAREFUL INSPECTION OF THE FINAL FLIGHT
CONFIGURATION OF THE DEPLOYABLE SYSTEM AND THE SURROUNDING
AREA FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF SNAGGING UP DURING DEPLOYMENT
o LEARN THE DIFFERENT PHASES, REQUIREMENTS, AND INVOLVEMENTS OF
BUILDING A FLIGHT DEPLOYABLE SYSTEM AND A SPACECRAFT
MCP 23
COSMIC BACKGROUND EXPLORER
THERMAL SUBSYSTEM
ON-ORBIT PERFORMANCE REPORT
R. A. Chalmers
March 7-8, 1990
COSMIC BACKGROUND EXPLORER
MISSION ORBIT CONFIGURATION
Dewar
Deployable Thermal/RF Shield
Deployable Solar Panels
(9 [panels, double-sided)
DMR Antennae
(3 instrument heads)
Earth Scanners
(3 locations)
Deployable OMNI Antennae Sun Sensors(3 locations)
rac-1 [QSFG]
THERMAL SUBSYSTEM
TOP-LEVEL REQUIREMENTS
• maintain dewar mainshell (exterior) temperature below 150 K
during mission operations
• meet emittance and temperature requirements on interior of
thermal shield (e < 0.07, t < 240 K)
• maintain spacecraft components within their survival range
(typically -25 to 50 C) at all times
• maintain spacecraffcomponents within their operating
temperature range (typically 0 to 40 C) whenever
performance is required
• minimize heater power requirements, especially during the
shadow season
• provide capability to safely dissipate excess power while
spacecraft is attached to launch vehicle
rac-2 (GSFC)
THERMAL SUBSYSTEM
MISSION ENVIRONMENT
spacecraft spin and pointing requirements ensure a near-
constant thermal environment:
.815 rpm body spin rate
o
angle between spin axis and sun maintained at 94
16 minute maximum shadow period
rac-3 (GSFC)
THERMAL SUBSYSTEM
DESIGN FEATURES
• thermal subsystem is designed to operate autonomously during
mission mode; monitoring and intervention through the POCC
are required during initial checkout period
• passive elements:
- optimized exterior coating patterns
- mli blankets
- thermal isolators
- aluminum heat sink plates
- thermally-conductive interface materials
• active elements:
- shadow season heaters
- instrument make-up heaters
- special function heaters
rac-4
THERMAL SUBSYSTEM
DESIGN QUALIFICATION
ANALYSES
• component-level thermal analyses and/or design reviews were
conducted for all flight electronics
• assembly-level thermal analyses were performed for the OMNI
antenna, shunt dissipator panels, thermal shield and
retention cable, solar arrays, and dewar ejectable cover
• observatory-level thermal analyses were performed for hot/
cold mission orbit, prelaunch, and ascent conditions
• observatory thermal math models were correlated with thermal
balance test results
rac-5 [GSFC]
THERMAL SUBSYSTEM
DESIGN QUALIFICATION
TESTING
• all electronics underwent at least four thermal cycles at
temperature levels 10 C in excess of predicted operating
extremes
• the solar array panels, shunt dissipator assemblies,
antennae, thermal shield, and deployment mechanisms
underwent additional thermal vacuum testing
• the flight observatory was subjected to eight thermal vacuum
soaks (4 hot/4 cold)
rac-6
THERMAL SUBSYSTEM
ON-ORBIT PERFORMANCE
• no violations of qual temperature limits have been seen to
date and none are expected during a nominal mission
• one non-critical temperature sensor was lost on the thermal
shield during deployment, possibly due to pyro shock
• temperature readings for most spacecraft components are
within 2-3 C of BOL predicts, due to the degradation of
thermal control coatings, temperatures next winter will be
somewhat higher.
• initial cooldown of dewar mainshell was more rapid than
expected due to specularity of thermal shield
• thermal shield is performing better than expected with
very stable inner surface temperatures of 180 K or lower
(spec is 220 K)
rac-7
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THERMAL SUBSYSTEM
ON-ORBIT PERFORMANCE
FLIGHT TEMPERATURES VS. QUALIFICATION LIMITS
SUBSYSTEM COMPONENT
TEMPERATURE (C)
1ST HOT SEASON QUAL LIMITS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
CiDH
CiDH
CiDH
CiDH
CiDH
CiDH
CiDH
CiDH
CiDH
CiDH
CiDH
CiDH
CiDH
CiDH
CiDH -
CiDH
COMM
COMM
COMM
COMM
COMM
COMM
COMM
DEWAR
DEWAR
ACS Power Supplies
Attitude Control Electronics
Digital Sun Sensors
Earth Scanner Electronics
Earth Scanners (avg of 2 thermistors)
Magnetometer Electronics
MMA Switching Unit
Momentum Management Assembly
Momentum Wheel Assembly 1
Momentum Wheel Assembly 2
MWEA 1
MWEA 2
MWEA Relay Unit
Reaction Wheel Drive Electronics
Reaction wheels
RMAs (gyros)
Sun Presence Sensors (+X)
Sun Presence Sensors (-X)
Sun Sensor Electronics
Three-Axis Magnetometers
Torquer Bars
Central Command Unit 1
Central Command Unit 2
Central Telemetry Unit 1
Central Telemetry Unit 2
Instrument Command Unit 1
Instrument Command Unit 2
Instrument Telemetry Unit 1
Instrument Telemetry Unit 2
Spacecraft Command Unit 1
Spacecraft Command Unit 2
Spacecraft Telemetry Unit 1
Spacecraft Telemetry Unit 2
Stable Oscillator 1
Stable Oscillator 2
Tape Recorder 1
Tape Recorder 2
Band Reject Filter
Diplexers
Navigation Oscillator (USO)
OMNI Antenna (TDRSS/GSTDN)
RF Transfer Switches
Transponder 1
Transponder 2
Dewar Mainshell
Valve Drive Electro.nics
20
17
32
21
36
19
17
21
21
16
20
21
17
23
23
21
31
(-20)
18
22
25
18
16
19
16
17
19
18
19
21
15
18
17
18
18 .
16
18
(20)
20
19
35.
(20)
21
23
-138
8
-10
-10
-30
-25
-25
-25
-10
-10
-10
-15
-10
-10
-10
-10
-10
-10
-50
-50
-20
-25
-10
-15
-15
-15
-15
-15
-15
-15
-15
-15
-15
-15
-15
-15
-15
-10
-10
-10
-20
-20
-50
-20
-10
-10
-138
-25
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
_to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
50
50
60
50
50
65
50
50
43
43
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
60
65
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
45
45
55
60
55
80
60
55
55
25
50
() temperature inferred using correlated thermal math model
THERMAL SUBSYSTEM
ON-ORBIT PERFORMANCE
FLIGHT TEMPERATURES VS. QUALIFICATION LIMITS
(continued)
TEMPERATURE (C)
SUBSYSTEM COMPONENT 1ST HOT SEASON QUAL LIMITS
DIRBE DIRBE Analog Unit 24 -10 to 50
DIRBE DIRBE Digital Unit 17 -10 to 50
DIRBE DIRBE IPDU 20 -10 to 50
DIRBE DIRBE Preamp 23 -20 to 50
DMR Data Electronics Units 25 0 to 50
DMR DMR IPDU 1 20 -10 to 50
DMR DMR IPDU 2 19 -10 to 50
ELECT Signal Conditioning Unit 17 -10 to 50
FIRAS FIRAS Fiberoptics Preamp 12 -20 to 30
FIRAS FIRAS IPDU 26 -10 to 50
FIRAS FIRAS Main Electronics Unit 21 -10 to 50
FIRAS FIRAS Preamplifier 21 -10 to 50
FIRAS MTM Electronics Unit 18 -10 to 40
POWER 20 AH Batteries 15 -10 to 25
POWER Power Supply Electronics 21 -25 to 50
POWER Shunt Dissipator Panels 135 (hottest) -60 to 160
POWER Solar Array Panels 30 (hottest) -65 to 50
THERMAL Thermal/RF Shield Interior Blankets -100 <-50 (220 K)
() temperature inferred using correlated thermal math model
rac-9
THERMAL SUBSYSTEM
ON-ORBIT PERFORMANCE
COOLDOUIN DF COBE DEUIflR MfllNSHELL RND EJECTRBLE COUER
(FROM FLIGHT DRTfl)
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THERMAL SUBSYSTEM
ON-ORBIT PERFORMANCE
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THERMAL SUBSYSTEM
ON-ORBIT PERFORMANCE
MAXIMUM/MINIMUM EXPECTED FLIGHT TEMPERATURES
(not correlated with flight data)
SUBSYSTEM COMPONENT
TEMPERATURES (C).
FULL SUN SHADOW QUAL LIMITS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
ACS
C&DH
CSDH
C&DH
CSDH
C&DH
CSDH
C&DH
C&DH
C&DH
C&DH
C&DH
C&DH
C&DH
C&DH
C&DH
C&DH
COMM
COMM
COMM
COMM
COMM
COMM
COMM
DEWAR
DEWAR
ACS Power Supplies
Attitude Control Electronics
Digital Sun Sensors
Earth Scanner Electronics
Earth Scanners
Magnetometer Electronics
MMA Switching Unit
Momentum Management Assembly
Momentum Wheel Assembly i
Momentum Wheel Assembly 2
MWEA 1
MWEA 2
MWEA Relay Unit
Reaction Wheel Drive Electronics
Reaction Wheels
RMAs (gyros)
Sun Presence Sensors (+X)
Sun Presence Sensors (-X)
Sun Sensor Electronics
Three-Axis Magnetometers
Torguer Bars
Central Command Unit 1
Central Command Unit 2
Central Telemetry Unit 1
Central Telemetry Unit 2
Instrument Command Unit 1
Instrument Command Unit 2
Instrument Telemetry Unit 1
Instrument Telemetry Unit 2
Spacecraft Command Unit 1
Spacecraft Command Unit 2
Spacecraft Telemetry Unit 1
Spacecraft Telemetry Unit 2
Stable Oscillator 1
Stable Oscillator 2
Tape Recorder 1
Tape Recorder 2
Band Reject Filter
Diplexers
Navigation Oscillator (USO)
OMNI Antenna (TDRSS/GSTDN)
RF Transfer Switches
Transponder 1
Transponder 2
Dewar Mainshell
' Valve Drive Electronics
26
22
18
31
25
23
21
28
25
20
23
27
21
29
27
27
17
-13(4)
21
35(8)
24
26
21
27
21
22
22
26
24
24
24
28
22
30
25
20
26
22
25
25
46
21
28
34
-132
6
2
2(10)
-18
9
-5(5)
2
3
6
5
-2
2
7
3
7
5
5
-4
-40(4)
0
8(8)
1
5
3
6
1
1(10)
1
5
4
4
3
9
2
11
2
1
4
-1
-1
4
-22
-2
6
5
-120
-9(5)
-10 to 50
-10 to 50
-30 to 60
-25 to 50
-25 to 50
-25 to 65
-10 to 50
-10 to 50
-10 to 43
-15 to 43
-10 to 50
-10 to SO
-10 to 50
-10 to 50
-10 to 50
-10 to 50
-50 to 50
-50 to 50
-20 to 60
-25 to 65
-10 to 50
-15 to 50
-15 to 50
-15 to 50
-15 to 50
-15 to 50
-15 to 50
-15 to 50
-15 to SO
-15 to 50
-15 to 50
-15 to 50
-15 to 50
-15 to 50
-15 to 50
-10 to 45
-10 to 45
-10 to 55
-20 to 60
-20 to 55
-35 to 65
-20 to 60
-10 to 55
-10 to 55
-138 to 25
-25 to 50
() assumed heater power in Watts
THERMAL SUBSYSTEM
ON-ORBIT PERFORMANCE
MAXIMUM/MINIMUM EXPECTED FLIGHT TEMPERATURES
(continued)
SUBSYSTEM COMPONENT
TEMPERATURES (C)
FULL SUN SHADOW QUAL LIMITS
DIRBE
DIRBE
DIRBE
DIRBE
DMR
DMR
DMR
ELECT
FIRAS
FIRAS
FIRAS
FIRAS
FIRAS
POWER
POWER
POWER
POWER
THERMAL
DIRBE Analog Unit
DIRBE Digital Unit
DIRBE IPDU
DIRBE Prearap
Data Electronics Units
DMR IPDU 1
DMR IPDU 2
Signal Conditioning Unit
FIRAS Fiberoptics Prcamp
FIRAS IPDU
FIRAS Main Electronics Unit
FIRAS Preamplifier
MTM Electronics Unit
20 AH Batteries
Power Supply Electronics
Shunt Dissipator Panels
Solar Array Panels
Thermal/RF Shield Interior Blankets
23
20
27
16
25
27
23
24
22(2)
27
28
22
25
18
25
143
35
-50
3(4)
1(10)
7
4 .
25
5
2(4)
4
17(4)
5
8
7
20(52)
-2
5
-45
-50
-70
-10
-10
-10
-20
0
-10
-10
-10
-20
-10
-10
-10
-10
-10
-25
-60
-65
<-50
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
30
50
50
50
40
25
50
160
50
(220 K)
() assumed heater power in Watts
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THERMAL SUBSYSTEM
TRADE-OFFS
• weight constraints (20 mil honeycomb facesheets, placement
of components primarily determined by harness weight
considerations)
• power limitations would not permit a design that required
a large amount of power during the shadow season; this
constraint forced a great deal of analytical 'fine-tuning'
to optimize the exterior coating design.
• active temperature control for magnetometers was ruled out
due to incompatibility with thermostats (steel); this
constraint, aggravated by schedule pressures, resulted
in a thermal design that is not fully redundant.
rac-14
THERMAL SUBSYSTEM
TRADE-OFFS
• concerns over electrostatic discharge problems originally
impacted choice of exterior thermal control materials; this
constraint was partially removed as a result of overriding
concerns (thermal inputs to FIRAS external calibrator), it
would be interesting to determine whether or not any on-
orbit discharge events can be detected during the shadow
season.
• high cost and complexity led to a decision not to fully
simulate environmental heat inputs on the thermal shield
during observatory TV/TB testing, test results were
adjusted using analytical models to compensate for the
missing heat inputs.
rac-15
THERMAL SUBSYSTEM
TRADE-OFFS
• performing thermal analysis of the instrument module was
accomplished using programs that do not account for specular
reflections, the actual couplings to space are higher than
these programs predicted, but a program to correctly model
specular surfaces was not available, as a result, the dewar
mainshell and thermal shield temperatures are colder than
predicted.
• choice of thermal control coatings greatly limited by non-
thermal issues such as contamination (shedding), adhesion
problems, and electrostatic charging concerns.
• long procurement lead-times for flight quality heaters and
thermostats made it necessary to use COBE/STS hardware, in
order to achieve the necessary power levels, several heater
circuits were constructed by combining the elements into
series and parallel arrangements.
rac-16
THERMAL SUBSYSTEM
TECHNICAL CHALLENGES
• determination of incident and absorbed environmental fluxes
was a difficult and unwieldy process due to COBE's unusual
mission orbit attitude
• thermal analysis of cryogenic instruments never before
performed by Code 732
• specular analyses performed to determine reflections of
solar array panels onto cowling
• large temperature differences between spacecraft and
instrument module components required careful modeling of
cabling and other frequently-ignored heat paths
rac-17
THERMAL SUBSYSTEM
PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED DURING I&T
presence of thermostats made it very difficult to check
proper operation of heater circuits
accurate calibration of PRTs not possible due to inadequate
characterization of SOU sensor conditioning circuitry
late discovery of heat inputs to FIRAS external calibrator
from thermal shield and DMR heads led to major rework;
these inputs should have been considered much earlier
last-minute design and installation of earth scanner RFI
shields precluded thorough analysis, in addition, the
flight RFI shields were irridited instead of being left
bare, combined, these two factors are largely responsible
for warmer-than-expected earth scanner temperatures.
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THERMAL SUBSYSTEM
LESSONS LEARNED
• confusion appeared to exist for a prolonged period regarding
the definition of design, qual, and operating temperatures.
as a consequence, some contractor-furnished components were
designed and tested to the operating limits.
• present in-house capabilities to analyze specular surfaces
are extremely limited
• thermal design of cryogenic instruments requires careful
attention to every detail
• thermal analyses of contractor-supplied boxes were
frequently inadequate, in retrospect, it would have been
preferable to make the thermal analysis deliverable to
Goddard at the time of each component's CDR and to make
review and acceptance of the analysis by Code 732 one of the
CDR action items.
rac-19
THERMAL SUBSYSTEM
LESSONS LEARNED
the power dissipations of several components were not
measured until observatory-level thermal vacuum testing, it
is recommended that a requirement to measure power
dissipation be included in all box-level acceptance test
procedures.
the dewar ejectable cover and clamp band should have been
more heavily instrumented with thermocouples during the
observatory TV/TB test, this information would have been
helpful in assessing the flight data prior to cover
deployment.
a method for easily verifing the operation of heater
circuits should have been developed prior to TV/TB testing.
rac-20
COBE POWER SUBSYSTEM
POWER SUBSYSTEM TEAM
Joel Jermakian - Subsystem Engineer, Solar Array Engineer
Dominic Manzer - Electronics Engineer & much more
Sid Tiller - Battery Manager
Dave Sullivan - Battery Test Engineer
Nick Mejia - Solar Array Technician
COBE POWER SUBSYSTEM
SYSTEM OVERVIEW:
Specification Requirements:
Direct Energy Transfer (DET) System:
• 3 Deployable Solar Array wings, each consisting of 3 panels having solar cell on both sides.
• 2 NiCd Modified NASA Standard 20 Amp-Hour Batteries (18 instead of 22 cells each)
• Power Supply Electronics which provides power management, bus regulation, and
primary power distribution functions.
• Shunt Dissipator Panels.
System Load Capability:
100% Sun 920 W (EOL)
Max Eclipse 712 W (EOL)
Pre-Array Deployment 400 W (BOL)
COBE POWER SUBSYSTEM
SHUNT DISSIPATORS:
Description:
• 6 Aluminum panels, with Kapton film heaters bonded on exterior surface.
• Shunt elements use cancellation to approach zero net dipole magnetic moment.
• Large weight savings versus STS shunts.
Performance:
• No shunt failures detected at present.
• Shunt temperatures at or below thermal predictions (max. recorded shunt
temperature 130°C).
COBE POWER SUBSYSTEM
SOLAE ARRAY:
Specification Requirements:
Performance:
• Support 1-year mission life.
• 1000 W, End Of Life, Summer Solstice, spin average array output at 28.5 volts.
• Meet magnetic cleanliness requirements of ACS and instruments.
Derived and Other:
• Utilize remaining STS COBE solar cells (-11000 cells or 53% of total cells in array).
• Move array blocking diodes from box internal to spacecraft onto the array.
• No single point failure to impact mission.
• Compatible with impact of changing to deployable system.
COBE POWER SUBSYSTEM
SOLAR ARRAY cont'd:
COBE SOLRR RRRRY NING
OUTER - TYPE R
Per Side:
17 - 2 x 6 cm StrIngs
72 CeI Is Per Str ing
1224 2 x 6 Gel Is
Panel Weight Without
Substrate: 15.7 Ibs.
Pane 1 Size:
40.2 x 68.0 In.
MIDDLE - TYPE R
Per Side:
17 - 2 x 6 cm Strings
72 CeI Is Per Str ing
1224 2 x 6 Ce) Is
Panel Weight Without
Substrate: 15.7 Ibs.
Pane I Size:
40.2 x 68.0 In.
INNER - TYPE B
Per Side:
1 4 - 2 x 6 cm StrIngs
1 - 2 x 4 c m S t rIng
72 Co 1 Is Per Str i ng
1008 2 x 6 C e l I s
72 2 x 4 C e l l s
Pane I We i ght Wlthout
Substrate: 16.3 Ibs.
Pane 1 Size:
35 .5 x 68.0 In.
flNTIMFlGNETIC
COMPEN5MTION
HSSEMBLY
COBE POWER SUBSYSTEM
SOLAK ARRAY cont'd:
Trade-offs required during development:
Magnetic Compensation
• STS solar array incorporated anti-magnetic returns for all strings directly underneath
cells. Analysis showed that in new array this heavy, costly and time consuming
compensation was only needed on inboard panels. Other panels' magnetic
characteristics were improved by optimizing layout.
Bypass Diodes:
• New array experiences extensive shadowing of strings. A shadow study of entire array
showed that with proper layout most strings could avoid shadow situations which require
bypass diodes. This saved weight, cost, and schedule and increased array output.
Position Telemetry
• In order to determine possible corrective action a lockout indicator was required on the
array hingelines. Historically, a microswitch has been used. A simple circuit was
designed which using only a passive analog channel reads out position of the array as
well as giving a positive lockout indication.
COBE POWER SUBSYSTEM
SOLAR ARRAY cont'd:
Significant Problems During I & T:
Handling:
• Due to time, area, weight, (inexperience?) little attention was given to handling of panels
and array system during design phase. Even though spacecraft technicians (mechanical
and electrical) did a super job some damage to array occurred and had to be repaired.
• Array inter-panel harness was essentially built in-place and installed with great
difficulty while deployed array was on spacecraft.
• Facility at VAFB should be carefully examined prior to next Goddard launch from there.
Significant hardware risks could be removed if minor measures are taken, eg. all cranes
work, access to S/C labs are improved (other than outside or through
computer/operations room.
Waivers/Deviations:
• Laydown of one portion of one panel was reversed by Solarex due to operator error. No
impact to mission.
COBE POWER SUBSYSTEM
SOLAR ARRAY cont'd:
On-orbit Performance:
Electrical:
• Array exceeds original predicts by 7%, latest prelaunch estimates by 2%.
• Current variation due to spacecraft rotation and roll angle is identical to analytical
model.
• No anomalous degradation in performance.
• South Pole has a high albedo.
Other:
• One microswitch did not trip to indicate a locked out hinge. Fortunately, we know the
position of the panel to be 100% deployed.
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COBE POWER SUBSYSTEM
SOLAR ARRAY cont'd:
Things To Do Differently Next Time:
• Use a full scale mockup for harness build.
• Give more attention to handling and integration of panels.
COBE Power System Electronics (PSE)
Requirements:
Bus Voltage
Output Power
Output Ripple
Output Impedance
Bus Voltage Transient
Fault Protection
BusUV
NEBus OC
Battery UV
Pyro Bus
Instrumentation
+28 Volts DC +-2%
700 Watts, Orbital Average @ 500 Km
200 Millivolts P-P, 1 KHz to 100 KHz
500 Millivolts P-P in Dead Band
0.01 Ohm 1 Hz to 1 KHz, increasing to 0.1 Ohm at 10 KHz, 0.1 to 100 KHz
26.88 Volts for less than 0.5 mS
Nonessential load removal should fault be detected
Detectors disabled via Ground Command
Trip point; 26.3 Volts, Time Constant 20 mS
Trip point; 40 Amps, Time Delay 100 mS
Trip Point; Half Bat. 9.0 Volts, Time Delay 100 mS
+22 +-5 volts, 40 Amp
Bus and Battery voltages, PSE and Bat. temp.
Bus, S.A., Bat., and Shunt Currents
Ampere-Hour Integrator Output
DM1
COBE POWER SUBSYSTEM BLOCK DIAGRAM
DM 2
COBE Power System Electronics (PSE)
Tradeoffs:
(1) Shunt Capacity
Requirements change: Out put from S.A. increased from 36 Amps to 45 Amps Peak..
Constraints: 2% Bus regulation, stability, number of shunt driver stages,
thermal dissipation limits of shunt transistors
Solution: Change operating mode of 6 drivers from linear to non-linear
(2) Power Distribution Fusing
Power distribution PC Board connected redundant fusses to all parallel wires causing
conflict between wire derating and fuse derating.
(3) Battery Safety
Used additional Fusing to control electrical hazards caused by requiring test batteries
to be on spacecraft for Integration testing.
DM3
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COBE Power System Electronics (PSE)
Problems during I &T
(1) Finding Equipment - Solution would be to have a full time person to control equipment,
review equipment required in work orders and kit it prior to need.
(2) Battery maintenance, GSE and cabling.
(3) Integration schedule required components be integrated before the components were completed.
Simulators for the PSE and the Shunt assembly allowed good work arounds.
(4) Calibration of spacecraft EGSE voltage and temperature monitors.
Waivers/Deviations
Battery A Ampere Hour Integrator state of charge readout failed during I &T.
On Orbit performance:
Performance within specification and expectations for all PSE parameters. The following features
have been verified; Bus voltage regulation, +-2%, Boost mode, charge mode shunt mode, AHI
and VT battery charge control, 500 mV ripple, Thermal predicts for 100% Sun.
10 to 15% Power increase at South Pole.
DM6
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COBE Power System Electronics (PSE)
What would I do Differently?
(1) Battery Safety Safe the battery power leads.
Have safing of signal leads integral to battery design.
Reduce the need for cables to Battery EGSE.
(2) Battery mechanical and thermal design.
(3) Shunt Blankets
(4) Additional Shunting Capacity
(5) Eliminate current measuring shunts as a Single Point Failure
(6) Improve power distribution assembly to include:
One fuse per wire
Switching of loads
Final filter for each load
37 pin connectors
DM9
COBE Power System Electronics (PSE)
Lessons Learned:
(1) EGSE must be reliable and include strip-chart recorders.
(2)CloseoutofMR's.
(3) Improve ability to do battery maintenance without exclusive use of Spacecraft.
DM10
COBE BATTERY
ON-ORBIT ENGINEERING PERFORMANCE
MARCH 1990
SMITH TILLER
Code 711.2
SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
- Temperature Range: -5 To +25 Degrees Centigrade
- Output Voltage Range: 18 To 27 Volts
- Output Current (Eclipse): 20 Amperes/Battery
- Peak Current Capability: 60 Amps For 5 Minutes
- Mission Life (2 Eclipse Seasons/Year): 1 Year Design
Requirement
2 Year Design
Goal
SUBSYSTEM OVERVIEW
- Battery Photo • Figure 1
- Battery Mechanical Structural Design - Figure 2
- Battery Signal Fuse Assembly Photo-Figure 3
- Cell Voltage Fuse Assembly Photo - Figure 4
TRADEOFFS REQUIRED DURING DEVELOPMENT
- Standard 20 Ampere-Hour Battery Redesigned For
Smaller Capacity And Fewer Cells to Reduce Weight
For Delta Configuration
FIGURE 1
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COBE BATTERY FUSE ASSEMBLY (J3)
SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS/ANOMALIES DURING I&T
- GSE Test Connector Connected To Spacecraft Bottom
Deck Damaged While Battery Charging During Other
I&T Activities in SES Chamber
- Battery Cells Manufactured with 2536 Separator
Material Have Slightly Higher Terminal Voltages Than
Previously Experienced
- Many WTR Facilitie's AC Power Wired Incorrectly
Caused Damage To GSE And Test Delays
WAIVERS/DEVIATIONS
- Replaced Suspect 2505 Cell Separator Material In
Battery Cells With 2536 Separator Material During
Manufacture.
- Added 3 Wires To Battery Positive and Negative
Terminals To Support Termination Points on COBE
Power System Electronics
- Implemented V-Notch To Maintain Battery Vibration
Level at ± 32db Flight Specification During
Acceptance at Manufacturer's Facilities
- Accepted Batteries With Cracked (Cosmetic) Thermal
Fins Following Manufacturer's Vibration Test
- Added In-Line Fuse Assemblies Between Battery and
Spacecraft Harness To Prevent Possible Spacecraft
Damage Due To Harness Shorts.
- Normal Manufacturing Procedures Had To Be Modified
To Avoid To Avoid Contamination Of Spacecraft By
Use Of Thermal Grease During Test And Evaluation
ON-ORBIT PERFORMANCE VS SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
- Battery Trickle Charge Performance Excellent:
DATA ON-ORBIT SPECIFIC
REQUIREMENTS
Cell Voltage 1.43V ±10% 1.43V ±10%
Half Batt. VJDelta 0.000V To 0.007V -0.5V To 0.5V
Batt. Temp. 12 To 15 Deg. C. 0 To 20 Deg. C.
- Battery Life Is Currently Expected To Be 3 Years Or
More Due To The excellent Performance Observed
Since Launch And Lower Mission Loads Than Initially
Predicted
- Spacecraft Thermal-Vac Battery Data Shows Slightly
Higher Cell Voltage Than Former Aerospace Batteries
- Anticipate Use Of Slightly HighVoltage/Temperature
(VT) Levels During Battery Recharge In Orbit
- Critical Battery Performance Data Will Be Available
After First Spacecraft Eclipse Season
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THINGS I WOULD DO DIFFERENTLY
- Suggest That Battery Turn-On Connectors On
Spacecraft Bottom Deck Be Mounted
Perpendicular To Spacecraft Thrust Axis To
Facilitate Easy Access
- Suggest That Battery Turn-On Connectors On
Spacecraft Bottom Deck Be Adequately Spaced To
Allow Easy Access
- Suggest That All Battery Turn-On Connectors On
Spacecraft Bottom Deck Be Scoop Proof
- Suggest Access Port To Battery Fuse Assemblies For
Replacement If Necessary To Prevent Launch Delays
- Add Additional Wires To Battery Positive And
Negative Terminals In the Cell Voltage Connector To
Facilitate Battery Conditioning With The Battery
Power And Signal Turn-On Connectors Installed In
Flight Configuration
LESSONS LEARNED
- Newly Designed Battery GSE Failsafe Systems Proven
Effective During Several I&T Mishaps
- Use Of Non-Flight Batteries During Portions Of I&T
Provided Experience Necessary For Launch Support
Activities
- Fully Trained Battery Personnel Must Be Present For
All Flight Battery Operations
- Always Coordinate Subsystem Activities With The
Spacecraft Structural Engineering Group, Quality
Assurance, Contamination Control Etc. To Prevent
Operational Impacts
- Personally Check AC Power In Test Facilities With A
Meter For Correct Voltages And Phasing
- Ascertain That AC Power Provided For GSE Is
Independent and Not Shared By Other Users
10
COMMAND AND DATA HANDLING,
TAPE RECORDERS AND
SIGNAL CONDITIONING UNIT
COBE LESSONS LEARNED
MARK FLANEGAN/CODE 735
MARCH 1990
MCF-1
COBE C&DH AND TAi E RECORDERS
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COMMAND AND DATA HANDLING TRANSPONDERS
MCF-2
SIGNAL CONDITIONING UNIT (SCU) FUNCTIONS
AUTOMATIC DEWAR VENT VALVE OPERATION DURING ASCENT.
SEQUENCER FUNCTION INITIATED BY DELTA COMMAND:
POWER TRANSMITTER *1
DEPLOY THERMAL SHIELD
POWER MOMENTUM WHEELS
DEPLOY SOLAR ARRAYS
DEPLOY ANTENNA BOOM
POWER REACTION WHEELS
PRT AND GRT TELEMETRY CONDITIONED AND SENT TO C&DH.
MCF-3
C&DH
COMMAND UNITS RELAY
CHANGEOUT
BACKGROUND:
C&DH SYSTEM SWITCHES POWER TO SUBSYSTEMS THROUGH
THE USE OF RELAYS WITHIN THE C&DH BOXES.
PROBLEM:
ISOLATION FAILURE DURING ACCEPTANCE TESTING AT
CONTRACTOR. TRACED TO SHORT WITHIN POWER SWITCHING
RELAYS.
CAUSE:
USE OF SHARP TOOLS TO INSERT WIRES IN RELAYS PINCHED
WIRES WITHIN RELAYS CAUSING SHORT TO CASE.
SOLUTION/LESSON:
NASA PERSONNEL SUPERVISED PRODUCTION OF NEW RELAYS.
ALL POWER SWITCHING RELAYS IN C&DH WERE REPLACED.
SIMPLE WORKMANSHIP PROBLEMS CAN HAVE MAJOR
CONSEQUENCES.
MCF-4
C&DH
COMMAND FAILURE IN
SPACECRAFT COMMAND UNIT
BACKGROUND:
FIRING A COMMAND ON COBE CAUSES A ROW AND A COLUMN DRIVER
TO FIRE IN THE C&DH. WHERE THEY MEET IS THE COMMAND THAT IS
SENT OUT.
PROBLEM:
ONE COMMAND WAS SENT, TWO RECEIVED IN REDUNDANT SPACECRAFT
COMMAND UNIT.
CAUSE:
STRAND OF WIRE ON BOARD UNDER CONFORMAL COATING CAUSED HIGH
IMPEDANCE SHORT WHICH BRIDGED A COLUMN AND CAUSED TWO
COMMANDS TO BE ACTIVATED. THIS WIRE WAS THERE FOR ABOUT TWO
YEARS (8 THERMAL VACUUM CYCLES) BEFORE CAUSING A PROBLEM.
SOLUTION/LESSON:
REMOVE THE WIRE.
CONTAMINATION CONTROL MUST BE CAREFULLY MAINTAINED
THROUGHOUT PRODUCTION/TEST. CONTAMINANTS CAN MOVE IN
CONFORMAL COATING CAUSING A PROBLEM LATER.
MCF-5
C&DH
COMMAND UNIT
PULL UP RESISTOR CHANGE
BACKGROUND:
SERIAL DIGITAL AND LOW LEVEL LOGIC COMMANDS FROM THE C&DH
USE OPEN COLLECTOR DEVICES WHICH ARE PULLED UP AT THE USER
END OF THE WIRE.
PROBLEM:
SERIAL DIGITAL COMMAND TO THE C&DH DID NOT OPERATE
RELIABLY. SIGNAL RISE TIMES WERE TOO SLOW.
CAUSE:
MILLER EFFECT IN DRIVING TRANSISTORS.
RESISTORS TO MINIMIZE THIS EFFECT HAD BEEN REMOVED TO
PREVENT A TRANSISTOR FAILURE FROM PROPAGATING TO THE
OTHER TRANSISTORS. PULL UP RESISTOR (10 K) WAS TOO LARGE
WITH THIS EFFECT TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.
SOLUTION/LESSON:
REPLACE 10 K RESISTORS USED IN C&DH WITH 1 K OHM. REVIEWED
OTHER USERS INTERFACES AND DECIDED THAT THEY HAD ENOUGH
MARGIN TO OPERATE RELIABLY.
GIVE CAREFUL THOUGHT TO THE TOTAL CAPACITANCE OF SYSTEM
BEFORE CHOOSING PULL-UPS.
MCF-6
C&DH
TELEMETRY UNIT PULL-UP
RESISTOR CHANGE
BACKGROUND:
CAPACITANCE IN THE HARNESS HAD BEEN A CONCERN VERY EARLY
IN THE DESIGN OF THE C&DH.
PROBLEM:
ANALYSIS INDICATED THAT SOME C&DH TELEMETRY POINTS
WOULD NOT BE SAMPLED CORRECTLY.
CAUSE: ' ,
CAPACITANCE MEASUREMENTS OF THE HARNESS SHOWED MUCH
HIGHER VALUES THAN HAD BEEN ESTIMATED BEFORE HARNESS
CONSTRUCTION (50 PF/FOOT).
SOLUTION/LESSON:
REDUCE VALUE OF PULL-UP RESISTORS IN TELEMETRY UNITS TO
GIVE MORE MARGIN.
GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE HARNESS CAPACITANCE
BEFORE PICKING PULL-UP RESISTORS. THE ESTIMATES MADE
BEFORE HARNESS CONSTRUCTION WERE ABOUT HALF OF WHAT
WAS EVENTUALLY MEASURED.
MCF-7
C&DH
TELEMETRY SYSTEM
CROSS-STRAPPING PROBLEM
BACKGROUND:
CROSS-STRAPPING OF USERS SIGNALS WAS ADDED TO THE C&DH
AFTER ITS INITIAL DESIGN. SIGNALS ARE WIRE-ORED IN THE C&DH.
PROBLEM:
BILEVEL TELEMETRY BITS STARTING DROPPING OUT AFTER
REDUNDANT C&DH I&T BEGAN. THE UNPOWERED C&DH SIDE WAS
LOADING DOWN THE POWERED SIDE.
CAUSE:
THE MULTIPLEXERS USED TO SWITCH THE SIGNALS IN THE C&DH
EXHIBITED A LOW INPUT IMPEDANCE (ABOUT 100 K OHMS)
INTERMITTANTLY WHEN UNPOWERED. TH£,f1ANUFACTURER DID NOT
SPEC THE UNPOWERED INPUT IMPEDANCE OF THE DEVICE. A MISTAKE
WAS MADE IN USING THE SPEC FOR A POWERED DEVICE WHEN
DESIGNING THIS CIRCUIT.
SOLUTION/LESSON:
CROSS STRAP THE MULTIPLEXER SUPPLIES BETWEEN TELEMETRY
UNITS SO THAT WHEN ONE UNIT IS ON, THE MULTIPLEXERS IN BOTH
UNITS ARE ON. THIS PUTS US IN THE SPEC CONDITIONS FOR THE
MULTIPLEXERS.
PAY ATTENTION TO THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH A DEVICE IS
SPECIFIED. BE CAREFUL OF UNPOWERED CONDITIONS.
MCF-8
C&DH
INSTRUMENT REMOTE
TELEMETRY UNIT FAILURE
BACKGROUND:
THE INSTRUMENT REMOTE IS THE PATH FOR ALL INSTRUMENT
TELEMETRY ON COBE.
PROBLEM:
LOADING DOWN OF PRIME INSTRUMENT TELEMETRY UNIT SIGNALS
DURING FUNCTIONAL TEST AT LAUNCH SITE.
CAUSE:
METALLIC CONTAMINATION ON BOARD BRIDGED TWO LINES CAUSING
A MULTIPLEXER IN THE UNIT TO SELECT MORE THAN ONE LINE AT A
TIME. CONTAMINATION APPEARED TO BE MACHINE SHOP SHAVING.
SOLUTION/LESSON:
REMOVE THE CONTAMINATION.
CONTAMINATION MUST BE ADDRESSED THROUGHOUT THE
PRODUCTION/TEST PROCESS. CONFORMAL COATING WILL NOT HOLD
CONTAMINANTS IN PLACE.
MCF-9
TAPE RECORDER
RECORD MODE PROBLEM
BACKGROUND:
THERE ARE TWO TAPE RECORDERS ON COBE. EACH IS COMPOSED OF A
TRANSPORT AND AN ELECTRONICS UNIT.
PROBLEM:
TAPE RECORDER *1 WOULD NOT GO INTO RECORD MODE FROM
STANDBY MODE DURING SPACECRAFT THERMAL VACUUM TESTING. IT
WOULD GO INTO PLAYBACK, FAST FORWARD AND FAST REVERSE.
CAUSE:
VOLTAGE DIP APPEARS ON FIVE VOLT LINE FROM CONVERTER WHEN
MODE CHANGE IS COMMANDED. DIP IS LARGER FOR SMALLER CURRENT
DRAWS. OVER TIME, AS THE UNIT IS WORKED IN, IT DRAWS LESS
CURRENT. EVENTUALLY IT REACHED A LEVEL WHERE THE DIP ON THE
FIVE VOLT LINE WAS ENOUGH TO CAUSE THE RESET CIRCUIT TO
ACTIVATE. RESET (ACTIVE LOW) PUTS THE TAPE RECORDER IN
STANDBY. OTHER MODES DRAW MORE CURRENT.
SOLUTION/LESSON:
CAPACITOR WAS ADDED TO RESET CIRCUIT TO FILTER OUT VOLTAGE
DIP. REWORK WAS PERFORMED ON BOTH UNITS.
TEST DEVICES EXTENSIVELY IN MISSION MODES IN MISSION
CONFIGURATION. MCF-10
C&DH
CLOCK NOISE
BACKGROUND:
THE C&DH PROVIDES TELEMETRY CLOCKS TO THE OTHER
SUBSYSTEMS ON COBE.
PROBLEM:
NOISE ON CLOCK LINES WAS SEVERE.
CAUSE:
IMPEDANCE MISMATCHING OF DRIVER TO LINE.
SOLUTION/LESSON:
ADD 27 OHM RESISTORS TO DRIVER (C&DH) END TO MATCH LINES
BETTER. WORKED VERY WELL.
PAY ATTENTION TO TRANMISSION LINE CONSIDERATIONS DURING
DESIGN.
MCF-11
C&DH
FREQUENCY STANDARD
OUTPUT AMPLITUDE
BACKGROUND:
THE FREQUENCY STANDARDS ON COBE PROVIDE THE 4 MHz SIGNAL
WHICH IS USED FOR ALL SPACECRAFT TELEMETRY TIME (INCLUDING
THE PB5 CLOCK).
PROBLEM:
FS *2 OUPUT AMPLITUDE OF THE 4 MHz SIGNAL WAS LOW. THE
TELEMETRY SYSTEM STILL WORKED BUT WITH LITTLE MARGIN.
CAUSE:
MICA CAPACITOR FAILED OPEN IN UNIT.
SOLUTION/LESSON:
REPLACED ALL MICA CAPACITORS IN BOTH FREQUENCY STANDARDS
WITH CERAMIC CAPACITORS. REPLACED MICA CAPACITORS IN
CENTRAL COMMAND UNITS WHEN OPPURTUNITY PRESENTED ITSELF.
PARTS BRANCH PREFERS CERAMIC CAPACITORS TO MICA'S.
MCF-12
C&DH
OPEN ITEMS
AT LAUNCH
1. FREQUENCY STANDARD *2 TELEMETRY BIT FOR FREQUENCY ADJUST RELAY *2
STUCK AT ZERO ON FIRST TRY DURING DELTA I&T.
(5/ 12/88; WOA D-046-03; MR 296)
TESTED MANY TIMES SINCE AND PROBLEM NEVER APPEARED AGAIN.
FUNCTION IS NOT CRITICAL IF LOST.
HAVE NOT SEEN PROBLEM IN FLIGHT.
2. TEN HIGH LEVEL PULSE COMMANDS FROM SPACECRAFT COMMAND
UNIT *2 DID NOT WORK WHEN INITIALLY CHECKED.
(6/ 1 /88; WOA D-064-01; MR 297)
COMMANDS:
8 SPARES
BATTERY *2 UNDERVOLTAGE DETECTOR DISABLE
BATTERY * 1 VT CONTROL NORMAL
I&T CREW CHECKED OUT EQUIPMENT AND THEN RETESTED COMMANDS.
THEY WORKED AND HAVE WORKED SINCE.
COMMANDS ARE REDUNDANT.
HAVE NOT SEEN PROBLEM IN FLIGHT.
MCF-13
C&DH
OPEN ITEMS
AT LAUNCH
3. CENTRAL TELEMETRY UNIT *2 PASSIVE ANALOG CHANNELS 28 THROUGH 31
READ LOW IN COUNTS INTERMITTANTLY.
(6/1 1/89; WOA-246-137; MR 3530)
CHANNEL FUNCTION
28 USO FLASK TEMPERATURE
29 SOLAR ARRAY WING B INNER POSITION INIDCATOR
30 STABLE CLOCK *1 FOOTPRINT
31 SOLAR ARRAY WING A INNER POSITION INDICATOR
32 STABLE CLOCK *2 FOOTPRINT
TESTING INDICATES FAILURE IS MOST LIKELY INPUT MULTIPLEXER.
THESE CHANNELS ARE NOT MISSION CRITICAL FAILURE OF INPUT
MULTIPLEXER WOULD NOT EFFECT OTHER TELEMETRY CHANNELS. UNIT
WILL BE USED AS IS.
SAME PROBLEM IS OCCURRING IN FLIGHT. IT IS NOT GETTING ANY WORSE.
MCF-14
scu
OPEN ITEMS
AT LAUNCH
1, SCU HIGH LEVEL COMMAND OUTPUT REGISTERS 1 1.67 V WHEN IT
IT SHOULD REGISTER 0 V. HIGH LEVEL COMMAND IS FOR MOMENTUM
WHEEL *1 DRIVER OFF FROM THE B SIDE.
(12/20/88; WOA D-492-15; MR 3256)
LEAKAGE CURRENT IN OPTO-ISOLATOR OF AROUND 10 MICROAMPS
IS CAUSE OF PROBLEM. THIS IS WITHIN SPECIFICATION FOR PARTS
(UP TO 250 MICROAMPS).
10 MICROAMP CURRENT MUST INCREASE TO 40 MILLAMPS TO CAUSE
MOMENTUM WHEEL TO TURN OFF. TURNING OFF SEQUENCER *2
BYPASS POWER WOULD ELIMINATE PROBLEM IF LEAKAGE GOT TO
40 MILLIAMPS. THIS LEAKAGE DOES NOT EFFECT THE OPERATION
OF MOMENTUM WHEEL *1.
HAVE NOT SEEN PROBLEM IN FLIGHT.
MCF-15
C&DHI&T
FREQUENCY STANDARD
FREQUENCY DROP
BACKGROUND:
FREQUENCY STANDARD FREQUENCY IS 4 MHz. IT IS CHECKED USING A
CESIUM STANDARD TO MILLIHERTZ. THERE ARE ADJUSTMENT RELAYS
TO ADJUST THE FREQUENCY BY ABOUT 1.3 Hz AROUND 4,096,000.000
Hz.
PROBLEM:
FREQUENCY OF FS *1 DROPPED TOO LOW FOR THE ADJUSTMENT TO
BRING IT BACK TO 4 MHz.
CAUSE:
CAUSE WAS TRACED TO ONE BOARD ON THE UNIT. FAILURE ANALYSIS
DETERMINED THAT SOME OF THE CAPACITORS ON THE BOARD HAD
SHIFTED IN VALUE. THIS APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN MISLEADING.
PROBLEM IS OCCURRING IN FLIGHT.
SOLUTION/LESSON:
ALL PARTS ON THE BOARD EXCEPT THE CRYSTAL WERE REPLACED.
THE CRYSTAL HAD TOO LONG A LEAD TIME TO REPLACE.
TREND IMPORTANT TREND PARAMETERS CLOSELY.
MCF-16
C&DH FLIGHT
FREQUENCY STANDARD
FREQUENCY DROP
BACKGROUND:
DROP IN FREQUENCY DURING I&T.
PROBLEM:
FREQUENCY STANDARD *1 IS DROPPING IN FREQUENCY AGAIN.
IF DROP CONTINUES FS *1 WILL FALL OUT OF ITS ADJUSTMENT RANGE IN FEW
MONTHS. THIS MEANS PB5 TIME WILL STEADILY DRIFT AWAY FROM GROUND
TIME.
CAUSE:
UNKNOWN.
SOLUTION:
THREE OPTIONS:
1. LIVE WITH THE DRIFT.
2. ADJUST THE TIME (FAST COUNT) EVERY HOUR OR SO USING COMMAND
MEMORY.
3. SWITCH TO C&DH SIDE *2.
MCF-17
TAPE RECORDER*!
PRESSURE DROP
BACKGROUND:
THE TAPE RECORDER TRANSPORT UNIT IS PRESSURIZED.
PROBLEM:
TR *1'S PRESSURE IS DROPPING AT ABOUT 0.6 PSI A MONTH. THIS
IS MORE THAN EXPECTED. TR*2 IS NOT DROPPING SIGNIFICANTLY.
CAUSE:
UNKNOWN.
SOLUTION:
NONE. THIS IS FASTER THAN EXPECTED BUT WILL NOT CAUSE COBE
A PROBLEM.
MCF-18
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY
1. CONTAMINATION CONTROL IS IMPORTANT DURING PRODUCTION/TEST.
2. CONFORMAL COATING WILL NOT HOLD CONTAMINANTS STATIONARY.
3. BE CAREFUL NOT TO UNDERESTIMATE CAPACITANCE IN SYSTEM WHEN
SIZING PULL-UPS.
4. BE AWARE OF THE CONDITIONS SPECIFICATIONS ARE MADE UNDER.
5. BE AWARE OF TRANSMISSION LINE CONSIDERATIONS WHEN DESIGNING.
6. CERAMIC CAPACITORS ARE PREFERRED OV€R MICA'S.
7. TEST THINGS IN MISSION MODE.
8. DESIGN SYSTEM FOR EASY MATE/DEMATE OF CONNECTORS; ESPECIALLY
THOSE CONNECTORS THAT NEED TO BE ACCESSED OFTEN.
9. DESIGN SEPARATE ARMING CONNECTORS FOR SEPARATE GROUPS OF
PYROS.
10. WRITE PROCEDURES TO AVOID USING LOTS OF BREAK-OUT-BOXES AT
ONCE, IF POSSIBLE.
11. BUILD BTE TO PERFORM TIME INTENSIVE TASKS AUTOMATICALLY.
12. USE CROSS-STRAPPING TO PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY.
MCF-19
